










The Abandonment of Landownership: 
A Proposed Model for Regulated Exit 
By 
Richard Henry Cramer (CRMRIC002) 
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Date of Submission: 16 September 2020
Supervisor: Professor Hanri Mostert, DST/NRF SARChI Research Chair: Mineral Law in Africa, 











The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be
published without full acknowledgement of the source.
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only.
Published by the University f Cape Town (UCT) in terms
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
ii 
In memory of Peter & Barbara Cramer, and Patrick Hayes. 
iii 
Declaration 
1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another’s work and pretend
that it is one’s own.
2. I have used the footnoting convention for citation and referencing. Each
contribution to, and quotation in, this thesis from the work(s) of other people has
been attributed and has been cited and referenced.
3. This thesis is my own work.
4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention
of passing it off as his or her own work.
____________________________ 
Richard Henry Cramer 
iv 
Declaration on Inclusion of Publications in 
a PhD Thesis 
I confirm that I have been granted permission by the University of Cape Town’s Doctoral 
Degrees Board to include the following publication(s) in my PhD thesis, and where co-
authorships are involved, my co-authors have agreed that I may include the publication(s): 
a. R Cramer “The Abandonment of Landownership in South African and Swiss Law”
(2017) 134 SALJ 870.
Signature: ________________________ Date: 16/09/2020 
Student Name: Richard Cramer Student Number: CRMRIC002 
v 
Acknowledgements 
The writing of this thesis has been a difficult journey in many respects. There are so 
many people to thank for making this thesis possible. If I forgot to mention anyone, I 
am incredibly sorry. 
It is essential to acknowledge the financial support which made this research possible. 
In this respect, I must extend my thanks to the National Research Foundation; the 
Swiss National Science Foundation; and the Faculty of Law at the University of Cape 
Town. The opinions expressed in this thesis are my own, and should not be attributed 
to any of these institutions. 
My deepest gratitude must be extended to Professor Ruth Arnet, my host for the 
Swiss-South African Joint Research Programme, and Katharina Tschopp, for 
facilitating my fruitful and rewarding research visit to Lehrstuhl Arnet at the University 
of Zurich. Further thanks must be extended to the members of Professor Arnet’s team 
during my stay in Zurich – Anne Schnierer, Lena Manz, Christian Doster and Felix 
Tuchschmid – for making me feel welcome and supported for the duration of my visit. 
I must also extend my deepest gratitude to Mr Malcolm Combe (now at the University 
of Strathclyde) for his invitation to conduct a research visit to the University of 
Aberdeen, as well as Professor Robin Evans-Jones for allowing me the use of his 
office for the duration of my stay in Aberdeen. Malcolm’s engagement with me on the 
topic of the abandonment of landownership in Scots law was critical for the direction 
in which this thesis went.  
I must also extend my thanks to the members of the Professor Hanri Mostert’s 
postgraduate writing circle for their continued feedback over the years. Their dedicated 
reading of my work is greatly appreciated. Special thanks must be extended to Dr 
Louie van Schalkwyk and Dr Cheri-Leigh Young for their support and critical feedback 
during the process of writing this thesis. 
Professor Hanri Mostert, my supervisor for my final-year LLB research paper, LLM, 
and finally this PhD, words cannot convey my gratitude for all the opportunities with 
which you have provided me over the years. Without your continued support, 
guidance, and supervision, none of this would have been possible. 
vi 
Without the continued support of family and friends, I would never have had the 
strength to make it to the end of this journey. There are too many of you to name 
individually, but I trust you know who you are. 
Finally, I must thank my late parents, Peter and Barbara Cramer. Your love and 
support will never be forgotten. I love you both and miss you every day. 
vii 
Abstract 
The question whether it is possible to abandon landownership is unresolved in South 
African law. The subject has only rarely been the subject of attention by scholars, with 
legislation and existing case law providing little in the way of clear guidance. This lack 
of clarity is obviously not ideal. In South Africa landowners may find themselves 
burdened with the ownership of land which has accrued a negative value. 
This thesis seeks to engage with the question on a theoretical level, including to 
provide answers to practical problems in the South African landownership context. 
Ultimately two primary questions must be answered: 
1. Is the abandonment of landownership possible in the South African legal
framework?
2. Should the abandonment of landownership be permitted, and if so, under what
circumstances?
The first question is evaluated in light of existing common-law principles, case law, as 
well as legislation such as the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. However, the second 
question will be the primary focus of the thesis. Through the lens of the social-
obligation norm of property as conceptualised by Gregory Alexander, as well as 
comparative studies of Swiss and Scots law, the thesis explores the viability of a right 
to abandon landownership in South African law. 
The thesis argues that the abandonment of landownership in South Africa is not 
possible in the prevailing legal framework. Furthermore, an unrestricted right to 
abandon is not viable in the South African socio-economic context. However, 
landowners who find themselves burdened with land which has accrued a negative 
value for which they are not at fault may require some form of regulated exit from that 
ownership. The thesis makes suggestions for legislative law reform in this regard, to 
provide balance between the interests of landowners and the wider community. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
One rarely acquires ownership inadvertently. Whether property is acquired with or 
without the assistance of a previous holder, it requires a conscious decision from the 
new holder to own.1 In many ways, abandonment is the antithesis of ownership. Loss 
of control over property is not always deliberate, nor calculated. In particular, the 
circumstances giving rise to the (informal) abandonment of land are often beyond the 
control of the landowner.2 
The subject of land has been an increasingly tense one in South Africa, pitting the 
demands for the protection of property rights by holders, against the legitimate 
 
1 Where property is acquired with the cooperation or assistance of the previous holder, a valid real 
agreement is required. A valid real agreement entails, among other things, an “intention of the transferor 
to transfer a particular real right to the transferee and the intention of the transferee to acquire that right”. 
See G Muller, R Brits, JM Pienaar & Z Boggenpoel Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 6 
ed (2019) 85-86; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 312-314; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Part III – 
Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 405 521; CG van der 
Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert (founding ed) LAWSA 27 2 ed (2014) para 212. See Legator McKenna 
Inc v Shea 2010 (1) SA 35 (SCA) para 22; Quartermark Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mkhwanazi 2014 (3) 
SA 96 (SCA) para 24. 
Similarly, in the context of original modes of acquisition, an intention on the part of the owner is required 
for the acquisition of ownership, in most cases. For example, one would not acquire ownership through 
occupatio by taking physical possession of an unowned thing alone. This assumption of physical 
possession must be accompanied by an intention to acquire ownership of the thing in question. Muller 
et al Silberberg 155; Van der Merwe Sakereg 217; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s 
Principles 489; Van der Merwe “Things” in LAWSA para 171; Underwater Construction and Salvage Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Bell 1968 (4) SA 190 (C) 192D-G. In the context of acquisitive prescription, an intention to be 
owner is clearly necessary through the requirement that the acquirer act openly as if owner. Section 1 
of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969; Muller et al Silberberg 181-183; Van der Merwe Sakereg 278; Van 
der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 513-514; Van der Merwe “Things” in LAWSA 
para 194; Morgenster 1711 (Pty) Ltd v De Kock NO 2012 (3) SA 59 (WCC) para 14. Accession may 
appear to be an outlier, since one may acquire ownership unintentionally of a new composite whole 
where another party is responsible for joining the property, although this is ultimately achieved through 
the intentional ownership of the principal thing. See Muller et al Silberberg 160; Van der Merwe Sakereg 
229-232; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 493; Van der Merwe “Things” 
in LAWSA para 181. See for example the case of Khan v Minister of Law & Order 1991 (3) SA 439 (T), 
in which the applicant was responsible for the joining of different car parts, some of which were from his 
1985 model wreck, and some of which were from a stolen 1988 model. The court ultimately found that 
the 1988 model was the principal thing, rendering the owner of the 1988 model the owner of the new 
composite whole (443E-G). 





grievances and aspirations of those who have been denied security of tenure.3 Recent 
moves by the South African government towards realising the possibility of 
expropriation without compensation (if such is not already possible in terms of the 
property clause of the Constitution4) have raised passions in this regard.5 Despite the 
heated debate about the direction of land reform in South Africa, circumstances may 
still arise where some landowners may wish to divest themselves of such ownership. 
Given that land is a finite resource, and much sought after, why would any landowner 
wish to abandon her property?6 This thesis explores this question, along with the 
question of how immovable property may be abandoned (if at all). Most importantly, 
 
3 AJ van der Walt Property in the Margins (2009) 1ff; H Mostert & A Pope The Principles of the Law of 
Property in South Africa (2010) 339; G Alexander “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property 
Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 745 784-785; F Michelman “Liberal Constitutionalism, Property 
Rights, and the Assault on Poverty” (2011) 22 Stell LR 706 721-722. This tension has become 
pronounced over the past year, as evidenced by the debate in the media. See B Cousins “Land Debate 
in SA Clouded” Citizen (14-03-2018) 14; P Dlamini “‘No Expropriation of Land From Blacks’” The Herald 
(20-06-2019) 2; S Mtshali “Overwhelming Support for Land Grab Amendment” Sunday Tribune (22-07-
2018) 4; S Feketha “Grounds Move on Private Property Fears” Cape Argus (16-08-2018) 9; Author 
Unknown “Participants Advocate for Land Seizure Move” Sowetan (10-12-2018) 9; B Phakathi 
“Committee Recommends Amending Constitution for Land Expropriation” (15-11-2018) Business Day 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-11-15-committee-recommends-amending-
constitution-for-land-expropriation/> (accessed 23-11-2018); B Phakathi “Parliament ‘Will Oppose 
AfriForum’s Bid to Halt Property Clause Amendment’” (21-11-2018) Business Day 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-11-21-parliament-will-oppose-afriforums-bid-to-halt-
property-clause-amendment/> (accessed 23-11-2018); M Merten “ANC’s Executive Proposal on 
Expropriation Without Compensation Obscures Already Vast Ministerial Powers” (28-01-2020) Daily 
Maverick <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-01-28-ancs-executive-proposal-on-
expropriation-without-compensation-obscures-already-vast-ministerial-powers/> (accessed 30-01-
2020); S Grootes “Land Issue: Once More at Front and Centre of the ANC’s Internal Politics” (27-01-
2020) Daily Maverick <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-01-27-land-issue-once-more-at-
front-and-centre-of-the-ancs-internal-politics/> (accessed 30-01-2020). See also the Draft Constitution 
Eighteenth Amendment Bill, 2019 (in Government Gazette 42902 of 13-12-2019). 
4 Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 3 ed (2011) 506; R Hall The Land Question: What is the Answer? (2018) unpublished 
public lecture presented at the University of the Western Cape, 02-08-2019; T Ngcukaitobi & M Bishop 
The Constitutionality of Expropriation Without Compensation (2018) unpublished paper presented at the 
Constitutional Court Review IX Conference hosted by Wits School of Law at the Human Rights Room, 
Old Fort, Constitution Hill, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, 2 August 2018. See also the conclusions of the 
Constitutional Review Committee: Constitutional Review Committee Report of the Joint Constitutional 
Review Committee on the Possible Review of Section 25 of the Constitution 15-11-2018. Available at 
<https://pmg.org.za/files/181115FinalReport.docx>. For a detailed overview of compensation for 
expropriation under the Constitution, see WJ du Plessis Compensation for Expropriation under the 
Constitution LLD thesis Stellenbosch University (2009).  
5 See the media sources listed in note 3 above. 
6 See R Cramer “The Abandonment of Landownership in South African and Swiss Law” (2017) 134 
SALJ 870. Note on the aforementioned publication by the author: My Memorandum of Understanding 
with my supervisor, as well as obligations attaching to funding I received through the Swiss-South 
African Joint Research Programme to facilitate my comparative study, required me to publish from my 





this thesis considers the question as to whether abandonment of ownership in 
immovable property should be permitted, and under what circumstances. 
In considering whether abandonment of immovable property should be permitted, this 
thesis also engages with the possibility of a regulated exit from landownership. Should 
unilateral abandonment not be a viable option for the termination of a relationship 
between an owner and her land, it is necessary to investigate whether some form of 
right to exit from ownership, in limited circumstances, should be permitted. Such a 
regulated exit, requiring the cooperation of legal authorities, would not be 
abandonment as commonly understood.7 However, regulated exit may provide the 
best balance between the competing rights and interests of community and landowner. 
The thesis proposes what such a model of regulated exit, given effect to by statute and 
regulated by legal process, would look like. 
2. Context 
Land ownership comes with liabilities, risks, and responsibilities. A landowner is 
responsible for municipal rates and taxes, among other things.8 Moreover, 
circumstances beyond the landowner’s control may effectively deprive her of beneficial 
use of her property, and may even see such property accrue a negative value.9 For 
 
7 See Chapter 2 which engages with the legal definition of abandonment. See in particular, see L 
Strahilevitz “The Right to Abandon” (2010) 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 355; E Peñalver “The Illusory Right to 
Abandon” (2010) 109 Michigan Law Review 191. 
8 Section 2(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004, for example, explicitly 
empowers municipalities to levy rates on property within its area. 
Furthermore, outstanding rates and taxes will result in a restraint on the transfer of the landowner’s 
property, as he will be unable to obtain a clearance certificate from the municipality. Without such a 
clearance certificate, indicating property rates and municipal service fees have been paid, the registrar 
of deeds may not register the transfer of the property. See section 118(1) of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. This restriction on transfer applies regardless of whether the 
landowner himself incurred the debt, or even if he was unaware of the debt. This debt enforcement 
mechanism was found to be constitutional in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
9 In his seminal article on abandonment, Strahilevitz distinguishes between market value and subjective 
value. Property may have a positive market value while simultaneously having a negative subjective 
value, such as jewelry gifted by a former lover. Property may also have a positive subjective value while 
holding a negative market value, such as a family heirloom. Property that holds both a negative subject 
value and a negative market value (refuse, for example) would be that property that is most subject to 
abandonment. Land may fall within this category, due to contamination, or burdensome property taxes. 
See Strahilevitz (2010) U. Pa. L. Rev. 355 362-372. 
Concerning the possibility of land accruing a negative value to an owner, see N Shoked “The Duty to 
Maintain” (2014) 64 Duke Law Journal 437. Shoked explains that for property to have a negative value, 
it “must do worse than offer no conceivable economic benefit”. The property must constitute a burden, 




example, due to urban decay and its consequences, an owner may find herself in 
circumstances where the property’s liability attaches to her, along with the inability to 
make use of the property in a commercially viable or any other beneficial way.10 A 
further example exists in the context of heritage buildings, where a landowner may lose 
beneficial use of her property due to restrictions on the use and alteration thereof, while 
potentially being saddled with high maintenance costs.11 
Absent restrictions on owners’ ability to abandon or dispose of property, and 
prescriptions about remedial costs, the consequences of abandoned property would 
be externalised and passed on to society at large.12 For example, tax resources are 
often redirected to remedy the consequences of illegal dumping,13 and municipalities 
have to enact by-laws on problem buildings to combat the consequences of 
unmaintained, (informally) abandoned immovable property.14 
 
(which may be negligible or even be calculated at zero due to the value of the property). The negative 
value of property, and land in particular, can only stem from a positive duty to maintain (441). Such a 
duty to maintain is not an external imposition to the property right, but an integral part thereof (463ff). 
Shoked is concerned with the context in the United States, but as will become clear in the discussion in 
Chapter 6 Section 3, his observations apply in the South African context as well.  
10 JC Sonnekus “Abandonnering van Eiendomsreg op Grond end Aanspreeklikheid vir Grondbelasting” 
(2004) TSAR 747 748. 
11 The relevant legislation in this respect is the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (NHRA). It 
requires the acquisition of a permit to demolish or alter structures over 60 years old (section 34(1). 
Furthermore, it empowers heritage authorities to impose compulsory repair orders on owners of certain 
classes of heritage buildings (section 45). See the detailed discussion in Chapter 6 Section 3.2. 
12 Strahilevitz (2009-2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 372, 388. 
13 City of Cape Town The Cost of Illegal Dumping 
<http://resource.capetown.gov.za/documentcentre/Documents/Graphics%20and%20educational%20
material/The%20cost%20of%20illegal%20dumping%20(PDF).pdf> (accessed 20-05-2019); A Watson 
“Gauteng’s Illegal Dumping Scourge” Citizen (06-07-2015) 8; M Ntseku “City of Cape Town Spends 
from R110m to R120m Cleaning Up Illegal Dumping” (13-10-2019) IOL 
<https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/city-of-cape-town-spends-from-r110m-to-r120m-cleaning-up-
illegal-dumping-34679517> (accessed 15-10-2019). 
14 To combat the abandonment of buildings and shift responsibility onto registered owners and those 
who appear to be in control of buildings, the City of Johannesburg has introduced the By-law on Problem 
Properties, 2014. The By-law makes provision for criminal prosecution and fines of up to R300 000 for 
failure to comply with its provisions as well as notices issued in terms thereof (section 11). In addition, 
the by-law makes the responsible person liable for the actual costs “the local authority incurs to repair, 
renovate, alter, close, demolish, remove, secure, maintain, or enforce compliance or payable in terms” 
of the relevant health, safety, town planning and fire by-laws (section 14). 
The City of Cape Town also has a by-law dealing with problem buildings. Such problem buidings include 
those that appear “to have been abandoned by the owner with or without the consequence that rates or 





The consequences of abandonment of immovable property are indeed far-reaching in 
the urban context. In City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd15 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal notes the following consequences of an abandoned, unmaintained 
apartment block, as identified by an inspecting task team, thus: 
all the floors were flooded with sewer water and … water ran through the 
building and spilled out of the parking level onto the pavement … the 
building was a fire hazard because there were no fire extinguishers, the 
fire hydrants were unusable, there was no water supply, smoke and 
draught doors had been broken and unsafe electrical wiring abounded. 
In the event of a fire, the occupants would not be able to escape or be 
rescued … the building was a fire trap.16 
Someone should take responsibility to remedy problem buildings such as the one 
described above. In cases such as this, the owner’s name is still on the title deed. 
However, the building is not maintained adequately, which may be for reasons beyond 
the owner’s control.17 However, the reality is that where a building has become derelict 
and has fallen into a state of disrepair, the owner is often untraceable.18 
An owner of unlawfully-occupied land is not able to renounce responsibility for rates 
and taxes, even if the land occupation is the result of lawlessness or uncontrolled 
informal settlement.19 The owner will most likely not be able to use the property as 
 
15 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA). 
16 Para 8. 
17 A Cox “Losing the Battle Against Urban Decay” Star (04-05-2012) 8; TimesLive “Hijacked Buildings – 
What They Are, and What City of Johannesburg is Doing About Them” (05-07-2017) TimesLive 
<https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-07-05-hijacked-buildings-what-they-are-and-
what-city-of-johannesburg-is-doing-about-them/> (accessed 16-01-2019); J Strydom & S Viljoen 
“Unlawful Occupation of Inner-City Buildings: A Constitutional Analysis of the Rights and Obligations 
Involved” (2014) 17 PER 1207 1222. See M Murray Taming the Disorderly City: The Spatial Landscape 
of Johannesburg after Apartheid (2008) 149-151. 
18 H Mphande “Guarding Derelict Eyesore Costs Ratepayers a Packet” The Herald (06-06-2008) 5; 
Author Unknown “Derelict Building Now a Dump” The Herald (31-08-2015) 11; C Mailovich “Pledge to 
Take Back Buildings” Business Day (01-06-2017) 1; A Lewis “Angry Residents to Take on ‘Devil’s Den’” 
Cape Argus (27-07-2015) 4; ENCA “Mashaba Wants Public Works to Intervene on Abandoned 
Buildings” (10-04-2018) ENCA <https://www.enca.com/south-africa/mshaba-wants-public-works-to-
intervene-on-abandoned-buildings> (accessed 10-05-2019); B Athman “Abandoned Houses and 
Unkempt Land Help Crime” (14-03-2018) News24 
<https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Local/Maritzburg-Fever/abandoned-houses-and-unkempt-land-
help-crime-20180313> (accessed 14-03-2018). 
19 Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 747-748. Section 2(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates 




security to obtain a mortgage from a bank due to the decreased value of the property 
and would most likely face protracted and expensive eviction proceedings to regain 
control of the property.20  
The issue of abandonment of land does not arise only in the urban and residential 
context. Abandoned mines and their accompanying dumps abound in the South 
African landscape.21 Abandoned mines, which have not been adequately rehabilitated, 
are sources of both water and air pollution.22 Under the current legal framework, the 
landowner has no agency regarding whether a third party is granted a right to prospect 
or mine on her land.23 The landowner is not responsible for the rehabilitation of the 
mined-upon land.24 However, South Africa has a poor record of effective and 
 
Section 7(1) obliges the municipality, when deciding to levy rates, to “levy rates on all rateable property 
in its area”. This is unless it is “impossible or unreasonably difficult to establish a market value because 
of legally insecure tenure resulting from past racially discriminatory laws or practices” (section 7(2)(a)(iv).  
Exceptions are made for owners whose property is below the market value determined by the 
municipality (section 2(e). For example, in the case of residential property, the City of Johannesburg 
does not charge rates for the first R350 000 of the market value of the property. See City of 
Johannesburg Property Rates Policy 2018/19 13. Available at 
<https://www.joburg.org.za/services_/Documents/Rebates%20documents/2018%20Rates%20Policy_
Final.pdf> (accessed on 03-06-2019). See also City of Johannesburg Draft Property Rates Policy 
2019/2020 20. Available at 
<https://www.joburg.org.za/services_/Documents/rates%20and%20taxes/Draft%20Rates%20Policy%
202019-%2020.pdf> (accessed 18-02-2020). 
20 Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 748. Unlawful occupiers are protected by section 26(3) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which provides that nobody “may be evicted from their home, or 
have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances”. This right is given effect to by the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation 
of Land Act 19 of 1998, which sets out the procedure for acquiring an eviction order. An eviction order, 
at the behest of a private landowner, cannot be granted unless it is just and equitable in light of the 
relevant sections. See section 4(6) and (7). The date on which an eviction may take place, when an 
order is granted, similarly must be just and equitable in the circumstances. See section 4(8) and (9). On 
evictions in general, see S Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights: Adjudication Under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) Chapter 6; Van der Walt Property in the Margins 146ff. 
21 S Hartzer & W du Plessis “The Liability of Historical Mine Authorisation Holders for Rehabilitation of 
‘Old Order Mine Dumps’” (2013) 29 SAPL 469 469-470. 
22 Hartzer & Du Plessis (2013) SAPL 470; ES van Eeden, M Liefferink & JF Durand “Legal Issues 
Concerning Mine Closure and Social Responsibility on the West Rand” (2009) 5 TD: The Journal for 
Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 51 51ff; D Limpitlaw, M Aken, H Lodewijks & J Viljoen 
Post Mining Rehabilitation, Land Use and Pollution at Collieries in South Africa (2005) unpublished 
paper presented at colloquium on Sustainable Development in the Life of Coal Mining hosted by South 
African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy at Boksburg, 13-07-2005 1ff; FG Bell, SET Bullock, TFJ 
Hälbich & P Lindsay “Environmental Impacts Associated with an Abandoned Mine in the Witbank 
Coalfield, South Africa” (2001) 45 International Journal of Coal Geology 195 195ff; A Akcil & S Koldas 
“Acid Mine Drainge (AMD): Causes, Treatment and Case Studies” (2006) 14 Journal of Cleaner 
Production 1139 1139ff. 
23 E van der Schyff Property in Minerals an Petroleum (2016) 581ff. 
24 These obligations rest with the right-holder. See Van der Schyff Property 560-574; MO Dale South 
African Mineral and Petroleum Law (SI 25 2018) 275-281C. See section 43 of the MPRDA and sections 




responsible mine closure.25 Landowners in such circumstances are thus never 
guaranteed to receive back their land in a rehabilitated condition. 
In the mining context, the failure to plan properly for, and implement, mine closure has 
an impact beyond the environment. The closure of a mine affects the economy of 
nearby communities.26 In the absence of adequate preparation for communities 
beyond the lifespan of the mine on which they rely for jobs and income, the failure to 
end the life cycle of a mine in a responsible manner can be devastating.27 Furthermore, 
abandoned mines are often taken over by illegal artisanal miners,28 referred to as Zama 
Zamas.29 They mine these abandoned, unrehabilitated mines under the risk of death 
 
25 See Limpitlaw et al Post-Mining Rehabilitation; T McKay & M Milaras “Public Lies, Private Looking 
and the Forced Closure of Grootvlei Gold Mine, South Africa” (2017) 13 The Journal for Transdisciplinary 
Research in Southern Africa 1 4; RD Krause & LG Snyman Rehabilitation and Mine Closure Liability: 
An Assessment of the Accountability of the System to Communities (2014) unpublished paper presented 
at the 9th International Conference on Mine Closure hosted by the University of Witwatersrand and 
Australian Centre for Geomechanics at the Sandton Convention Centre, 1-3 October 2014); C Digby 
Mine Closure and Rehabilitation: From Dereliction to Accountability? (2016) unpublished presentation 
presented at seminar titled From Dereliction to Accountability? hosted by Centre for Environmental 
Rights at the University of Witwatersrand, 05-05-2016; E van Druten & M Bekker “Towards an Inclusive 
Model to Address Unsuccessful Mine Closures in South Africa” (2017) 117 Journal of the Southern 
African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 485; Centre for Environmental Rights “Mine Closure and 
Rehabilitation: The Hangover that Follows the Mining Party” (09-05-2016) Centre for Environmental 
Rights <https://cer.org.za/news/mine-closure-and-rehabilitation-the-hangover-that-follows-the-mining-
party> (accessed 25-01-2019). See also T Field State Governance of Mining, Development and 
Sustainability (2019) 319-320 for general comment on the problem of enforcement of mine closure 
provisions in both developed and developing jurisdictions. 
26 J Howard Corporate Social Responsibility in the Mining Industry LLM dissertation UCT (2014) 41-42; 
JM Killian “Addressing the Social Impact of Mining Activities on Communities for Sustainability” (2008) 
16 Civil Engineering 22 22-24. 
27 Howard Corporate Social Responsibility 41-42; Kilian (2008) Civil Engineering 22-24. 
28 Artisanal mining is “characterised by basic and manual mining techniques and it is largely unregulated. 
Artisanal miners are exposed to wide range of hazards and the industry is associated with number of 
social and economic ills, including diversion of people from more sustainable activities, squalid living 
and working conditions and widespread substance abuse and sexual promiscuity”. See D Limpitlaw & 
C Digby Planning for Mine Closure in Sub-Saharan Africa – Taking Urban Development and Artisanal 
Miners into Account (2014) unpublished paper presented at 9th International Conference on Mine 
Closure hosted by the University of the Witwatersrand at the Sandton Convention Centre, 1-3 October 
2014 4. For an overview of artisanal mining in South Africa, see L Wilson Unshackling South African 
Artisanal Miners: Considering Burkina Faso’s Legislative Provisions as a Guideline for Legislation and 
Regulation LLM thesis University of Cape Town (2018) 45-50. 
29 E Thelwell “Six Things to Know About the Illegal Mining Boom” (26-06-2014) News24 
<https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Six-things-to-know-about-the-illegal-mining-boom-
20140626> (accessed 11-10-2019); B Debut “Gang Wars Erupt over Abandoned Mines in SA” (02-11-
2015) Mail & Guardian <https://mg.co.za/article/2015-11-02-gang-wars-erupt-over-abandoned-mines-
in-south-africa> (accessed 11-10-2019); M Olaide “Driven Underground by Poverty” (09-10-2015) IOL 
<https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/driven-underground-by-poverty-1927803> (accessed 11-10-2019). 




and in zones of lawlessness.30 Gang wars are frequent, and forced labour in 
abandoned mines is not uncommon.31 
There are thus two problems that one needs to engage with concerning the question 
of the abandonment of land. The first problem is the societal cost of abandoned land, 
and the second is the burden on owners of land that has accrued a negative value. 
Even if unrestricted abandonment is not feasible, some form of exit from landownership 
in certain circumstances is justified and necessary. Regulation is ultimately critical. 
3. Legal framework 
Owners of negative-value property may desire a way out of their ownership. That 
movable property may be abandoned - rendering it res derelicta (abandoned) and open 
to acquisition of ownership by another through occupatio - is considered 
uncontroversial.32 Movable property is regarded as having been successfully 
abandoned where the physical loss of possession is coupled with the intention to divest 
oneself of ownership of the property.33 Whether the intention requirement has been 
met will depend on the circumstances of the case.34 South African courts will not readily 
find that valuable movable property has been abandoned without compelling 
evidence.35  
Whether immovable property can be similarly abandoned is not settled in South African 
law. The standard view held by legal scholars is that if land is abandoned, it is rendered 
bona vacantia, meaning that it accrues to the State.36 That abandoned land is rendered 
bona vacantia seemed to be taken for granted by the old Appellate Division in the case 
 
30 Debut “Gang wars erupt over abandoned mines in SA” Mail & Guardian. 
31 Debut “Gang wars erupt over abandoned mines in SA” Mail & Guardian. 
32 Van der Merwe Sakereg 224-225; Muller et al Silberberg 158; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – 
Property” in Wille's Principles 490-491. 
33 Van der Merwe Sakereg 224-225; Muller et al Silberberg 158; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – 
Property” in Wille's Principles 490-491. 
34 See discussion of the case law in Chapter 2 Section 4.1. In particular, see the cases of S M Goldstein 
& Co (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 1979 (4) SA 930 (A) and Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage 
Syndicate, Ltd. (1906) 23 SC 169. 
35 See Van der Merwe Sakereg 225; S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 1979 (4) SA 930 (A) 936F-
G; Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd. (1906) 23 SC 169 171. 
36 Van der Merwe and Pope "Part III - Property" in Wille's Principles 490-491; Muller et al Silberberg 
159; Van der Merwe Sakereg 227; CG van der Merwe “Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 2 





of Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker.37 However, the court found that the 
requirements for abandonment had not been met.38 In the absence of a finding of 
abandonment, it was not necessary for the court to interrogate the assumption that 
land is rendered bona vacantia more closely or whether abandonment is possible. 
Although, most scholars agree that if the abandonment of immovable property is 
possible, it is rendered bona vacantia and accrues to the State, Sonnekus provides a 
strong dissenting view.39 He argues that not only is the abandonment of immovable 
property possible,40 but also that such property is rendered res nullius and thus open 
to appropriation by another.41 
The abandonment of land in South African law appears impossible, due to the relevant 
legal rules.42 In the context of movable property, the requirements for abandonment 
are the relinquishment of physical possession with the intention of no longer remaining 
owner.43 As Mostert explains, it is uncertain how an intention to abandon immovable 
property can be evidenced in the absence of any actions in the deeds registry.44 The 
relevant land registration legislation45 is devoid of guidance in this regard, and 
registration actions are what provide for publicity “in respect of proprietary positions 
relating to land”.46  
It is also necessary to touch on the legal framework within which property may acquire 
a negative value. The mining context described above raises questions about the 
 
37 1979 2 SA 944 (A). 
38 946A-947B. 
39 See JC Sonnekus “Enkele Opmerkings na Aanleiding van die Aanspraak op Bona Vacantia as 
Sogenaamde Regale Reg” (1985) TSAR 121; JC Sonnekus “Grondeise en die Klassifikasie van Grond 
as Res Nullius of as Staatsgrond” (2001) TSAR 84; Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 747. 
40 Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 755-756. 
41 Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 752. 
42 H Mostert “No Right to Neglect? Exploratory Observations on How Policy Choices Challenge the 
Basic Principles of Property” in S Scott & J van Wyk (eds) Property Law Under Scrutiny (2015) 26. 
43 Muller et al Silberberg 158; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 490; Van 
der Merwe Sakereg 224; Reck v Mills 1990 (1) SA 751 (A) 757C; S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 
1979 (4) SA 930 (A) 936F-G; Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd. (1906) 23 
SC 169 171. 
44 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law 27. Registration is the form of delivery that prevails in respect of 
immovable property in South Africa. The transfer of immovable property is publicised through recording 
of said transfer at the deeds registry. It is unclear how the intention to abandon land could be manifest, 
with the possible exception of removing the title entry from the register. For more detail on the 
registration of land in South Africa, see Muller et al Silberberg 225ff. 
45 Deeds Registries Act 47of 1937. 




position of landowners on whose land such mines – both active and abandoned - are 
located. The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act47 (MPRDA) makes 
the State the custodian of the nation’s mineral resources.48 Rights to prospect and mine 
minerals on land are granted in terms of the MPRDA,49 and thus exist apart from 
landownership. The landowner, who must be consulted during the mining right 
application process,50 has little say as to whether or not prospecting and mining 
operations take place on her land.51 The MPRDA provides some protection and 
provision for compensation for landowners,52 although, as Badenhorst points out, it still 
favours the holder of the mining right as well as the State.53 Furthermore, none of the 
grounds on which the State may expropriate mined-upon land is triggered in the event 
of the land being no longer viable for the landowner’s purposes.54 
 
47 Act 28 of 2002. 
48 Section 3(1). 
49 Prospecting rights are applied for, granted, and renewed in terms of sections 16 to 18 of the MPRDA. 
Mining rights are applied for, granted and renewed in terms of sections 22 to 23. 
50 See sections 10, 16(4)(b), 22(4)(b), 27(5)(a) . 
51 As Badenhorst points out, an owner who has been notified and consulted in a proper manner may 
make reasonable demands of the right holder. However, such demands may be construed as 
unreasonable, given the right holder’s statutory right of access. Should such demands on the right holder 
not be met, any refusal of access to the right holder may be deemed as being unlawful in the 
circumstances. See PJ Badenhorst “Conflict Resolution Between Owners of Land and Holders of Rights 
to Minerals: A Lopsided Triangle?” (2011) TSAR 326 338. 
52 See, for example, section 54. 
53 Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 340. If the owner (or lawful occupier) refuses to allow the holder of a right 
in terms of the MPRDA access to the land, or makes “unreasonable” demands for such access, the 
holder can notify the relevant Regional Manager (section 54(1)(a)-(b)). The Regional Manager must 
within 14 days then notify the owner to make representations concerning issues brought to the fore by 
the right holder (section 54(2)(a)). In the process, the owner is informed of the rights of the right holder, 
as well as the provisions of the Act being contravened by her actions and the steps that could be taken 
against her should she continue to contravene these relevant provisions (section 54(2)(b)-(d). If the 
Regional Manager is of the view that the owner has already suffered, of faces the prospect of suffering, 
loss or damage due to mining-related activities on her land, she must “request the parties concerned to 
endeavour to reach an agreement for the payment of compensation for such loss or damage” (section 
54(3). Should the parties not come to an agreement, such compensation is to be determined by 
arbitration or by a competent court (section 54(4). If after having considered the issues brought forward 
by the holder, the representations by the landowner and any written recommendation of the Regional 
Mining Development and Environmental Committee, the Regional Manager concludes that any further 
negotiation may detrimentally affect certain objectives listed in section 2, she may put forward a 
recommendation to the Minister that the land be expropriated (section 54(5). Should, in the view of the 
Regional Manager, the fault for not reaching an agreement lie with the holder, he may “in writing prohibit 
such holder from commencing or continuing with prospecting or mining operations on the land in 
question until the dispute has been resolved by arbitration or by a competent court” (section 54(6). 
Section 54 applies, with necessary changes, if the landowner approaches the Regional Manager to 
notify him that loss or damage will likely result from prospecting or mining operations on the land in 
question (section 54(7). 
54 See Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 338-339. It is true that the tendering of sufficient financial provision for 




In the context of problem buildings and unlawful occupation of land, landowners may 
similarly find themselves in an undesirable situation.55 While being unable to make use 
of the property in question, they may be held responsible for the state of such buildings 
in terms of problem-building by-laws.56 Unlawful occupations, the size of which 
effectively render the loss of the owner’s land a fait accompli due to the impossibility of 
carrying out an eviction order, also pose serious challenges for landowners.57 
Finally, it is also possible that landowners may find all beneficial use of their property 
negated by laws and regulations concerning the protection of heritage buildings and 
sites.58 Beyond being denied beneficial use of her property, the property could 
potentially accrue a negative value for the landowner, who can be held responsible for 
the maintenance thereof.59 
4. Research question 
Against this background, the research question, i.e. how the law can and should 
provide for abandonment of immovable property, may translate into the following 
subsidiary questions that are considered critically: 
To what extent should people be free to abandon their immovable property in general, 
in light of the social obligations that come with ownership? 
Is the abandonment of immovable property legally possible, and if so, is that property 
rendered res nullius or bona vacantia? 
 
mining or prospecting operations on land (see section 24P of the National Environmental Management 
Act 107 of 1998). However, this is no guarantee that the land will ever be rendered viable for the owner’s 
purposes in the future when mining operations have since ceased, or even that the necessary 
environmental rehabilitation will even take place. It also provides no remedy to an owner who wishes to 
divest herself of land that is no longer fit for her purposes. See Chapter 6 Section 3.1.2. 
55 See Chapter 6 Section 3.3. 
56 See, for example, the City of Johannesburg By-Law on Problem Properties, 2014; the City of Cape 
Town Problem Building By-Law, 2010; the eThekwini Problem Building By-Law, 2015. See also detailed 
discussion in Chapter 6 Section 3.3. 
57 See Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers 2018 (2) SA 228 (WCC) para 1; President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) para 8. See detailed discussion 
in Chapter 6 Section 3.3. 
58 See J Strydom A Hundred Years of Demolition Orders: A Constitutional Analysis LLD thesis 
Stellenbosch University (2012) 180. See detailed discussion in Chapter 6 Section 3.2. 
59 See section 45 of the NHRA. See also J Strydom A Hundred Years of Demolition Orders: A 




Should the abandonment of immovable property, particularly immovable property with 
little to no economic value (thus passing ownership thereof to the State), be made 
possible or easier? 
What abandonment regime should be adopted in respect of immovable property, 
taking into account the interests of both the landowner and society at large? 
5. Research method 
This thesis relies primarily on scholarship and case law concerning the abandonment 
of ownership, as well as the social obligations that accompany ownership. It engages 
in comparative legal research. Comparative law involves collecting information 
regarding foreign law.60 This information may encompass an entire legal system, a 
particular institution or a single rule.61 The information is juxtaposed and contrasted to 
make comparisons, outlining the relevant similarities and differences between legal 
systems.62 However, the function of comparative law goes beyond mere comparison, 
but also includes making available knowledge for law reform and research, as well as 
“furthering the universal knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon of law”.63  
The comparative jurisdictions chosen for this study are Switzerland and Scotland. The 
rationale for choosing these two jurisdictions are the different approaches to the 
abandonment of landownership that prevail therein.64 In Switzerland, the abandonment 
(Dereliktion) of landownership is almost wholly unrestricted,65 with the delivery of a 
 
60 E Örücü “Developing Comparative Law” in E Örücü & D Nelken (eds) Comparative Law: A Handbook 
(2007) 43 46; M Siems Comparative Law (2014) 2-3. 
61 Örücü “Developing Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 46; K Zweigert & H Kötz An Introduction 
to Comparative Law (1998) 4-5. 
62 Örücü “Developing Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 46. 
63 Örücü “Developing Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 46. 
64 See Chapter 5. 
65 Art. 666 Abs. 1 read with Art. 964. Abs. 1 of the Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB). See H Rey 
& L Strebel “Art. 666” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed 
(2015) 1134-1135; J Schmid & B Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht 5 ed (2017) para 868; H Rey Die 
Grundlagen des Sachenrechts und das Eigentum 3 ed (2007) para 1673ff; P Tuor, B Schnyder, J 
Schmid & A Jungo Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch 14 ed (2015) § 100 para 33; F Hitz “Art. 666” 
in M Amstutz, P Breitschmid, A Furrer, D Girsberger, C Huguenin, A Jungo, M Müller-Chen, V Roberto, 
AK Schnyder & HR Trüeb (eds) Handkommentar zum Schweizer Privatrecht 3 ed (2006) 166-167; P 
Simonius & T Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht (1995) para 127. The only restriction which 
appears to exist is where the property is the family home (married couples) or the joint home (registered 
couples), in which case the spouse or partner’s consent is required. See Art 169 lit 1 ZGB; Art 14 lit 1 




waiver by the landowner to the land registry being all that is required to achieve 
abandonment.66 In Scotland, by contrast, the abandonment of landownership is not 
possible due to the absence of a mechanism through which a landowner may 
unilaterally terminate her ownership.67 The approaches of these two jurisdictions are 
compared with the prevailing position in South Africa, with the contrasting socio-
economic situations in all three respectively kept in mind. 
6. Course of Inquiry 
The ideal solution to immovable properties which have accrued a negative value would 
be to provide effective remedies in terms of legislation. These remedies would provide 
owners of land that has ceased to be viable for reasons beyond their control to be 
properly compensated subject to expropriation by the State. In the absence of such 
measures, particularly in a country where the State is already subject to budgetary 
constraints,68 it may be necessary to allow landowners to walk away from their 
 
Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommenter 1135; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 526; Hitz 
“Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167. 
66 See Art. 964 Abs. 1 ZGB; Art. 46 and 48 GBV (Grundbuchverordnung of 23 September 2011). See 
also Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 868; Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommenter 
1134-1135; Rey Sachenrechts para 1676; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 
33; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 166-167; Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches 
Immobiliarsachenrecht para 127. 
67 See The Scottish Environment Protection Agency v The Joint Liquidators of the Scottish Coal 
Company Limited [2013] CSIH 108 para 103; M Combe & M Rudd “Abandonment of Land and the 
Scottish Coal Case: Was it Unprecedented?” (2018) 22 The Edinburgh Law Review 301 303; Lord 
Eassie, HL MacQueen, A Anderson, D Bain, D Cabrelli, G Cameron, M Combe, C Ervine, N Grier, S 
Lamont-Black, D Nichols, R Paisley, A Simpson, M Sundara Rajan & Lady Wise Gloag and Henderson 
The Law of Scotland 14 ed (2017) para 34.03n30. 
68 The South African economic situation is perennially gloomy, characterised by low growth, a budget 
deficit and a poor credit rating. See S Muller “South Africa’s Finance Minister Delivers a Budget 
Designated to Steady the Ship” (20-02-2019) The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/south-
africas-finance-minister-delivers-a-budget-designed-to-steady-the-ship-112162> (accessed 15-10-
2019); S Muller “Why Ramaphosa’s ‘New Dawn’ Will Break Slowly for South Africa’s Finances” (21-10-
2018) The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/why-ramaphosas-new-dawn-will-break-slowly-
for-south-africas-finances-105302> (accessed 15-10-2019); S Mapenzauswa “#Budget2019: SA 
Budget Deficit to Widen as it Borrows R1.2bn a Day” (20-02-2019) IOL <https://www.iol.co.za/business-
report/budget/budget2019-sa-budget-deficit-to-widen-as-it-borrows-r12bn-a-day-full-speech-
19404658> (accessed 15-10-2019); South African Institute of Professional Accountants “South Africa 
to Reach Fiscal Cliff by 2042” (23-02-2019) IOL <https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/budget/south-
africa-to-reach-the-fiscal-cliff-by-2042-19443575> (accessed 15-10-2019); M Isa “Last Rating Standing” 
(28-02-2019) Fin24 <https://www.fin24.com/Finweek/Business-and-economy/last-rating-standing-
20190228> (accessed 28-02-2019); S Muller “Slow Growth and Shrinking Revenues Limit South Africa’s 
Finance Minister” (27-10-2019) The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/slow-growth-and-
shrinking-revenues-limit-south-africas-finance-minister-67745> (accessed 15-10-2019).  
Budgetary constraints are demonstrated by the neglect of the land reform budget. See D February 





ownership as a last resort. This will require balancing the interests of the landowner, 
in divesting herself of ownership, against the impact on society, of externalised costs 
related to such abandonment. As such, it may be better to refer rather to such a 
divestment of ownership as a “regulated exit”, rather than abandonment, which by its 
nature is an inherently unilateral act.69 
By “regulated exit”, it is meant that a landowner is enabled to seek divestment of 
ownership of her property in the absence of another person that is willing to take 
transfer thereof. Such property would then fall into the ownership of the State, in line 
with the bona vacantia rule in respect of abandoned land.70 The circumstances in which 
a landowner is enabled to divest herself of such ownership will be regulated, taking 
into account the competing interests of the relevant parties.71 The term “abandonment” 
is used in this thesis for the sake of simplicity. 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. The aim and contents of each chapter is set 
out below. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
In the first chapter, the research question is introduced and its relevance in 
contemporary society discussed. This introduction sets out the relevant background, 
establishing why the abandonment of ownership – and in particular the abandonment 
of land in the urban and mining contexts - is a topic that warrants research. 
 
(accessed 15-10-2019); Q Masuabi “Government Has Never Taken Land-Reform Budget Seriously” 
(16-05-2018) Huffington Post <https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2018/05/16/government-has-never-
taken-land-reform-budget-seriously_a_23435787> (accessed 15-10-2019); G Makou “Yes, South 
African Spends as much on VIP Protection & Security as on Land Reform” (09-05-2019) Africa Check 
<https://africacheck.org/reports/yes-south-africas-government-spends-as-much-on-vip-protection-
security-as-on-land-reform/> (accessed 15-10-2019). 
Evidently in this context, it is unlikely landowners can pin their hopes on government providing them 
with an effective remedy that entails expropriation at their request when land becomes unviable for their 
purposes, whether in the urban or mining context. 
69 See Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 197-198. 
70 That, in the event of the abandonment of landownership being possible, such land falls into the 
ownership of the State, is the standard view held by South African property law scholars. See Van der 
Merwe and Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 492; Van der Merwe Sakereg 227; Van der 
Merwe (1980) TSAR 187-188; Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership 8-9. 
71 Guidelines for drafting legislation enabling “regulated exit” are proposed in Chapter 4 Section 6 and 




Chapter 2 – An Overview of Abandonment 
This chapter seeks to establish what constitutes abandonment. It provides historical 
background to the basic requirements for abandonment as they exist in South African 
law. Abandonment as it existed in Roman law and Roman-Dutch law is thus explored, 
before discussing abandonment as it exists in South African law, including African 
customary law. An overview of the existing case law is provided to determine how 
South African courts approach cases in which abandonment of property is alleged.72  
Chapter 3 – The Possibility of Abandoning Landownership 
This chapter discusses the extent to which the abandonment of land is possible (or 
impossible) in the South African legal system. The only three cases in which the 
abandonment of land was raised were resolved on the grounds that there was an 
absence of intention to abandon.73 The courts in these cases did not have to concern 
themselves with the publicity principle and how this may be satisfied in respect of the 
abandonment of land.74 This chapter discusses the relevant sections of the Deeds 
Registry Act,75 and the opposing views as to whether the provisions of the legislation 
allow for the abandonment of landownership.76  
Chapter 4 – Locating Abandonment in a Social-Obligation Norm Framework 
This chapter provides a theoretical background for the research undertaken in this 
thesis. The conception of the social-obligation norm as formulated by Alexander is 
adopted as the theoretical approach that informs this thesis.77 The chapter then 
proceeds to evaluate whether the social-obligation norm of property finds expression 
in and is compatible with the constitutional framework, particularly the constitutional 
 
72 See Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd. (1906) 23 SC 169; Underwater 
Construction and Salvage Co (Pty) Ltd v Bell 1968 (4) SA 190 (C); Minister van Landbou v 
Sonnendecker 1979 2 SA 944 (A); S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 1979 (4) SA 930 (A); Reck v 
Mills 1990 (1) SA 751 (A). 
73 See Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 (2) SA 944 (A) 946A-947B and Meintjes NO v 
Coetzer 2010 (5) SA 186 (SCA) paras 11-17; Papas NO v Motsere Trading CC [2014] ZAGPJHC 144. 
74 See Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 28. 
75 Act 47 of 1937. 
76 See Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 26-28; Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 755-757. See 
also Van der Merwe (1980) TSAR 185-188. 




property clause.78 Finally, in light of the social-obligation norm, the parameters for any 
potential law reform are proposed. 
Chapter 5 – Comparative Study - The Abandonment of Land in South Africa, 
Switzerland and Scotland 
This chapter engages in comparative study and highlights the imperatives of 
undertaking a legal comparison. The approach to the abandonment of land in South 
African, Swiss and Scots law are compared, with the contrasting socio-economic 
contexts of each jurisdiction kept in mind.79 
Chapter 6 – Motivating for Reform 
This chapter evaluates three different contexts to determine whether some form of 
abandonment of or regulated exit from, landownership should be permitted. The 
contexts in question are (1) mining, (2) heritage buildings, and (3) problem buildings 
and unlawful occupation of land. The parameters formulated in Chapter 4 are applied 
to determine whether in light of the burden to which landowners are subjected, as well 
as the adequacy of existing remedies, landowners should be permitted to divest 
themselves of landownership.  
Chapter 7 – Reforming the Law of Abandonment 
In light of the conclusions drawn in Chapter Six, this chapter considers the shape of 
law reform in respect of abandonment or regulated exit from land ownership. It 
suggests that an abandonment statute is necessary to facilitate the necessary reform. 
Suggestions are made as to how such a statute will operate, including the pre-
conditions before the courts become involved in a dispute over abandonment. This 
Chapter also considers recent moves towards realising the possibility of expropriating 
land without compensation, as well as the implications of such a move for the relevance 
of an abandonment statute. 
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
 
78 See Chapter 4 Section 5. 




This chapter provides the conclusion for the thesis. It summarises the conclusions 










Chapter 2: Defining Abandonment – 
History and Overview 
 
1. Introduction 
While this thesis is specifically concerned with the possibility of the abandonment of 
land, locating it within the wider area of abandonment more generally is necessary. 
Such context makes it possible to identify how the abandonment of movables and 
immovables differ. A more in-depth understanding of the nature of abandonment, and 
its history as a legal concept, is crucial. It is crucial not only for determining whether 
the abandonment of landownership is possible in the current legal framework, but for 
formulating necessary law reform. 
The framework for this chapter is the following: First, a definition of abandonment is 




by the ideas of American academics who have addressed the complicated nature of 
abandonment in law.1  
Second, an overview of abandonment as it existed in Roman and Roman-Dutch law is 
provided. Finally, the doctrine of abandonment as it exists in South African law is 
examined. The abandonment of other interests in land, such as servitudes and rights 
granted in terms of legislation, are also canvassed and compared to the abandonment 
of land by the owner. This is accompanied by an analysis of whether the law gives an 
owner an affirmative right to abandon in our law, or whether the doctrine merely serves 
as a means of resolving ownership disputes.2 
2. Abandonment defined 
In South African law, abandonment of property is simply understood as the 
relinquishment of possession with the intention to divest oneself of ownership of a 
thing.3 Once this is done, property becomes res derelictae and open to appropriation 
by another.4 
The essence of abandonment is its unilateral nature.5 The owner, in effect, unilaterally 
divests himself of ownership of a thing he no longer wishes to own. If the cooperation 
of a third party is necessary to effect the disposal of the property in question, 
abandonment in its true sense has not occurred.6 Cooperation of a third party negates 
the unilateral nature of the divestment of ownership, which is the distinguishing feature 
of divestment through abandonment.7 
 
1 E Peñalver “The Illusory Right to Abandon” (2010) 109 Michigan Law Review 191 192ff; L Strahilevitz 
“The Right to Abandon” (2010) 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 355 355ff; L Fennell “Forcings” (2014) 114 Columbia 
Law Review 1297 1310ff. 
2 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 208. 
3 G Muller, R Brits JM Pienaar & Z Boggenpoel Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 6 ed 
(2019) 39, 158; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Part III – Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of 
South African Law 9 ed (2007) 490-491; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 224-227. 
4 Muller et al Silberberg 39, 158; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 490-
491; Van der Merwe Sakereg 224-227. 
“Res derelictae” is the Latin term for an abandoned thing. Such things currently have no owner, having 
been disposed of by their previous owners with the intention of relinquishing ownership. “Res derelictae” 
is to be distinguished from “res nullius”, which refers to things which have never been subject to private 
ownership. See JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 166-168; Muller et al Silberberg 38-39. 
5 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 194. 
6 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 194-195. 




“Unilateral” disposal means that the cooperation of a third party is not required and that 
the disposal is not directed to a particular person.8 One can, but need not, have 
knowledge as to who may ultimately become the owner: it makes no difference to 
whether abandonment has occurred.9 Depending on the location in which 
abandonment occurs, the unwanted thing will usually only be available to a 
“geographically confined pool and a weighted lottery within that pool”.10 Consequently 
there are persons who – due to locale – are more likely to find and appropriate the 
abandoned property before others. Knowing that the appropriator of the abandoned 
thing will more than likely be a resident of the locale in which it was abandoned does 
not negate the fact that abandonment has occurred.11 
3. Abandonment in the Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
The abandonment of ownership has ancient roots, with the concept stemming back to 
Roman law and ultimately being received into our law through the old authorities of 
Roman-Dutch law.12 It is useful to trace the concept’s development, which, on the face 
of it, shows little change from its original sources. 
3.1 Roman law 
The principles of the common law of abandonment find their earliest expression in the 
Roman-law sources. It thus forms the starting point of any historical overview of 
abandonment. 
3.1.1 Movables 
In Roman law, an abandoned thing ceased to belong to the abandoner, and would 
become the property of the first taker.13 Acquisition by the first taker, however, 
 
8 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 197-198. 
9 Strahilevitz (2009-2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 378-380. 
10 Strahilevitz (2009-2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 379. 
11 Strahilevitz (2009-2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 379.  
12 For an overview of abandonment, with use of both Roman and Roman-Dutch sources, see Van der 
Merwe Sakereg 224-227. 
13 PJ du Plessis Borkowski's Textbook on Roman Law (2015) 197-198; Thomas Roman Law 166-168; 
AM Prichard Leage’s Roman Private Law 3 ed (1967) 176-178; W Buckland & P Stein A Text-Book of 
Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 3 ed (1963) 206-207; F Schulz Classical Roman Law (1951) 




depended on whether there was an intention on the part of the owner to relinquish 
ownership of the thing in question.14 
3.1.2 Immovables 
Thomas points out that in the later Roman empire, with regard to agri deserti (deserted 
lands), the principles of derelicto were applied.15 The abandonment (or desertion) of 
land did seem to be an occurrence where it accrued a negative value, such as due to 
high taxation.16 A person could obtain ownership of abandoned land by occupying and 
cultivating it, if two years passed without the owner seeking to assert his title.17 Thomas 
also notes the case of the landowner who abandoned land due to finding himself 
unable to meet the tax obligations that attached to it.18 In these circumstances, should 
the owner fail to return to the land within six months, it would be open to anyone who 
took occupation of the land and undertook to meet the fiscal requirements that came 
with it, to acquire ownership of said land.19 
3.1.3 Other rights in land 
Other interests in land could also be abandoned. In respect of praedial servitudes, 
under Justinian, renunciation resulted in the termination of the servitude, whether such 
was done expressly or indicated by tolerance of conduct that was inconsistent with the 
servitude.20  
 
14 Du Plessis Borkowski's Textbook 197-198; Thomas Roman Law 167-168; Prichard Leage’s 176-178; 
Buckland & Stein Text-Book 206; Schulz Classical 361-362; Buckland A Manual 138; Inst 2 1 48; D 41 
7 7. 
15 Thomas Roman Law 168. 
16 R van den Bergh “Ownership of Agri Deserti During the Later Roman Empire” (2004) 67 THRHR 60 
60-62. 
17 Thomas Roman Law 168 relying on C.Th 5 11 12 and C 11 58 8. See further Van den Bergh (2004) 
THRHR 64-65. 
18 Thomas Roman Law 168 relying on C 11 58 11. 
19 Thomas Roman Law 168 relying on C 11 58 11. See also C 11 59 on imperial legislation bringing agri 
deserti into agricultural economy. 
20 Thomas Roman Law 201; Du Plessis Borkowski's Textbook 174; Buckland & Stein A Text-Book of 




3.2 Roman-Dutch law 
The view of the Roman-Dutch authorities on the abandonment of ownership largely 
reflects the position as it existed in Roman law. It is ultimately these views that inform 
the law of abandonment in South Africa as it exists in the present. 
3.2.1 Movable property 
The abandonment of movables in Roman-Dutch law remained largely unchanged from 
the approach taken in Roman law. So long as a thing is disposed of with the intention 
of relinquishing ownership, abandonment occurs.21 
3.2.2 Immovable property 
The question as to whether in Roman-Dutch law, land could be abandoned and 
rendered res nullius is uncertain.22 The possibility is mentioned by some Roman-Dutch 
authorities.23 
Voet notes that in Roman law, it was open to the owner of land left vacant to take back 
his land within two years from the person who had seized it.24 He goes on to discuss 
a possible distinction between land being left vacant and land that is abandoned, and 
that the recovery of land within two years should be reserved for the former situation.25 
In Voet’s view, it seems the abandonment of land is possible, although not 
unrestricted.26 For example, an owner cannot abandon barren land while retaining 
fertile land in the same area.27 Rather, he must remain owner of all the land, or 
abandon it as a whole.28 
Carey Miller points out that other Roman-Dutch writers, while raising the possibility of 
the abandonment of land, do not favour the unrestricted abandonment of land.29 
Liabilities associated with one’s land ownership, for example, could not be escaped 
 
21 Grotius 2 1 52; Van der Linden Manual 1 7 2(d); Van Leeuwen Censura Forensis 1 2 3 14. 
22 Van der Merwe Sakereg 227. 
23 See DL Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership (1986) 8 relying on Grotius 2 32 3 
and Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 32 3. See also Voet 41 1 10 and Muller et al Silberberg 158n38. 
24 Voet 41 1 10. 
25 Voet 41 1 10. 
26 Voet 41 1 10. 
27 Voet 41 1 10. 
28 Voet 41 1 10. 




through purporting to abandon the land in question.30 For example, Grotius notes that 
land subject to dyke dues31 could not be abandoned, unless the landowner abandoned 
all her property situated on the same polder.32 This is supported by both Van Leeuwen 
and Van der Keessel.33 
As noted, Grotius mentions the possibility of abandoning land. However, his view 
seems to favour such property as accruing to the state rather than being rendered res 
nullius. He lists abandoned land as one of the unappropriated things that the law 
deemed to be the property of the Commonwealth, and in the past was given to the 
Counts so they could be maintained.34 This is supported by Van der Keessel.35 
3.2.3 Other rights in land 
The Roman-Dutch authorities discussed the abandonment of other rights in land in the 
context of the termination of servitudes. It was open to the owner of the dominant 
tenement to abandon a servitude in favour of his land.36 The usufruct37 – a personal 
servitude discussed by the Roman-Dutch authorities - was also open to abandonment 
by its holder.38 As such, abandonment in these circumstances was a fairly simple 
matter. 
3.3 Bridging the historical sources to the modern South African law 
An overview of the doctrine of abandonment as it existed in Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law reveals that the basic principles regarding abandonment have remained static. As 
will be evident from the following overview of abandonment in South African law, the 
 
30 Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership 8 relying on Grotius 2.32.3, Van Leeuwen 
Commentaries 2 3 12 and Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 32 3. 
31 A levy paid towards the administration of dykes. See C Dekker “The Representation of the Freeholders 
in Drainage Districts of Zeeland West of the Scheldt during the Middle Ages” in Acta Historiae 
Neerlandicae/Studies on the History of the Netherlands VIII (1975) 18. 
32 Grotius 2 32 3. A polder is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “a piece of low-lying land 
reclaimed from the sea, a river, etc., and protected by dykes”. See “polder, n.1” in Oxford English 
Dictionary <www.oed.com> (accessed 14-02-2020). 
33 See Van Leeuwen Commentaries 2 3 12 and Van der Keessel Praelectionesi 2 32 3. 
34 Grotius 2 1 54. 
35 Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 32 3. 
36 Van der Merwe Sakereg 537; Grotius 2 37 3; Van Leeuwen Censura Forensis 1 2 14 45; Van Leeuwen 
Commentaries 2 22 2. 
37 An usufruct can be defined as “a limited real right in terms of which the owner or grantor of a thing 
confers on the usufructuary the right to use and enjoy (ius utendi) the thing and to draw both the natural 
and civil fruits (ius fruendi) from the thing to which the usufruct relates”. See Muller et al Silberberg 383. 




basic two requirements remain largely unchanged. These are the relinquishment of 
possession coupled with the intention of no longer remaining owner of the thing.39 
Further threads can be picked up in respect of the abandonment of land when moving 
from the historical sources to modern South African law. Much in line with modern law, 
land ownership in Roman-Dutch law came with obligations that could not be avoided 
through abandonment.40  
4. South African law 
In general, the Roman-Dutch law principles form the bedrock of the South African law 
of abandonment. The approach of our courts has been in line with these principles. 
The law of abandonment has received little attention in major textbooks.41 It often finds 
itself discussed under the heading of occupatio.42 Where the area has found itself the 
subject of academic interest, the focus has generally been on the disputed issue of the 
status of abandoned land, i.e. whether abandoned land becomes res nullius or accrues 
to the state.43 However, the abandonment of movables has received minimal academic 
attention.44  
Given the focus of this dissertation on the abandonment of land, it may be questioned 
why the abandonment of movables is discussed at all. It is useful – and necessary - to 
examine both the abandonment of movables and immovables, as well as other rights 
 
39 Muller et al Silberberg 158; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 490; Van 
der Merwe Sakereg 224; Reck v Mills 1990 (1) SA 751 (A) 757C; S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 
1979 (4) SA 930 (A) 936F-G; Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd. (1906) 23 
SC 169 171. 
40 Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership 8 relying on Grotius 2.32.3, Van Leeuwen 
Commentaries 2 3 12 and Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 32 3. 
41 Muller et al Silberberg 158-160, 305-306; Van der Merwe Sakereg 224-227; Van der Merwe and Pope 
“Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 490-491. 
42 Muller et al Silberberg 158-160; Van der Merwe and Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 
490-491. 
43 CG van der Merwe “Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 2 SA 944 (A)” (1980) TSAR 183; JC 
Sonnekus “Enkele Opmerkings na Aanleiding van die Aanspraak op Bona Vacantia as Sogenaamde 
Regale Reg” (1985) TSAR 121; JC Sonnekus “Grondeise en die Klassifikasie van Grond as Res Nullius 
of as Staatsgrond” (2001) TSAR 84; JC Sonnekus “Abandonnering van Eiendomsreg op Grond end 
Aanspreeklikheid vir Grondbelasting” (2004) TSAR 747. 
44 For the most part, academic attention with regard to movable property in the context of abandonment 
has been focused on shipwrecks and their acquisition. See JC Sonnekus “Besitsverkryging Oor ‘n 
Skeepswrak as Res Nullius: Mills v Reck and Others 1988 3 SA 92 (K)” (1989) TSAR 720 720-730; J 
Bruk An Analysis of the Law Governing the Acquisition of Shipwrecks LLM mini-dissertation University 




in land, for two main reasons. Firstly, the application of the basic principles regarding 
abandonment is much better developed in the context of movables. This development 
contrasts with the abandonment of corporeal immovables, subject to only three cases. 
Secondly, as will become clear in the subsequent comment and analysis section, the 
approach of the law to the abandonment of movables and immovables is not that 
different.45 Similar to Peñalver’s observations in the context of American law,46 the 
South African law displays a general suspicion of abandonment. 
4.1 Movable property 
Abandonment of movable property occurs where an owner relinquishes possession of 
a thing with the intention of no longer retaining ownership of it.47 Once these 
requirements have been met, a thing is rendered res derelicta and thus open to 
acquisition of ownership through occupatio.48 As such, the conventional view of 
abandonment in the South African law is that it is a fairly simple matter. 
The case law on abandonment of movables is sparse. However, S M Goldstein & Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Gerber,49 perhaps best demonstrates how our courts will approach claims 
that movable property has been abandoned. It seems to indicate the courts will take 
into account the nature and circumstances in which allegedly abandoned property is 
found. 
In S M Goldstein, the plaintiff sought damages against the defendant in respect of a 
road roller. After having completed the construction of certain roads using the roller, 
the plaintiff parked it on a construction site used by the defendant. This was done with 
the permission of a foreman who worked for the defendant. To make sure the roller 
could not be easily stolen, the battery was then removed. The roller was later sold by 
the defendant to a scrap metal dealer, and it was subsequently cut up for scrap. The 
plaintiff succeeded with a claim for damages in the court a quo. The defendant 
 
45 See Section 4.4 below. 
46 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 214. 
47 Muller et al Silberberg 158; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 490; Van 
der Merwe Sakereg 224; Reck v Mills 1990 (1) SA 751 (A) 757C; S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 
1979 (4) SA 930 (A) 936F-G; Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd. (1906) 23 
SC 169 171. 
48 Reck v Mills 1990 (1) SA 751 (A) 757D; Underwater Construction and Salvage Co (Pty) Ltd v Bell 
1968 (4) SA 190 (C) 192C-D. 




appealed, arguing that the court a quo should have found that the roller had been 
abandoned, and thus open to appropriation by the defendant.50 
The court found on the evidence that there was nothing indicating an intention to 
abandon the roller.51 While the roller was left on the defendant’s site for an extended 
period of time, it was, according to witnesses, a common practice for heavy industrial 
equipment that is not currently in use to be left in the open.52 The defendant thus should 
have made proper enquiries regarding the status of the roller.53 The appeal 
consequently failed. 
The issue of the abandonment of movable property has also arisen in the context of 
shipwrecks and their cargo. The court in Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage 
Syndicate Ltd54 set out a strict intention requirement for determining whether the cargo 
of a wreck can be regarded as abandoned. The case involved the underwriters of the 
owners of the shipwreck, on the one hand, and a syndicate that had begun salvaging 
operations in the belief the wreck and its cargo had been abandoned, on the other. 
The court stated that to lay claim to cargo against the original owners, one would be 
required to show that said owners had altogether abandoned the cargo.55 With regards 
to cargo, it is insufficient to show that the owner has made no attempts to recover his 
property for a number of years.56 There is the possibility that the owner may have been 
waiting for a new technological advancement that would facilitate the recovery of his 
property.57 As such, it could not be said that the wreck and its cargo had been 
abandoned. 
It is thus clear that our courts will be careful in finding that valuable property has been 













towards (or a prolonged absence from) the property automatically equates to the 
required intention for a finding of abandonment.58  
Subsequent abandonment case law in the context of shipwrecks did not involve the 
owner, and there was no dispute as to whether the wreck and its cargo constituted res 
derelictae. Rather, the court was concerned with abandonment in the context of the 
competing ownership claims of two parties over salvaged parts of a wreck.  
In Underwater Construction and Salvage Co (Pty) Ltd v Bell,59 the plaintiff had 
separated four propeller blades from a wreck, which neither party disputed was res 
nullius.60 Two were taken ashore while the other two were left on the seabed with a 
marker attached to them.61 The defendant then later visited the site of the wreck and 
removed the two propeller blades.62 The defendant had argued that the plaintiff had 
forfeited any rights in the two propeller blades by not remaining in possession of 
them.63 This argument was rejected by the court. The propeller blades were res 
derelictae, and once seized with the intention of acquiring ownership, it did not matter 
that the plaintiff did not remain in possession.64 
In Reck v Mills,65 there was again no dispute that the wreck was abandoned by both 
its original owners as well as its insurers.66 Salvage from the wreck, such as the 
condenser the respondent was seeking to salvage, was thus open to appropriation by 
the first taker.67 The question was rather whether by tying a rope with a buoy on the 
other end established physical control of the condenser. Such was necessary to show 
that the respondent had been wrongfully deprived by the appellant. The court found 
that in the circumstances that sufficient physical control had not been established.68 
 
58 Sonnekus (1985) TSAR 140; S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 1979 (4) SA 930 (A) 936F-G; 
Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd. (1906) 23 SC 169 171. Although it dealt 
with the abandonment of land, see also Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 2 SA 944 (A) 947A-
D. 













4.2 Immovable property 
Whether the abandonment of immovable property in the South African law is possible 
is a point of contention,69 particularly in light of the publicity principle.70 The principle is 
served in respect of movables through relinquishing possession.71 Whether it may 
similarly be served in respect of land is open to question, given the failure of the 
legislation to provide a specific mechanism through which the owner’s name can be 
struck from the title deed to the land.72 This failure by legislation to provide a 
mechanism through which land can be abandoned is key, as registration in the deeds 
registry operates to give effect to the publicity principle concerning changes in 
ownership of land.73  
This failure to provide a specific mechanism to strike the owner’s name from the title 
deed will be explored in more detail in the subsequent chapter. However, the potential 
legal consequences of abandoning land are also important to consider, given that they 
are the primary motivation for the theoretical engagement this thesis seeks to provide. 
The consequences of abandonment are key to determining whether or not such 
abandonment should be permitted, and under what circumstances. The following 
section proceeds on the assumption that the abandonment of land is possible, to 
explore the question as to what becomes of abandoned land. The courts in the cases 
analysed below themselves appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the 
abandonment of landownership is possible,74 but that it simply did not occur on the 
facts of those cases. It is thus crucial to review these cases before proceeding with the 
in-depth analysis of the subsequent chapter. 
 
69 See Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 747ff; H Mostert “No Right to Neglect? Exploratory Observations on How 
Policy Choices Challenge the Basic Principles of Property” in S Scott & J van Wyk (eds) Property Law 
under Scrutiny (2015) 27; Van der Merwe (1980) SALJ 186-188. See also Carey Miller The Acquisition 
and Protection of Ownership 9. 
70 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 27. 
71 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 26-27. 
72 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 26-27; Van der Merwe (1980) SALJ 186-188; 
Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership 9. 
73 Muller et al Silberberg 93-94; Van der Merwe and Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 410; 
Van der Merwe Sakereg 14. 




4.2.1 Bona vacantia or res nullius? 
If one accepts that the abandonment of land is possible, this raises the further question 
as to what becomes of such abandoned land. The standard view holds that abandoned 
immovable property is rendered bona vacantia.75 However, Sonnekus offers a 
dissenting view, arguing that abandoned immovable property is rendered res nullius, 
thus rendering it open to appropriation by the first taker.76 
Sonnekus has expressed his displeasure with the suggestion that the rule of bona 
vacantia has been received into our law and has advised caution of unfounded state 
claims to private property.77 According to the rule of bona vacantia, the state has a 
claim to, among other things, abandoned immovable property.78 On his reading of the 
historical sources, the regal privilege to ownerless or abandoned property never 
formed part of the Roman-Dutch law.79 
What about the aforementioned view put forward by Grotius that abandoned land 
becomes property of the Commonwealth (i.e. the state)?80 Sonnekus attributes views 
such as this on the part of Roman-Dutch jurists to the influence of French jurists of the 
day.81 In his view, they incorrectly believed that ownerless land became property of the 
state, when no such rule existed in the law of their own land.82 
As such, he argues that the principle of bona vacantia was never received into our law 
when Roman-Dutch law was transplanted at the Cape.83 He provides further support 
for his view by pointing out the manner in which land could be obtained through 
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occupatio in the early colonial Cape.84 So long as one occupied such land with the 
necessary animus domini, one could obtain ownership through original acquisition.85 
Furthermore, he argues that, despite the position in English law that all land is owned 
by the crown,86 the British occupation never resulted in the alteration of the legal 
position at the Cape.87 This failure to alter the legal position at the Cape is due to the 
British policy that the law of conquered and ceded territories remains in force until 
expressly changed through statute.88 The royal prerogative of the crown to ownerless 
land was never recognised in South Africa.89 As a consequence, Sonnekus argues 
that ownerless land in South Africa is thus res nullius.90 
Sonnekus further points out that the early South African case law contains little mention 
of the concept of bona vacantia.91 These cases do not deal with land, but rather with 
unclaimed inheritances. In Ex parte Leeuw,92 the court stated that the crown was not 
entitled to exercise its right to a vacant inheritance until 40 years have passed.93 
Despite not concerning land, Sonnekus holds that this shows that the South African 
law never received the English rule concerning the claim of the crown to bona 
vacantia.94  
There are later cases in which courts seemed to accept the rule of bona vacantia in 
our law. Again these cases were not concerned with land.95 However, according to 
Sonnekus, these cases often seemed to be decided on the mistaken assumption that 
the rule of bona vacantia forms part of our law.96 The judges in these cases did not 
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interrogate the pedigree of the bona vacantia rule in our law in any detail.97 However, 
despite Sonnekus’ objections regarding its pedigree, the rule of bona vacantia has 
become accepted by the courts, academics, and those in practice with regard to assets 
belonging to a deregistered company to which nobody can establish title.98 This 
position is unlikely to change, and the rule of bona vacantia in these circumstances 
has solidified in our law. The position regarding unclaimed inheritances is also that 
such property is rendered bona vacantia,99 although this position is regulated by 
legislation now.100 
Finally, to return to the issue of abandoned land, Sonnekus suggests that the legal 
position in South African law was never explicitly changed by statute.101 Thus the 
common law position in respect of unowned land prevails.102 In particular, no clear 
definition of state land exists in statute law, or at least brings unowned land within its 
scope.103 For example, in the State Land Disposal Act,104 “State land” is defined as 
land in which the right of disposal vests in the State President, as well as “right in 
respect of State land”.105 This definition evidently does not seem to bring unowned land 
within its scope. 
Section 18 of the Deeds Registries Act106 creates some uncertainty.107 This section 
provides for the transfer of state land. The Act does not provide a definition of state 
land. Of particular interest, though, is section 18(1) which discusses the transfer of 
“unalienated state land”. Such land can only be transferred by a duly authorised deed 
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of grant. Nel notes that the term “unalienated state land” refers to land that has never 
been alienated (granted into private ownership).108 Land which the state has alienated 
in the past, but has since reacquired, is referred to as “acquired state land”.109 This 
categorisation is to reflect that the land in question previously formed the subject of 
private ownership.110 
Does this refer to all unowned land, including that which has intentionally been 
abandoned by its owner, bringing such under the ownership of the state? A more 
express statement to this effect would be desirable if this was the intention. In the 
absence of a clearer definition, it would seem that Sonnekus is correct in his 
observation that no clear definition of “state land” exists in statute law.111 
Does Sonnekus’ view that abandoned land is rendered res nullius hold up? Certainly, 
he is correct in his assertion that legislation does not provide us with a clear answer.112 
However, as has been stated, most academics support the view that abandoned land, 
(should such abandonment be possible) accrues to the state.113 In this respect, they 
enjoy the support of old authorities such as Grotius and Van der Keessel.114 Sonnekus’ 
dismisses such statements by Roman-Dutch authorities on the ground of possible 
influence by the French jurists of the day.115  
However, if Sonnekus is correct in his evaluation of the Roman-Dutch sources and the 
influence of French jurists, the standard view remains preferable. This contention is 
made in light of the need for someone to take responsibility for the land, even if that is 
the State, so as to prevent immovable properties become hazards.116 The proliferation 
of immovable properties which are res derelictae in law is undesirable. For this reason, 
the standard view, supported by the statements of Grotius and Van der Kessel,117 
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should be accepted as the position in South African law. The uncertainty that prevails 
in this area of property law justifies the theoretical engagement provided by this thesis. 
If Sonnekus’ analysis of the historical and legal sources is correct, however, then the 
state is not the owner of all unowned and abandoned land in South Africa. It would 
thus be necessary for the position to be changed explicitly through statute law. In 
recent years, there appeared to be a shift in this direction with the Green Paper on 
Land Reform, 2011.118 The Green Paper envisages land as a “national asset”.119 The 
implications of this still need to be clarified.120 The possibility that this will entail the 
nationalisation of land has been raised.121 Whether or not the legislation that stems 
from the policy direction of the Green Paper results in nationalisation of land, it is 
doubtful that abandoned or ownerless land would be rendered res nullius under such 
a regime. However, the nationalisation of land does not appear to be an objective of 
the current government. Rather, the goal of government at present appears to be a 
moderate form expropriation without compensation, targeting unused or underutilised 
land.122 
4.2.2 The approach of the courts to the abandonment of land 
Our courts have taken a strict approach in determining whether valuable property has 
been abandoned.123 Apathy on the part of the owner of valuable property is thus 
insufficient to establish an intention to abandon.124 Given the value attached to 
immovable property, a court will not find that abandonment has occurred absent an 
express intention to do so on the part of the owner. Such an approach was taken in 
Sonnendecker, Meintjes NO v Coetzer,125 and Papas NO v Motsere Trading CC.126 
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These are currently the only cases in which the possibility of the abandonment of land 
has been considered by our courts. 
In Sonnendecker, the respondent sought to obtain title to the land in question on the 
basis of acquisitive prescription while the appellant argued the land had been 
abandoned, thus rendering it bona vacantia. The land in question was registered in the 
name of Firmin. Firmin originated from the Baltic islands and had no family living in 
South Africa. Firmin could not be tracked down, with it appearing that he had returned 
to the Baltic Islands. The court a quo described the land as a wasteland at the time the 
respondent took possession of it. Furthermore, Firmin had not paid tax on the land 
from 1925 to 1934. It thus seems from the surrounding circumstances that the 
registered owner had a long-term disinterest in his land. 
The respondent’s claim based on acquisitive prescription failed in the court a quo, and 
he did not appeal the decision. The appellant’s claim based on abandonment also 
failed in the court a quo, leading it to appeal to the Appellate Division (AD) as it was 
then known. The AD was thus concerned only with the appellant’s claim based on 
abandonment of the land. The court took note of the true owner’s apparent disinterest 
in the land. However, it was not willing to conclude that the land had been abandoned 
in the absence of an express indication on behalf of the owner.127 Quoting the judgment 
of the court a quo, the possibility that the owner intended to retain the land as a long-
term investment could not be discounted.128 Nor could the possibility be ignored that 
he was unable to return to South Africa and his land for compelling reasons.129 Thus 
the Appellate Division rejected the appellant’s appeal, finding that it was not possible 
to establish an intention to abandon land on the evidence available. 
In the absence of an express intention to abandon on the part of the owner, the court 
in Sonnendecker did not have an opportunity to engage with some of the more 
pertinent questions related to the abandonment of land. The court seemed to take it 
for granted that, should abandonment be established, the land would be rendered bona 
vacantia. It also did not provide clarity on how one may demonstrate an intention to 
abandon land in light of the publicity principle that must be given effect when ownership 
 






in land changes.130 This case thus yields little as concerns the abandonment of land, 
other than the court’s affirmation that more than sheer apathy on the part of a 
landowner is required to establish an intention to abandon. 
Meintjes NO’s circumstances were different to Sonnendecker. In Meintjes NO, the 
defendants had orchestrated the transfer of portions of a farm belonging to the 
deceased into their own names without her knowledge, prior to her death. The transfer 
was achieved through the falsification of documents. At no point did the deceased sign 
the relevant documents necessary to facilitate transfer. The plaintiff, in his capacity as 
executor of the deceased’s estate, brought an action seeking rectification of the title 
deeds to reflect the deceased estate as owner of the portions of the farm.131 
Prior to her death, the deceased had become aware of the fact that the two portions of 
her farm had been transferred into the names of the two defendants. The defendants 
argued that given the lack of action on the deceased’s part to recover the two portions 
of the farm, the deceased had abandoned her rights to the two portions. The court 
rejected this argument. The defendants bore the onus to prove abandonment on the 
part of the deceased.132 Registration of the property in the defendants’ names was 
insufficient to indicate ownership.133 Instead, there needs to be a clear intention to 
abandon on the part of the owner.134 
The defendants were unable to prove an intention to abandon the property. Even 
though the deceased did not take steps to recover her property,135 the court did not 
find this sufficient to establish that abandonment had occurred.136 As in Sonnendecker, 
the court seemed unwilling to find that land had been abandoned in the absence of an 
express intention to do so by the landowner. 
The question as to what would happen to land should it be found to be abandoned was 
not raised in Meintjes NO. The defendants seemed to assume that, should a finding of 
abandonment be made, their position as owners would be confirmed. Given the 
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weakness of the defendants’ argument, the court did not seem to give any thought as 
to what the consequences of a finding of abandonment would be. Furthermore, unlike 
in the case of Sonnendecker, it was in neither parties’ interest that the land be declared 
bona vacantia on the ground that the owner had abandoned her ownership. This was 
likely the reason for the court’s failure to consider the consequences of abandonment. 
A further judgment in which the abandonment of land was raised is that of Papas 
NO.137 Prior to his passing, the now deceased registered owner of the property in 
question had entered into what was termed an “abandonment agreement” with the City 
of Johannesburg.138 The terms of the agreement stated that the deceased 
“abandoned” the property to the City of Johannesburg, which was set-off against what 
the deceased owed in taxes and municipal service fees.139 Papas, the executor of the 
deceased estate, discovered in 2012 that the property had been fraudulently 
transferred to the first respondent (Motsere Trading CC), and then subsequently 
transferred to the second respondent (Temis Business Enterprises CC). The second 
respondent was innocent in respect of the fraud. 
The second respondent, Temis, opposed the application by the executor seeking the 
setting aside of the fraudulent transfers. This opposition was founded on the claim that 
the executor lacked the necessary locus standi. While not claiming ownership of the 
property itself, Temis argued that the conclusion of the “abandonment agreement” by 
the deceased meant that the property was “unilaterally abandoned” to the City of 
Johannesburg.140 
The court stated that, for abandonment to occur, there must be an intention to do so 
on the part of the owner.141 The existence of such an intention must be established on 
the facts of the case.142 
The court correctly found that no intention to abandon could be established on the facts 
of the case.143 The agreement did not constitute an “abandonment” of the property by 
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the deceased, but rather a transfer in return for a quid pro quo.144 The deceased 
remained the registered owner of the property in question until registration of the 
property in the name of the City of Johannesburg.145 The mere use of the words 
“abandon” or “abandonment” does not transform what is effectively a bilateral 
agreement to transfer property in return for a quid pro quo into abandonment.146 As 
such, the court ordered the fraudulent transfers to be set aside.147 
As in Sonnendecker and Meintjes, the question as to whether abandonment would be 
possible – should an intention to abandon be established on the facts – was not raised. 
However, remarks by the court seem to indicate it may have been of the view that 
abandonment is possible, and that the consequence would be that such property would 
be res derelictae and open to appropriation.148 No mention was made of the view that 
abandoned immovable property is rendered bona vacantia.149 However, given that the 
court did not engage with these questions more closely – seeing as there was no 
intention to abandon in the first place – any remarks made in this respect are of little 
consequence. 
4.3 Other rights in land 
Other rights in land are open to abandonment as well. Differences exist depending on 
whether these are rights that exist at common law, such as servitudes, or statutory 
rights, such as rights granted in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act.150 
4.3.1 Common law: servitudes 
It is open to the holder of a servitude to abandon it. Clear proof that such an intention 
to abandon existed is required.151 Such intention need not be express, as it is possible 
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to infer the intention from the conduct of the servitude holder or owner of the dominant 
tenement.152 
It has been said, however, that a servitude may not be abandoned if the servient 
tenement stood to be seriously harmed through such abandonment.153 Authority for 
this view stems from Du Plessis v Philipstown Municipality.154 In this case, the 
Philipstown Municipality had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, allowing it to 
divert a river flowing over his land. To facilitate the diversion of the river, a weir and a 
wall were constructed, which resulted in water being dammed above the wall on the 
plaintiff’s land. In this case, the municipality sought an order declaring it entitled to 
abandon its servitude and the wall. Ultimately, the river would be diverted back to its 
original course. 
The nature of the land had been altered through the diversion of the river, and there 
was no guarantee that the municipality could restore the land to its natural state once 
the river was restored to its original course. The plaintiff was thus faced with the 
possibility of serious harm should the river be diverted back to its original course. Given 
this possibility, the court found that the municipality was not entitled to abandon its 
servitude and remove the wall.155 The municipality requested that if the court was 
unwilling to allow it to remove the wall, it should still be entitled to abandon the servitude 
and the wall, thus leaving the river flowing along its current course. This request was 
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also rejected by the court.156 The court stated that the municipality could not abandon 
its duties concerning the wall, and would have to continue maintaining the wall.157 
The general interpretation of this decision is that servitudes cannot be abandoned 
where doing so would result in the servient tenement being seriously harmed.158 The 
court did not indicate that its decision was limited to circumstances in which an organ 
of state sought to abandon a servitude, and academics have not interpreted the 
decision as implying such a limitation to the scope of the decision.159 
Servitudes can thus be freely abandoned, except in the circumstances that such 
abandonment will have negative consequences for the servient tenement.160 In these 
circumstances, an owner of a dominant tenement may be expected to retain his 
servitude, and maintain any works connected thereto. 
4.3.2 Statutory rights in land 
There are a number of statutory real rights one can hold in another’s land.161 The two 
that will be canvassed here are water servitudes in terms of the National Water Act162 
and rights in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act.163 The 
reason for choosing these two Acts is not only that they make provision for the granting 
of limited real rights. The rights granted in terms of these Acts also have in-built 
obligations, which as will become clear, cannot be avoided through abandonment. 
4.3.2.1 Water servitudes 
The National Water Act provides for servitudes in respect of water sources.164 Where 
it is necessary to make effective use of water, a person authorised to use water in 
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Servitudes granted in terms of the Act may be either personal or praedial.165 These 
servitudes can be cancelled for a number of reasons,166 such as if the relevant 
authorisation to use water has been terminated,167 or if the rights and obligations 
attaching to the servitude have not been exercised on the burdened land “for a 
continuous period of three years”.168 The Act further allows for a servitude granted in 
terms of its provisions to be cancelled for “any other lawful reason”.169 Such 
cancellation occurs at the behest of the landowner, rather than the servitude holder. 
One can assume that where the Act has not expressly altered the common law, the 
common-law rules regarding servitudes will apply to these servitudes granted in terms 
of the legislation. It would thus be possible to abandon any servitude granted in terms 
of the Act, subject to the qualification that a servitude cannot be abandoned if it would 
result in significant harm to the servient tenement.170 The Act, however, does not allow 
the servitude holder to walk away from the burdened land. On termination of the 
servitude it is required that “the holder of the servitude must rehabilitate the land 
subject to the servitude to the extent that this is reasonably possible”.171 
4.3.2.2 Rights in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) 
It is warranted to mention the issue of abandonment of rights granted in terms of the 
MPRDA to provide a complete picture of abandonment under South African law. 
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However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into the depth the subject 
requires.172 
The MPRDA does appear to envisage the possibility of abandoning rights accorded in 
terms of its provisions,173 although little in the way of guidance has been provided as 
to how this may be achieved.174 Section 107(1)(g) does empower the Minister to make 
regulations regarding the abandonment of any permit, licence, certificate and 
permission granted in terms of the Act. The regulations, however, are equally silent as 
to how one may abandon rights in terms of the MPRDA.175 
The provision which appears to permit the abandonment of rights in terms of the 
MPRDA is section 11(1). A prospecting right or mining right may only be ceded, 
transferred, let, sublet, assigned, alienated or “otherwise disposed of” with the 
permission of the Minister.176 It has been suggested, and it appears most likely, 
abandonment would fall within the ambit of this section.177 Furthermore, section 56(f) 
provides that any right or permission granted in terms of the Act shall lapse when 
abandoned.178 
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amendment, modification, deduction, abandonment or cancellation shall be accompanied by a plan or 
a diagram depicting the area affected”. Such suggests that abandonment of rights granted in terms of 
the MPRDA must be registered. See Hart Abandonment 22-23. See further Van der Schyff’s discussion 
of the possibility of abandoning rights in terms of the provisions of the MPRDA: E van der Schyff Property 




Abandonment of a right in terms of the MPRDA, however such may be achieved, does 
not mean that the holder is free of liabilities.179 The holder of prospecting right, mining 
right, retention permit or mining permit that ceased to exist retains liability for the 
environmental damage caused through mining activities.180 The liability for 
rehabilitation of the land continues until the holder is granted a closure certificate by 
the Minister.181 On the abandonment of a right granted in terms of the MPRDA, the 
holder of such a right must apply for a closure certificate.182 No closure certificate can 
be granted until the environmental obligations of the right holder have been 
addressed.183 
4.3.3 Customary law rights in land 
Land tenure rights granted in terms of customary law are open to abandonment.184 
Ultimately, though, such land does not become open to appropriation by others, but is 
subject to the reversionary interests of chiefs.185  
Express, public disavowments of land rights in the customary law context would be 
unusual, according to Bennett.186 Abandonment of customary law rights in land are 
usually inferred from extended periods of non-use which are deemed to be 
unreasonably long.187 What is considered unreasonable will depend on community 
practice.188 The traditional authorities in some areas have set prescribed periods for 
what constitutes a period of permissible absence from land before rights are lost.189 
Abandonment of customary land rights differs from the common law of abandonment. 
At common law, abandonment has said to occur when possession of property is 
relinquished with the intention of no longer remaining owner.190 In customary law, 
unless there is an express intention to abandon on the part of the right-holder, rights 
 
179 Van der Schyff Property 509-510. 
180 Section 43(1). 
181 Section 43(1). 
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seem to be lost on the basis of a period of non-use, deemed unreasonable by the 
community.191 This loss can occur without a closer scrutiny of the facts to determine 
whether there was either an express or inferred intention to abandon on the part of the 
right holder. 
Loss of rights in the manner outlined above seem to have more in common with 
prescription.192 However, as Bennett points out, prescription itself, as far as the 
acquisition of rights is concerned, is at odds with customary law.193 In customary law, 
rights in land by their nature depend on consent, while to acquire rights through 
prescription requires possession be non-precarious.194 
4.4 Comment and analysis 
Much in line with Peñalver’s observation regarding the abandonment jurisprudence in 
the United States,195 the South African case law on the abandonment of ownership 
has never been concerned with confirming an actual right to abandon ownership of 
property. Rather, the case law is predominantly concerned with settling ownership 
disputes. Such disputes can be between the original owner and the would-be 
appropriator, or between two parties competing to claim to property about which there 
was no dispute regarding its status as res derelictae. The South African courts have 
yet to consider a case in which an owner has raised abandonment of corporeal 
property as a defence, asserting her right to do so.  
As Peñalver puts it:196 
[abandonment] provides a useful mechanism for resolving disputes over 
ownership after the fact, when there are multiple parties willing and able 
to assert responsibility for ownership of the item … it does nothing 
affirmatively to empower owners to unilaterally sever their ties to an item 
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195 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 208. 




of property in the absence of another party who wishes to accept 
responsibility for it. 
An example of the former is seen in cases such as S M Goldstein and Salvage 
Association. Circumstances may arise where a third party acts on the assumption that 
movable property has been abandoned. The court must then make a decision, based 
on the principles that govern the abandonment of ownership in the South African 
common law, as to whether to come to the aid of the original owner or protect the claim 
of the appropriator.197 More often than not, however, given the strict requirements laid 
down with respect to the requisite intention required for valuable property to be 
regarded as abandoned, the court will support the claim of the original owner. 
The next set of cases concern property whose status as res derelictae is not in dispute, 
at least prior to an attempted appropriation by the parties involved. In these cases, the 
court must decide as to whose attempt at appropriation complied with the requirements 
for occupatio of unowned property. Again, there is no mention of a right to abandon. 
The property is only classed as abandoned for the purpose of allowing another party 
to appropriate it, not for the purpose of protecting some right of the long-lost owner to 
dispose of her property as she sees fit.198 
This approach can be seen in the context of land as well. At no point has a landowner 
approached a court to assert a right to abandon her land to avoid the liabilities that 
attach to her ownership of that land. Instead, as Sonnendecker, Meintjes NO and 
Papas NO make clear, abandonment only operates in the context of ownership 
disputes regarding land, where the abandonment of said land by the original owner 
would lead to the acquisition of ownership by one of the parties. Such an approach is 
not new. As noted above, even the Roman-Dutch authorities recognised that 
abandonment could not serve as an escape from one’s obligations as landowner.199 
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A defence of abandonment is unlikely to serve to allow one to escape liability stemming 
from one’s property.200 In respect of various statutory incorporeal property rights, such 
liability is directly built into the right itself.201 
The only case in which a party has asserted their right to abandon, in the face of 
opposition from another party to a finding of abandonment, is in the context of 
servitudes. Servitudes can (usually) be freely abandoned, as the circumstances in 
which such abandonment can have an external impact are few and far between. 
However, where the possibility of a negative external impact from the abandonment of 
a servitude arises, it would seem that no right to abandon such a servitude exists.202 
As in Du Plessis v Philipstown Municipality, the servitude holder will likely find herself 
unable to free herself from the servitude, and obliged to maintain any related 
infrastructure. 
Only where abandonment has no external impact, does it appear possible to abandon 
property freely. In all other circumstances, one will need to follow the (often strict) 
guidelines provided by law for disposal,203 or even find themselves unable to relinquish 
ownership of the property in question.204 This applies in respect of both corporeal and 
incorporeal property. The manner in which the doctrine of abandonment of corporeal 
movables has been negated, or at least highly streamlined, by legislation governing 
the disposal of unwanted property, is often overlooked.205 It is, however, beyond the 
 
200 See Peñalver’s observations regarding derelict boats in Florida, where it would be no defence for the 
owner to rely the doctrine of abandonment to avoid liability. Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 208. 
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on owners in terms of the National Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008. With regard to 
immovable property, the common law doctrine of abandonment will more than likely not serve as a 
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scope of this thesis to explore the abandonment of movables and the regulation of 
such in further detail. 
What about land? Whether the abandonment of land is possible seems uncertain from 
the above overview. Sonnekus has put forward a compelling argument as to why 
abandoned land may be rendered res nullius.206 However, for the aforementioned 
reasons, the standard view that abandoned land is to be rendered bona vacantia is to 
be preferred. Either way, whether the abandonment of land is possible in the absence 
of any mechanism to provide for the publicity principle is questionable.207  
Publicity is a core principle of property law.208 It requires “consonance between the 
legal and the factual situations”.209 As such, the existence of a real right and its 
acquisition (or loss) should be apparent to the world at large.210 Regarding 
abandonment specifically, in the case of movables, the publicity principle can be 
served through the relinquishment of possession. In the case of land, in the absence 
of a mechanism through which a person’s name can be struck from the title deed, it is 
difficult to see how the required publicity for abandonment can be achieved.211 The 
cases in which the abandonment of land has been alleged were decided purely on the 
basis of intention. It was thus unnecessary for the courts to have grappled with the 
issue of how the publicity principle may be served in the abandonment context. 
The uncertainty as to whether the abandonment of land is even possible, in line with 
our law’s requirements for the abandonment of property, may reflect a general 
suspicion of abandonment by our law.212 Our law regarding abandonment does not 
significantly differ from the American approach to abandonment set out by Peñalver.213 
Abandonment appears to be heavily regulated. The abandonment of land, while not 
being directly addressed by legislation, does not appear to be an exception. Possibly 
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the failure to address the question in the relevant legislation, i.e. the Deeds Registries 
Act, could reflect an intention that the abandonment of land should not be possible. 
Such an intention would not be surprising, given the negative externalities that can 
arise from the (informal) abandonment of land, and the attempts by legislators to hold 
landowners accountable.214 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the concept of abandonment. The historical 
development of the requirements for abandonment, and the way it operated in respect 
of different types of property, has been outlined. This culminated in an overview of the 
doctrine of abandonment as it exists in South African law, and how the requirements 
for abandonment have been applied in case law. The abandonment of statutory rights 
has also been addressed. 
Most important to take away from the above is that nothing in the case law appears to 
support a right to abandon on the part of the owner or right holder. In the one case in 
which such a right was asserted, where abandonment of a servitude would have 
negative external consequences for the servient owner, the court rejected the 
existence of any such right on the part of the holder.215 Rather, as asserted by 
Peñalver, the doctrine of abandonment finds its greatest application in the context of 
ownership disputes.216 
Regarding land specifically, there are compelling arguments on both sides as to 
whether abandoned land becomes res nullius or bona vacantia.217 For reasons of 
policy as well as support from Grotius and Van der Keessel,218 it is submitted that the 
latter approach is to be preferred. However, the possibility of the abandonment of land, 
considering the publicity principle, has not been adequately addressed, our courts 
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finding against abandonment purely on the basis of intention.219 Such may reflect a 
general suspicion of abandonment in our law.220 
Following the overview of the concept of abandonment, as well as the South Africa law 
of abandonment as it stands, it is necessary to engage with the question as to whether 
abandonment is possible in the prevailing legal framework. This is the subject to which 
this thesis now turns. 
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South African scholars have paid scant attention to the abandonment of land.1 The 
primary debate has centred on the consequences of such abandonment, particularly, 
whether abandonment renders land bona vacantia,2 or res derelictae.3 The former 
approach is preferred for policy reasons.4 However, it is premature to consider the 
consequences of abandonment before analysing whether the abandonment of land is 
possible in South African law. That is the focus of this chapter. 
2. Legal possibility of abandoning land: differing views 
Only Sonnekus and Mostert have engaged with the question of whether land can be 
abandoned under South African law in any detail and they have reached opposite 
conclusions. Sonnekus argues that the abandonment of land is possible in the absence 
of registration actions, which are only necessary to bring some formality to the 
abandonment in question.5 To support this, he relies on the negative system of 
registration that prevails in South Africa.6 In terms of the negative system of 
registration, the position in the Deeds Registry is not guaranteed to reflect the correct 
legal position regarding the existence of real rights in the land.7  
 
1 See the more detailed discussion in Chapter 2 Section 4. 
2 CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Part III – Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law 9 ed (2007) 405 492; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 227; CG van der Merwe “Minister 
van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 2 SA 944 (A)” (1980) TSAR 183 187-188; DL Carey Miller The 
Acquisition and Protection of Ownership (1986) 8-9. 
3 JC Sonnekus “Enkele Opmerkings na Aanleiding van die Aanspraak op Bona Vacantia as 
Sogenaamde Regale Reg” (1985) TSAR 121 121ff; JC Sonnekus “Grondeise en die Klassifikasie van 
Grond as Res Nullius of as Staatsgrond” (2001) TSAR 84 91ff. 
4 See Chapter 2 Section 4.2.1. 
5 JC Sonnekus “Abandonnering van Eiendomsreg op Grond end Aanspreeklikheid vir Grondbelasting” 
(2004) TSAR 747 751ff. 
6 Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 756. 
7 Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 537; G Muller, R Brits, JM Pienaar & 
Z Boggenpoel Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 6 ed (2019) 260-261; Van der Merwe 





Mostert reaches the opposite conclusion, finding that in view of the prevailing law, it is 
not possible to abandon land in South Africa.8 She primarily relies on the principle of 
publicity to support this assertion.9 Registration actions give effect to the principle of 
publicity concerning changes of proprietary relations in the land.10 According to 
Mostert, in the absence of a specific mechanism in the Deeds Registries Act,11  
abandonment of land is not possible.12 
Before engaging with these arguments, it is beneficial to set the parameters of the 
argument found in this chapter. The parameters of the argument are followed by an 
introduction of the important concepts relevant to the arguments put forward by 
Sonnekus and Mostert. Finally, their respective arguments are analysed and critiqued. 
2.1 Parameters of the Discourse 
Loss and acquisition are often intertwined. In the case of derivative acquisition of 
ownership, loss and acquisition occur simultaneously. Once the parties reach the real 
agreement and delivery occurs (whether actual or constructive), one loses ownership 
and the other acquires ownership.13 Similarly, in most forms of original acquisition of 
ownership (the exception being occupatio, where the acquired property for whatever 
reason is currently unowned14), loss and acquisition occur simultaneously. For 
example, in the context of prescription, the moment the requirement of an uninterrupted 
period of possession as-if-owner is met, the previous owner loses ownership while the 
acquirer acquires ownership.15 
Abandonment is different. Abandonment is a form of loss of ownership, not a form of 
acquisition. As such, the rules regulating the acquisition of ownership cannot determine 
the rules regarding abandonment. Abandonment thus needs to be evaluated in its own 
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particular context. There is no automatic acquirer, at least not in the case of movables. 
The standard view regarding the consequences of abandonment of immovable 
property is that it accrues to the state.16 It otherwise operates purely as a form of loss, 
in no way inherently connected to acquisition. The only similar action, which operates 
as a pure form of loss of property, is destruction.17 Abandonment thus needs to be 
considered in the context of loss, separate from the context of acquisition. 
Nevertheless, there are some common rules that apply to both loss and acquisition, 
given that they are both concerned with changes in proprietary relations. As explained 
by Carey Miller and Pope, “the rules governing acquisition of ownership serve to 
constrain unfettered intention and to ensure sufficient publicity”.18 Loss of ownership 
similarly requires effect be given to the principle of publicity, and cannot occur purely 
on the basis of “unfettered intention”. In most contexts, loss of ownership depends on 
the acts that ensure publicity in the acquisition context, due to loss being often 
intertwined with acquisition.  
However, where loss occurs on its own, independent of a form of acquisition that can 
be observed by third parties, it is necessary that acts are performed to give effect to 
the principle of publicity. In the context of movables, this is a simple matter, as the 
relinquishing of possession gives effect to the publicity principle.19 However, whether 
this is possible in the context of immovables, without a specific mechanism in the 
Deeds Registries Act, has been subject to doubt.20 Before proceeding to engage with 
the relevant arguments about the possibility of abandoning landownership in the South 
African law, it is necessary to introduce some important concepts.  
 
16 Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 492; Van der Merwe Sakereg 227; 
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2.2 Core concepts 
There are several important concepts that need to be kept in mind, not only regarding 
the rules that regulate acquisition, but also concerning the rules about loss. These are 
the negative system of registration that prevails in South African law and the principle 
of publicity. 
2.2.1 Negative system of registration 
In a negative system of registration, there is no guarantee that the land register is 
correct.21 The land register may, for various reasons, not reflect the true legal position 
of proprietary relations in respect of a parcel of land. The land register may be 
incomplete, or even incorrect.22 For example, proprietary relations may have changed 
through an original mode of acquisition such as acquisitive prescription, or registration 
in another party’s name may have been effected through fraud. In the former case, 
proprietary relations change despite the absence of registration actions.23 In the latter, 
proprietary relations do not change, despite the occurrence of registration actions.24 
A negative system of registration does not guarantee that the land register is correct,25 
and there are circumstances where registration actions are not required to change 
proprietary relations.26 For example, original modes of acquisition such as acquisitive 
prescription do not require registration actions. Nevertheless, the transfer of rights 
(derivative acquisition) requires registration actions.27 When real rights in land are 
transferred, registration fulfils the same function as delivery in case of movable things, 
giving effect to the principle of publicity.28 
 
21 Muller et al Silberberg 256ff; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 537; Van 
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Although the fact that South Africa has a negative registration system means that the 
absolute correctness of the records cannot be guaranteed, the deeds registration 
system observes a high degree of accuracy and is considered very reliable.29 This high 
level of reliability has led to it being compared with a positive system of registration.30 
2.2.2 Principle of publicity 
The principle of publicity is a basic tenet of the law of property.31 This is not only the 
case in South Africa but also other modern systems of property law. Switzerland and 
Scotland, for example, strictly adhere to the principle of publicity, in a manner that 
mirrors South African law.32 
The principle is related to the absolute nature of real rights.33 “Absolute” refers to the 
enforceability of real rights, that is, that they are “enforceable against all other legal 
subjects”.34 For example, an owner may vindicate his property from any person in 
control of it, even if they are holding it in good faith and have acquired it in return for 
consideration.35 The term “absolute” does not refer to an unrestrained power for the 
owner to do with his property as she pleases. It is universally accepted that real rights, 
including ownership, can never and have never been “absolute” in this sense of the 
word.36 The absolute nature of real rights contrasts with personal rights, which are 
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regarded as relative in nature.37 By relative, it is meant that personal rights are only 
enforceable against “a particular person or association of individuals on the basis of a 
special relationship”.38 For example, claims arising from a contract or a delict are only 
enforceable against the contracting parties or persons liable for the harm.39 
The enforceability of real rights is why the principle of publicity is important. Due to the 
absolute nature of real rights, it is necessary that their existence, and their content, are 
discernible to third parties.40 If real rights are enforceable against third parties, third 
parties should be able to determine the existence of such rights and conduct 
themselves accordingly. Through the publicising of real rights,41 the interests of the 
owner or right holder and third parties are balanced. 
The way the principle of publicity is given effect to differs in respect of different forms 
of property. For movable property, the principle of publicity is given effect to through 
possession.42 There is a rebuttable presumption “that the possessor of a movable thing 
is also the owner thereof”.43 Further, in some instances, possession is an essential 
element of limited real rights in movable property. For example, a pledge (real security 
right) in movable property cannot come into existence nor continue to exist in the 
absence of possession, achieved through delivery.44 The holding of real security rights 
in movable property in the absence of possession is only possible through statute,45 
where the principle of publicity is given effect to through other means. For example, 
possession is not required for a special notarial bond.46 The clear description of the 
movable property in the registered notarial bond serves the principle of publicity.47 
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Regarding movables, the principle of publicity is not only served through possession 
to “advertise” the existence of real rights. In respect of changes in property relations 
through transfer, it is given effect to through a strict numerus clausus of constructive 
modes of delivery.48 These modes of delivery, as with original modes of acquisition, 
require that changes in property relations be made evident to third parties,49 or that the 
legal situation be aligned with the clear factual situation, as in the case of prescription.50 
The handing over of physical possession of the land in question is irrelevant to the 
changing of proprietary relations in the land. While possession is important for serving 
the principle of publicity in respect of movable property, its relevance is greatly 
diminished concerning immovable property. Proprietary relations in land, with 
exceptions in the context of original acquisition of ownership, can only change through 
registration actions in the Deeds Registry.51 An intention to transfer ownership in land 
or to create real rights in land is necessary but insufficient in the absence of 
registration, which fulfils the delivery requirement for rights in land.52  
Original modes of acquisition give effect to the principle of publicity in their own way, 
through aligning the legal situation with the factual situation that is observable by third 
parties.53 In the context of acquisitive prescription, for example, possession does 
ultimately serve the publicity principle. Proprietary relations are changed through 
possessing property openly “for an uninterrupted period of 30 year…as if he or she 
were the owner thereof”.54 Furthermore, other real rights in land such as servitudes can 
be acquired through openly exercising the content of such a right for an uninterrupted 
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49 Muller et al Silberberg 201; Van der Merwe Sakereg 314-315. 
50 Muller et al Silberberg 179ff; Van der Merwe Sakereg 268ff. 
51 Muller et al Silberberg 261-262. See also JWS Heyl Grondregistrasie in Suid-Afrika (1977) 142, in 
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period of thirty years.55 Outside original modes of acquisition of ownership, however, it 
appears that proprietary relations in land can only change through registration actions, 
due to the need to give effect to the principle of publicity. 
How does this relate to abandonment? The abandonment of ownership in property – 
movable or immovable – is neither a derivative nor original mode of acquisition of 
ownership. It is a form of loss that operates on its own. While abandonment facilitates 
rendering movable property res derelictae – and thus susceptible to an original mode 
of acquisition (appropriation) – it does not involve the acquisition of ownership itself. 
For reasons that are established below, registration actions would appear necessary 
to facilitate abandonment of landownership, in light of the principle of publicity. 
2.3 “Abandonment” in the context of immovable property 
The term “abandonment” is often misused or used in a different sense in the context 
of land, than the term is otherwise understood in the law of property. In the law of 
property, abandonment entails the unilateral divestment of ownership in property.56 It 
is not the surrender of the property to another party or the mere neglect of property. It 
is necessary to address the various uses of the term “abandonment” to clear up any 
possible misconceptions that may arise. 
In the context of the inner city of Johannesburg, one finds the term abandonment 
misused, as well as used in a different sense. The first example is the so-called 
“abandonment agreements” between the City of Johannesburg and owners who are in 
arrears with rates.57 The second example is the use of the term “abandoned” to refer 
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to property neglected by its owner, both physically and in terms of her failure to meet 
her legal obligations.58 
2.3.1 Abandonment agreements 
In the context of urban renewal, the term “abandonment” has surfaced as a way to 
describe landowners’ surrender of their property rights in exchange for a waiver of their 
property debts. The so-called “abandonment agreement” is one of the measures taken 
by the City of Johannesburg to promote the rejuvenation of its inner city.59 In terms of 
abandonment agreements, owners of immovable property who are in arrears with 
municipal rates and taxes are offered the opportunity to surrender, or more precisely, 
transfer their property to the City.60 In return for the transfer of the property to it, the 
City forgives the owner’s municipal debts.61 Owners in such circumstances often have 
little choice but to accept such an agreement to avoid incurring further debt. They are 
powerless as municipalities may withhold rates clearance certificates62 if there are 
outstanding municipal taxes.63 A rates clearance certificate is a prerequisite for the 
transfer of land. Hence, the landowner cannot alienate the property without clearing 
the arrear municipal rates. 
Despite the use of the word “abandonment” in the name of these agreements, these 
agreements do not resemble abandonment in the legal sense. Rather, what is 
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occurring here is a transfer of property in return for a quid pro quo.64 The property is 
being transferred to a particular party, rather than being relinquished by the owner to 
nobody in particular. This is a bilateral transaction, regardless of how little choice the 
weaker party has to enter into the agreement. 
This interpretation of abandonment agreements was confirmed in Papas NO v Motsere 
Trading CC.65 In this case, it was argued that the conclusion of the abandonment 
agreement constituted the abandonment of the property, rendering the property res 
nullius. In rejecting this argument, the court found that the use of the term “abandon” 
in the wording of the agreement was of no significance.66 What was envisioned by the 
parties was, in fact, a transfer in exchange for a quid pro quo.67 As such, there was 
simply no intention on the part of the owner to abandon his property.68 It is contended 
that, given the above, it is clear that the term “abandonment agreement” is misleading. 
It is submitted that “surrender agreement” or “release agreement” would be more 
appropriate.69 
2.3.2 Abandoned buildings 
Colloquially, one may refer to “abandoned” buildings where the owner of the land does 
not have any interest in the land and ceases to pay municipal rates and taxes.70 Such 
conduct on the part of the owner, and the condition of the building in question, may fall 
within the dictionary definition of abandonment,71 Nevertheless, such conduct does not 
qualify as abandonment in the legal sense. Such a building may be “abandoned” by its 
owner, in that she allows it to lie idle (or unlawfully occupied) and fails to comply with 
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her obligations as owner. Nevertheless, she remains the owner of the property, despite 
such neglect. 
2.4 The possibility of abandoning land: Arguments for and against 
This section provides a detailed overview of Mostert and Sonnekus’ respective 
arguments, while reaching its own conclusions as to the prevailing legal position. In 
doing so, it draws on the discussion of the relevant case law regarding the 
abandonment of landownership from Chapter 2. 
2.4.1  Abandonment of immovables in case law 
The abandonment of land is an issue our courts have only had to engage with on a 
few occasions. In all these cases, already canvassed in Chapter 2,72 the courts seemed 
to proceed on the assumption that the abandonment of land is possible.73 However, 
none of them found that the abandonment of land had occurred, primarily based on 
the intention requirement for abandonment.74 Our courts are in general hesitant to infer 
an intention to abandon valuable property.75  
In Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker,76 the court was unwilling to infer an intention 
on the part of the owner to abandon his land.77 This was despite years of neglect of the 
land in question. The court did not engage with the question of the possibility of 
abandoning land, should the owner’s intention to do so be established on the facts. 
Similarly, in Meintjes NO v Coetzer,78 a lack of intention was the reason for finding that 
abandonment had not occurred.79 The question of the possibility of abandonment was 
not raised. Perhaps the court assumed that the abandonment of land was possible, or 
did not find it necessary to engage with the question in a case which involved clear 
fraud on the part of the defendants. 
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Finally, in the unreported case of Papas NO v Motsere Trading CC,80 the court found 
that abandonment of land had not occurred. The finding was based on a lack of clear 
intention.81 As with the former Appellate Division and current Supreme Court of Appeal 
authority, no consideration was given to the possibility of such abandonment. 
If the courts in the above cases did proceed on the assumption that abandonment of 
land is possible,82 such assumption ultimately means very little. The principle of 
publicity, including how it is given effect to through registration actions in the deeds 
registries, was not addressed by the courts. Given the importance of publicity for 
changes in proprietary relations, including both derivative as well as original modes of 
acquisition, it would be necessary for a court to engage with whether the principle has 
found sufficient effect in the circumstances. The decisions do little but to indicate further 
the reluctance of our courts to infer an intention to abandon valuable property. It is thus 
necessary to take a closer look at how the relevant common law rules and statutory 
provisions interact. 
2.4.2 The abandonment of land in the context of a negative registration system 
Sonnekus grounds his abandonment argument in the negative registration system that 
prevails in South Africa.83 It is his contention that formalities prescribed by the Deeds 
Registries Act are unnecessary to achieve the abandonment of land.84 He adds that it 
is desirable to cancel formally the registration of ownership in land in the relevant 
Deeds Registry, thus observing the need for publicity.85 However, cancellation is not a 
prerequisite for an owner to abandon land, as abandonment can precede any deletion 
of entries in the Deeds Registry.86 
In Sonnekus’ view, all that is required is for an owner of land to comply with the same 
common-law requirements applicable to the abandonment of movables.87 That is, 
possession of the land must be relinquished with the intention of no longer remaining 
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owner.88 Once the owner has fulfilled these requirements, the land is abandoned 
(which, in his view, renders it res derelictae, and consequently, open to appropriation 
by the first taker).89 This is possible in the absence of registration actions because it is 
not necessary for the position on the register to reflect the correct legal position in a 
negative registration system.90 
According to Sonnekus, requirements for abandonment beyond those that exist in 
common law are purely administrative.91 These have no bearing on the changing of 
the ownership position in respect of land through abandonment.92 Their only function 
is to formalise the change in proprietary relations through the amending of the records 
in the registry.93 
While Sonnekus does not assert registration actions are necessary for the 
abandonment of land, he discusses how existing provisions of the Deeds Registries 
Act may provide formality to abandonment. As he correctly explains, the Registrar of 
Deeds may only exercise those powers granted to him in terms of the Act, and as such, 
the only permissible amendments to the registry are those authorised by law.94 
The simplest example of when the Registrar may amend the registry would be to give 
effect to a transfer of property between two parties.95 The Registrar may also be 
compelled to amend or cancel an existing registration, as provided for in section 6 of 
the Act. Finally, the Registrar is empowered to amend the register where an error 
exists.96 Such an error may arise where the current owner has married in community 
of property,97 or a third party has acquired ownership or a servitude through acquisitive 
prescription.98 
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For the sake of bringing formality to the abandonment of ownership, Sonnekus places 
reliance on section 3(1)(r) of the Deeds Registries Act.99 In terms of this section, the 
registrar is empowered to “register…any…extinction of any such registered right”. It 
appears necessary from the wording of this provision that the right in question must 
have already been extinguished before it finds application. The provision does not itself 
operate to terminate rights, but rather to bring the register in line with the existing legal 
situation. As explained above, in Sonnekus’ view, compliance with the common-law 
requirements for abandonment already extinguishes the right.100 Effectively, cancelling 
the registration of land through this section would thus amount to little more than an 
administrative formality, beyond publicising the abandonment of the land.101 
The next question is how the abandoning owner would utilise this section of the Deeds 
Registries Act to cancel registration of her land formally. Sonnekus contends all that is 
required is the submission of an affidavit by the registered owner stating that the land 
in question has been abandoned.102 Most long-serving Registrars of Deeds, to the best 
of Sonnekus’ knowledge, have never been confronted with such a scenario.103 
Nevertheless, the underutilisation of a legislative mechanism does not negate its 
existence.104 
The interplay between common law and legislation, in Sonnekus’ view, permits the 
abandonment of land, both legally and formally. Once the common-law requirements 
have been complied with, the land in question is abandoned.105 The owner may then 
simply rely on the legislative mechanism provided for in section 3(1)(r) of the Deeds 
Registries Act to bring formality to the abandonment.106 
On the face of it, the negative registration system that prevails in South Africa supports 
Sonnekus’s argument. The question remains, however, how well Sonnekus’ view holds 
up when considered in light of the principle of publicity. 
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2.4.3 The abandonment of land in light of the principle of publicity 
Contrary to Sonnekus, Mostert argues that South African law does not allow, the 
abandonment of land: it is not possible, as “[i]t would seem that the constellation of 
applicable legal regulations renders it impossible to abandon land”.107 According to 
Mostert, the principle of publicity is not given proper effect to in the absence of a 
specific mechanism providing for abandonment in the Deeds Registries Act.108 The Act 
specifically does not appear to expressly empower the Registrar to give effect to 
requests from registered landowners.109 
It has been noted that the basic requirements for the abandonment of movable property 
are the giving up of possession coupled with the intention of relinquishing ownership 
of the property in question.110 Such requirements operate logically in the context of 
movable property, adequately giving effect to the principle of publicity.111 However, it is 
unclear how the requirements can be given effect to in respect of land.112 Courts are 
reluctant to infer an intention to abandoned valuable property.113 In the context of land, 
anything less than an express declaration by the owner of an intention to abandon 
seems insufficient for the courts. This approach is perhaps best illustrated by the case 
of Sonnendecker. The owner in this case had been absent for decades, seemingly no 
longer residing in the Republic, with the property being described as a wasteland. 
Despite this, the court was unwilling to infer an intention to abandon from the set of 
facts before it.114 
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While possession operates to give effect to the principle of publicity in respect of 
movable property, registration serves this purpose for of rights in land.115 Since 
registration is central to changes in proprietary relations in land, the Deeds Registries 
Act needs to provide expressly for the abandonment of land.116 The problem is that the 
Deeds Registries Act is devoid of any guidance in what procedure to follow to abandon 
land.117 
2.5 Analysis 
The competing arguments provided by Sonnekus and Mostert are both compelling and 
warrant detailed consideration. Sonnekus has grappled with the sources in significant 
depth. However, Mostert’s argument must be preferred. This contention is primarily for 
legal reasons, considering the principle of publicity. Policy reasons also favour her 
argument, which are covered in the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
In the context of original acquisition of ownership, proprietary positions can change 
despite the absence of registration actions.118 Original modes of acquisition give effect 
to the principle of publicity through aligning the legal situation with the factual situation 
that is clear to third parties.119 Consequently, it is necessary to ask whether the 
abandonment of land (a form of loss as opposed to acquisition) may give effect to the 
principle of publicity in a manner similar to original modes of acquisition. In view of the 
negative system of registration, can the same common-law requirements applicable to 
the abandonment of ownership in movable property change the ownership position in 
respect of land without the necessity of registration actions? To answer this question, 
the way acquisitive prescription and marriage in community of property give effect to 
the principle of publicity is scrutinised. A subsequent inquiry focuses on whether the 
abandonment of land following the common-law requirements may similarly give effect 
to the publicity principle. 
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Acquisitive prescription is an example of an original mode of acquisition of ownership 
and real rights in land.120 It facilitates not only the acquisition of ownership in movable 
and immovable property,121 but also the acquisition and termination of servitudes.122 In 
the former case, a person may acquire ownership in land through holding it openly as 
if owner, together with any periods the land was held by his predecessors, for an 
uninterrupted period of thirty years.123 Acquisition of ownership occurs in the absence 
of registration actions.  
The acquirer is entitled at the end of the prescriptive period, in terms of the procedure 
set out in section 33 of the Deeds Registries Act, to demand registration of the land in 
question in her name.124 What is key is that, until the owner makes use of the procedure 
set out in section 33 to facilitate registration in her name, there is a discrepancy 
between the legal position and that reflected in the Deeds Registry. 
The acquisition of a servitude through acquisitive prescription also requires a 
significant degree of openness. One may acquire a servitude through exercising the 
entitlements associated therewith for an uninterrupted period of thirty years.125 As in 
the case of the acquisition of ownership, this must be done openly.126 Similarly, a 
positive servitude may be terminated through an owner’s failure to exercise the powers 
associated therewith for an uninterrupted period of thirty years.127 Finally, a negative 
servitude may be terminated through the failure to object to the owner of the servient 
tenement acting contrary to the rights of the servitude holder for the same period of 
time.128 
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It is thus clear that in respect of acquisitive prescription, the principle of publicity is 
adequately served. In effect, the legal position is brought into compliance with the clear 
factual situation that is publicised to third parties. This alignment of factual and legal 
situations has been acknowledged as the raison d’être for prescription.129 For example, 
in respect of the acquisition of ownership of land through prescription, one is required 
to act openly as if owner. Acts that fall short of the openness condition, even if they 
would usually be performed by an owner, will not be sufficient for the physical control 
requirement of acquisitive prescription. 
Hayes v Harding Town Board130 provides a useful example of how courts will approach 
the openness requirement.131 In this case, the court found that the payment of 
municipal rates by the party seeking to acquire ownership through prescription failed 
to establish the requisite physical control.132 This finding was despite that fact that such 
payment evidenced an intention to be owner, being an act usually associated with the 
ownership of land.133 While demonstrating an intention to be owner, it was evidently 
not sufficient to publicise such intention to the public at large. These acts by the would-
be acquirer contrast with making physical use of the land itself openly as if owner of 
said land. 
It does not seem that the abandonment of land serves the principle of publicity in a 
similar manner. The mere absence of the owner from his land for an extended period 
does not give rise to the presumption that the land itself is unowned. Even an empty 
piece of land, for example, may be held for investment purposes. This is made clear 
from the approach taken by the court in Sonnendecker. The fact that the court was 
unwilling to infer an intention to abandon in circumstances of extended absence and 
neglect indicates that the principle of publicity was not adequately served through even 
an extended period of absence. The court could not discount the possibility that the 
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land was being held as a long-term investment, or that perhaps there were compelling 
reasons preventing the owner from returning to the Republic.134 
It is thus evident that the abandonment of land is not possible by inferring an intention 
to abandon. The principle of publicity is inadequately served. The principle of publicity 
thus does not find the same expression that it does in the context of acquisitive 
prescription. 
However, what about circumstances in which the owner expressly declares his 
intention to abandon his land? Could this not adequately give effect to the principle of 
publicity and thus facilitate the abandonment of the land in question, so long as such 
intention is coupled with the relinquishment of physical control? 
It would seem that even an express declaration is insufficient to facilitate the 
abandonment of land. Express declarations are not enough to change the ownership 
position in land. Regardless of whether such a declaration is coupled with the physical 
relinquishment of the land in question, registration actions remain necessary to change 
the ownership position.135 The principle of publicity in a modern system of land 
registration requires registration actions for changes in ownership positions in land 
outside original modes of acquisition, which give effect to publicity in their own way.136 
In the absence of such registration actions, there is insufficient publicity, and thus no 
change in ownership. 
A possible objection to the above is that in some circumstances, proprietary relations 
in land can change through inferred intention or express declarations. Such a change 
is possible in the context of limited real rights, and in particular, servitudes. Servitudes, 
unlike ownership in land, may be abandoned.137 Such abandonment does not require 
registration actions in the Deeds Registry.  
Despite the absence of registration actions, the publicity principle is given effect to in 
the context of the abandonment of servitudes. In respect of limited real rights such as 
servitudes, as these are rights less than ownership, the threshold for the principle 
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would evidently be lower than what is required to give effect to the abandonment of 
ownership. 
For example, abandonment of a servitude can be inferred from circumstances in which 
the servitude holder or the owner of the dominant tenement acquiesces in conduct that 
is in conflict with her rights.138 This seems possible both in the context of positive 
servitudes and negative servitudes.139 The servient tenement owner may prevent the 
servitude holder from exercising her rights in the former case.140 In the latter case, the 
servient tenement owner may flout the restrictions placed on her ownership 
entitlements by the servitude in question, while the servitude holder fails to object for 
an extended period of time.141 Clearly in both sets of circumstances, there is sufficient 
publicity from which an intention to abandon may be inferred. 
Van der Walt disputes whether the abandonment of a servitude can indeed be 
classified as a unilateral act.142 Rather, it appears to be bilateral in character.143 Usually, 
the parties in the case of a praedial servitude – that being the owners of the dominant 
and servient tenements – will come to an agreement that the servitude in question will 
be “abandoned”.144 Even in the absence of an express agreement to abandon, where 
the owner of the dominant tenement acquiesces to conduct in conflict with her rights, 
this would be more bilateral than unilateral.145 The parties are effectively cooperating, 
even if implicitly.146 
 
138 Muller et al Silberberg 401; Van der Walt Servitudes 577-578. See Pickard v Stein 2015 (1) SA 439 
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In addition, Van der Walt explains that the loss of a servitude through abandonment 
will only be effective against third parties once the register has been amended to reflect 
the extinguishment of the right.147 This emphasises the fact that actions in the deeds 
registry are essential for the changing of proprietary relations in land, even for real 
rights less than ownership such as servitudes. 
This then leaves the final exception to the rule that registration actions are required to 
change ownership positions in land, namely, marriage in community of property. 
Community of property is the default matrimonial property regime, unless altered by 
an antenuptial contract between the parties to the marriage.148 The consequences of a 
marriage concluded in community of property is that all assets of the parties – both 
acquired before and after the marriage – form part of the joint estate.149  
The spouses are the co-owners of the estate.150 This arrangement is considered a 
bound form of co-ownership.151 As such, the spouses are not permitted to alienate their 
undivided share independently of the other so long as the underlying relationship 
persists.152  
The ownership position in respect of the antenuptial assets changes despite an 
absence of registration actions in the Deeds Registry.153 While the Deeds Registry may 
reflect one spouse as owner, this is in conflict with the correct legal position, namely, 
that the property in question is subject to bound co-ownership. This situation again 
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demonstrates the operation of the negative system of registration that prevails in South 
Africa. 
Despite the absence of any actions in the Deeds Registry, marriage in community of 
property is compatible with the principle of publicity. The Marriage Act154 prescribes 
that marriages must be registered.155 Such registration does not occur in the Deeds 
Registry, but nevertheless, it serves to publicise the occurrence of the marriage – and 
the change in proprietary relations - to the public in a similar fashion. The abandonment 
of ownership in land, following the common-law principle, gives no similar effect to the 
principle of the publicity.  
In some circumstances, the marriage may not yet be registered. Despite this, the law 
governing marriage provides rules and presumptions to regulate these 
circumstances.156 The presumptions in favour of the existence of a marriage depend 
on external evidence.157 External evidence includes evidence of a marriage ceremony 
having taken place between the parties and that the parties have co-habited.158 
In light of the above, it would seem difficult to justify the abandonment of land as similar 
to acquisition of co-ownership through marriage in community of property. The law of 
marriage has well-developed and clear rules that adequately give effect to the principle 
of publicity, despite the absence of any actions in the Deeds Registry.159 In contrast, in 
the absence of a specific mechanism provided for in the Deeds Registries Act, 
abandonment of land falls short in serving the principle of publicity.160 
Mostert is thus correct in her conclusion that the abandonment of land is not possible, 
given the absence of any mechanism to give effect to the publicity principle.161 Original 
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modes of acquisition do not require actions in the Deeds Registry for proprietary 
relations in land to change.162 However, original modes of acquisition give effect to the 
publicity principle in a manner that the common-law requirements for abandonment – 
a form of loss - cannot in a modern system of land registration. Thus, even though 
South Africa observes a negative system of registration, the abandonment of land in 
the absence of registration actions does not appear possible. Such abandonment 
would require a specific mechanism in the Deeds Registries Act or other legislation.163 
Sonnekus draws attention to section 3(1)(r) of the Deeds Registries Act that empowers 
the Registrar to register the extinction of a right (subject to the provisions of the Act).164 
In Sonnekus’ view, this amounts to little more than an administrative formality, the 
abandonment already being achieved through compliance with the common-law 
rules.165 
It appears necessary that before the Registrar may exercise his powers in terms of 
section 3(1)(r), the right in question should already be extinct, as a result of another 
law (e.g. extinctive prescription of a servitude166). As such, Sonnekus is correct that 
this section facilitates an administrative formality in removing registered rights from the 
Deeds Registry that have been rendered extinct for other reasons.167 However, since 
it does not appear possible that abandonment may take place in the absence of 
express registration actions, this section does not facilitate the formal abandonment of 
land. Effectively, this section is irrelevant in considering whether the abandonment of 
land is possible or not. 
3. Abandonment of Co-ownership shares in land: A brief note 
The abandonment of land in South African law is not possible. However, what of co-
ownership shares in land? Is it within the powers of a co-owner to renounce unilaterally 
or abandon her undivided share?168 
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The legal literature on co-ownership in South Africa is silent on this question. South 
African law distinguishes between two forms of co-ownership, these being free co-
ownership and bound co-ownership.169 Under the former, the co-ownership 
relationship is the only legally relevant relationship between the parties, who may 
alienate or encumber their undivided shares as they wish.170 Under the latter, there is 
an underlying legal relationship – for example, marriage in community of property – 
that binds the co-owners.171 Co-owners in such a relationship may not alienate or 
encumber their undivided shares unilaterally.172 
It is trite that a free co-owner is free to alienate or encumber her undivided co-
ownership share.173 In the absence of a co-ownership agreement, a co-owner may 
encumber with a real security right or alienate to a third party her co-ownership share 
without the consent of her co-owners.174 In respect of land, this entitlement is 
acknowledged by section 34(1) of the Deeds Registries Act.175 
The question arises as to whether this entitlement includes a right to abandon an 
undivided share in land. It would appear not, based on a perusal of the relevant section 
of the Deeds Registries Act.  
Section 34(1) of the Act is primarily concerned with the issuing of certificates of 
registered title of undivided co-ownership shares. It further outlines under what 
circumstances undivided co-ownership shares in land may be disposed of or 
encumbered with other rights. The first circumstance in which a certificate may be 
issued is upon application by one of the co-owners. Second, for a co-owner to transfer 
only a fraction of her undivided share, or to hypothecate or lease the whole or a fraction 
of her share, it is a prerequisite that a certificate be issued. The issuing of a certificate 
is not a prerequisite, however, for co-owners in unison to transfer an undivided or a 
fraction of a share. It is further not required for co-owners acting together to 
hypothecate or lease the whole of the share or land. Finally, the issuing of such a 
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certificate is not necessary for a co-owner to dispose of the entirety of her share 
through “deeds of transfer registered simultaneously”. 
The Deeds Registries Act does not envision, or enable, the imposition of one’s co-
ownership share on the other co-owners against their will.176 The Act is only concerned 
with transfers and encumbrances of undivided shares. Co-owners among themselves 
may agree that one co-owner will transfer her share to the other for no consideration. 
However, this is a donation, and thus a transfer. Abandonment does not appear 
possible.  
It would be anomalous if an undivided co-ownership share in land could be abandoned, 
while the land itself could not. This anomaly may leave one unfortunate co-owner 
burdened with a valueless piece of land because the other co-owners were quicker on 
the draw to abandon their undivided shares.  
Regardless, the Deeds Registries Act is silent on the matter. In line with Mostert’s 
argument,177 and the conclusions drawn in this chapter, in the absence of registration 
actions, it would not seem possible to abandon undivided shares in land. The necessity 
of registration actions appears just as applicable to co-ownership shares as they do to 
the land itself. 
4. Publicity and the impossibility of abandoning landownership 
The question of whether it is possible to abandon ownership of land in South Africa 
appears to lack an explicit answer. However, in light of the principle of publicity, it would 
appear that it is impossible to abandon land.178 This conclusion is reached despite the 
fact that South Africa observes a negative system of registration as well as the original 
modes of acquisition that do not require actions in the Deeds Registry to change 
proprietary relations.179 When one examines original modes of acquisition more 
closely, they appear to serve the principle of publicity in the context of land in a manner 
that the doctrine of abandonment cannot. In the absence of express registration 
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actions being available to facilitate the abandonment of land, it must be concluded that 
the abandonment of land is not possible.180 
The conclusion reached above may be contentious, given the dearth of academic 
commentary on the possibility of abandonment of landownership beyond the debate 
between Mostert and Sonnekus. However, even if one agrees with the position of 
Sonnekus – that the abandonment of landownership is possible through the common-
law requirements for abandonment181 - this will not be the primary focus for the 
remainder of the thesis. Rather, it is necessary to engage with another question: should 
the abandonment of ownership in South African law be permitted, and if so, under what 
circumstances? These questions will be the focus of the following chapters. As a first 
step in answering this question, the next chapter will engage with the social-obligation 
norm of property as conceptualised by Alexander.182 
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Chapter 4: Locating Abandonment in a 
Social-Obligation Norm Framework 
 
1. Introduction 
Scholars acknowledge that ownership entails obligations and not simply entitlements.1 
These scholars seek to challenge the conventional view that private property is solely 
concerned with individual rights, rather than obligations and responsibilities. The 
concept of abandonment in law has existed for millennia.2 Nevertheless, the law does 
not appear to provide an unrestricted right to abandon, but rather, cases concerning 
abandonment involve parties contesting ownership of property.3 Concerning 
immovable property, abandonment is simply not possible in South African law, as 
established in Chapter 3.4 It is also not possible in Scots law,5 while being almost 
unrestricted in Swiss law, as is canvassed in Chapter Five.6 It is thus necessary to 
explain how a concept such as abandonment can exist in law, while a right to abandon 
does not, at least not in every jurisdiction. In this respect, it is beneficial to explore the 
school of thought that emphasises the responsibilities that accompany ownership. This 
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2 See the historical overview of the law of abandonment in Chapter 2 Section 3. 
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school of through provides justification for the legal framework which does not permit 
owners to relinquish their obligations to the detriment of society at large. 
Despite perceptions to the contrary, property rights are not regarded in scholarship as 
absolute; not even when they amount to the so-called ultimate form of property, namely 
ownership.7 Ownership is subject to a plethora of limitations, stemming from legislation, 
limited real rights held by third parties, as well as the interests of other owners and the 
general public.8 Unrestricted ownership would, in the words of Singer, be a form of 
“dictatorship”.9 Evidently, unrestricted ownership is not viable, as ownership cannot 
entail a “right to rule” without consideration to the impact that the exercise of 
entitlements may have on others.10 These observations clearly extend to the 
circumstances in which an owner can terminate her relationship with property – 
exercising the ius disponendi11 - in the form of abandonment.12 The liberal tradition of 
viewing property as a means of escape from community ignores that people are 
simultaneously individuals and social creatures.13 Interpreting rights – including 
property rights - as being relational avoids the pitfalls of individualism.14 
Ownership entails obligations that cannot be separated from the social context in which 
ownership exists.15 These obligations may be seen as arising from a social contract 
between the owner as individual and the broader community on the one hand.16 On 
 
7 See G Muller, R Brits, JM Pienaar & Z Boggenpoel Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 
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13 J Nedelsky “Reconceiving Rights as Relationship” (1993) 1 Review of Constitutional Studies 1 13. 
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the other, they may be seen as a price one pays for membership of the community in 
which the property rights in question exist, thus enabling people to flourish.17 
Regardless, obligation and responsibility remain crucial aspects of ownership, 
including the right to terminate ownership, whether through transfer or abandonment. 
The doctrine of abandonment reinforces obligation and responsibility through 
restrictions (and sometimes outright prohibition) on unilaterally divesting oneself of 
property.18 The impossibility of abandoning landownership, for example, can serve as 
a vehicle for the enforcement of obligations in property law.19 
This chapter seeks to provide an overview of the social-obligation norm, locating the 
norm in the South African legal framework, and ultimately linking the norm to the law’s 
treatment of abandonment. It proceeds along the following lines. Firstly, the tenets of 
a social-norm based theory of property are introduced. Secondly, the concept of 
externalities in property law is briefly reviewed. Following this, an in-depth analysis of 
the social-obligation norm as set out by Alexander is provided, given that this 
conception of the norm will inform the suggestions made by this thesis. Finally, this 
chapter evaluates how the social-obligation norm is given expression to by the 
Constitution,20 in particular the property clause therein.21 
2. Tenets of a social-norm based property theory 
Property rights are conceived of as “inherently relational”,22 with the consequence that 
owners – and landowners in particular - owe obligations to society at large.23 It is 
necessary to acknowledge – even as property owners - that one is dependent upon 
others as well as the social framework that enables people to flourish, and that there 
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is thus a moral obligation to support such frameworks.24 Consequently, ownership does 
not serve as an “exit” (ability to withdraw) from one’s community,25 but reinforces one’s 
bonds with the community in which such property is located.26  
Alexander highlights two particular conceptions of the social-obligation norm in the law 
of property that warrant consideration.27 The distinction between the two approaches 
depends on how an individual’s membership of her community is perceived.28 The first 
approach, the so-called “contractarian” version,29 views community membership in 
“purely instrumental terms”.30 Obligations stem “from our consent or from [these 
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contrast, is more artificial in the context of Gesellschaft, an exchange-based community, resembling a 
more modern, urban society. Individuals in Gesellschaft are more isolated and will act in their own self-
interest. See Selznick The Moral Commonwealth 365-366; F Tönnies Community and Association 
(1955) translated by C Loomis 74. 
Broader definitions of community which potentially encompass cities clearly fall within Gesellschaft. 
Nevertheless, the importance of these communities to enabling human flourishing cannot be gainsaid. 
While not being examples of the tightly-knit Gemeinschaft, property owners owe obligations to these 
communities, which have enabled them to flourish, to facilitate the flourishing of others. See Alexander 
Property and Human Flourishing 81. 
26 E Peñalver “Property as Entrance” (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1889 1894. 
27 Alexander (2009) Cornell 758-760. 
28 Alexander (2009) Cornell 758. 
29 See Alexander Property and Human Flourishing 42ff. 




obligations] being to our advantage”.31 The second conception places greater 
emphasis on community membership.32 While the individual is not disregarded, her 
membership of her community is taken more seriously than in the first conception.33 A 
liberal, but a community-focused social-obligation norm is the result.34 
It is important to establish on which of these conceptions reliance is placed when 
justifying the existing legal framework in which the abandonment of landownership is 
not possible.35 Whether one views one’s relationship with the community as stemming 
from reciprocal consent,36 or rather as a deeper relationship with one’s community,37 
there are important implications for the ius disponendi, and abandonment in particular. 
The first conception has been developed in a number of articles by Dagan.38 Alexander 
terms this the “contractarian version of the community-based conception of social 
obligation”.39 In this approach, Alexander explains, the individual is regarded as the 
“basic unit of social organization”.40 Communities are composed of individuals who 
consensually amalgamate to achieve certain goals for their shared benefit.41 This 
approach views the relationship between the individual and community as contractual, 
as the two are bound by mutual agreement in pursuit of shared goals.42 The main 
motivation to cooperate with the broader community is to maximise one’s personal 
welfare, for example, the common interests of tenants in a building in promoting fire 
safety.43 Cooperation with the community in these circumstances evidently has a 
reciprocal advantage for the owner, at least in the event of a fire, through increasing 
the likelihood that her possessions (and possibly even her life) may be saved. Key is 
 
31 Alexander (2009) Cornell 758 relying on Dagan (1999) Virginia 771-772; Alexander Property and 
Human Flourishing 42. 
32 Alexander (2009) Cornell 758; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing 45ff. 
33 Alexander (2009) Cornell 758; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing 45ff. 
34 Alexander (2009) Cornell 758. 
35 See discussion of the possibility of abandoning landownership in the South African legal framework 
in Chapter 3. 
36 Alexander (2009) Cornell 758; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing 42. 
37 Alexander (2009) Cornell 758; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing 45ff. 
38 Dagan (1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 741; H Dagan “Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social 
Meanings” (2000) 99 Michigan Law Review 134; Dagan (2007) Cornell 1255. 
39 Alexander (2009) Cornell 758; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing 42ff. 
40 Alexander (2009) Cornell 759 relying on Dagan (1999) Virginia 771-774; Alexander Property and 
Human Flourishing 43. 
41 Alexander (2009) Cornell 759 relying on Dagan (1999) Virginia 791-792; Alexander Property and 
Human Flourishing 43. 
42 Alexander (2009) Cornell 759; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing 43-44. 




that cooperation with one’s community (that being, fellow sectional title owners and 
tenants) is based on reciprocal advantage, whether such advantage is accrued in the 
present or some underdetermined future date. 
Critically, the obligations placed on community members (such as to maintain their 
property and not abandon it) must provide them with benefits in return.44 Cooperation 
with one’s fellow tenants and sectional title owners in a building regarding fire safety is 
a clear example, as it improves one’s personal welfare, through the extra security 
provided to oneself in the event of a fire. The returns to burdened members of the 
community may be accrued, if not in the short-term, at least in the long-term.45 The 
concept of “reciprocity of advantage” is contested.46 On the one hand, such reciprocity 
may be construed narrowly, requiring “distinct and tangible compensation-in-kind” to 
be provided to the burdened owner.47 On the other, reciprocity may be construed 
broadly, requiring that the burdened owner benefit as a member of the community 
through the “general welfare-enhancement generated by the public action”.48 Even if 
the burden placed on the owner exceeds the benefit accorded to the community.49 
Again, returning to the example of cooperation with fellow tenants in respect of 
ensuring adequate fire-safety standards are met, which would benefit one as a member 
of that community by virtue of one’s membership. 
Similarly, a landowner benefits from her neighbours not neglecting and abandoning 
their properties, while they in turn benefit from her doing the same. This protects 
against urban decay and reduction in property values. There is thus a reciprocal benefit 
to a landowner in retaining and maintaining her property, thus providing justification for 
the absence of a mechanism in the law that permits her to abandon landownership.50 
Dagan favours a long-term conception of reciprocity.51 A landowner is a member of the 
community, from which she derives a number of social benefits at no financial cost.52 
 
44 Alexander (2009) Cornell 760; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing 44. 
45 Dagan (1999) Virginia 771ff; Alexander (2009) Cornell 760. 
46 Dagan (1999) Virginia 768-770. 
47 Dagan (1999) Virginia 769. 
48 Dagan (1999) Virginia 769. 
49 Dagan (1999) Virginia 769. 
50 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the absence of such a mechanism in South African law.  
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Consequently, she also has obligations flowing from her community membership.53 
Dagan does not see any problem with one particular landowner carrying a 
disproportionate burden, as long as (1) there is no extreme disproportionality in the 
distribution of the burden in question and (2) the burdened party is not particularly 
politically or economically weak.54 Ultimately, uncompensated burdens are 
unacceptable in the absence of any returns that will balance out the sacrifice made by 
individual community members.55 In the context of restricting the abandonment of 
landownership, this view would require one to examine the proportionality of the 
burden on the landowner, taking into account her economic and political strength. 
The second conception, favoured by Alexander and Peñalver, is referred to as the 
“ontological” conception of social obligation.56 Here, the emphasis is on the importance 
of dependency and interdependency on other people as inescapable parts of our 
humanity, despite human beings yearning for autonomy.57 Human flourishing is, 
consequently, of utmost importance.58 This conception, as well as other theories of 
human flourishing, will be discussed in greater detail in section 4, given its central 
importance to this thesis. 
Regardless of which conception is favoured, it is evident from property law scholarship 
that community membership entails obligations, and that property rights are not the 
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Aristotle did not conceive of an individual’s human flourishing as something which happens in insolation. 
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to the well-being of the community, in turn, continues to promote human flourishing. Aristotle, for 
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trumps they are automatically assumed to be.59 One, for example, is not simply free to 
divest unilaterally oneself of ownership in property (and the obligations attached 
thereto) from which negative externalities can flow. Community membership does 
involve accepting burdens and responsibilities in respect of one’s ownership of 
property.60 
A social-obligation approach requires that one take account of the extent of the public 
burden imposed on the individual.61 When deciding whether owners should be allowed 
to abandon land – and if so, under what circumstances – it must be decided whether 
they should carry the burden that comes with ownership of land. Alternatively, it should 
be decided whether they should be allowed to divest themselves of that ownership and 
pass the liabilities associated with it onto society at large. When such a burden is 
disproportionate, it needs to be analysed carefully, as disregarding a disproportionate 
distribution of public burden is offensive to both equality and community.62 It must be 
asked whether the burden imposed on the individual is “a proper price of communal 
citizenship” or “an unfair sacrifice of the few to the many”.63 This observation is made 
in the context of expropriation law and distributive justice. However, it can similarly be 
applied in the context of the abandonment of land, and the denial of such an exit to a 
landowner, which will require such an owner to retain and maintain her property as a 
price of “communal citizenship”.64  
3. Ownership and externalities 
An important concept to review prior to an in-depth discussion of the social-obligation 
norm is that of externalities. The issue of ownership and the externalities that flow from 
the exercise of its entitlements has been explored by Singer.65 What is meant by the 
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term externality?66 An externality is an impact on third parties from an action or 
transaction in which they are not directly involved.67 It is possible to define the term in 
a manner which brings any external effect, positive or negative, within its scope.68 A 
preferable definition, however, according to Singer, is that an externality is any effect, 
positive or negative, “that has moral significance and to which the law should pay 
attention”.69  
The issue of externalities, and when they warrant the concern of the law, is critical to 
determining whether the abandonment of landownership should be permitted. 
Abandonment inevitably does not occur in a vacuum and has consequences for society 
at large. While one may normally associate externalities with positive acts, externalities 
can similarly flow from a negative act, from an owner dispensing with her obligations. 
There are numerous externalities that will flow from the abandonment of landownership 
should such be permitted, particularly in a context in which there is no willing party to 
take responsibility for such property. Unsafe buildings and fire hazards can result from 
the proliferation of neglected properties. This will further contribute to the growth of 
urban decay. As abandoned immovable property (if such abandonment is possible) 
 
66 Singer provides a brief history of externalities. See Singer “Property norms” in Property and 
Community 66ff. He notes Mill’s theory of self-regarding acts, in terms of which one may act as they 
wish, so long as others are not affected by such actions. When one’s actions do have an effect on third 
parties, the question arises as to whether the harmful activity should be regulated, either through 
limitation or outright prohibition. See J Singer “How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of 
Ownership” in G Alexander & E Peñalver (eds) Property and Community (2010) 68; J Mill On Liberty 
and Other Essays (1998) 85ff (Oxford World’s Classics edition). 
Singer notes, however, that Mill’s model began to lose ground from the nineteenth century onwards. 
There was a legal and moral shift which began to view liberty as entailing a right to impose harms of 
third parties. Increasingly, there was a shift away from attempting to identify which actions may 
legitimately have a negative impact on others and towards interest balancing. Singer explains that this 
“skeptical approach to moral judgments makes it even harder to distinguish self-regarding acts from 
other regarding acts”. From the perspective of Coase, for example, a claim to limit another’s interest is 
itself an externality. As such, the claim by a local community that a factory owner is not entitled to inflict 
harm on their properties through pollution is itself an externality in that it potentially limits what the factory 
owner may do with her land. See Singer “Property norms” in Property and Community 68-69; R Coase 
“The problem of social cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 41-42. 
Singer is critical of such an approach, likening the idea of homeowners’ imposing an externality on the 
factory owner to complaining that your victim’s chin got in the way of your fist. Property norms that are 
embedded in our culture, he explains, justify this view. Since one views homeownership as including an 
entitlement to safety in one’s home, the homeowners in such circumstances should be regarded as 
“having a morally superior claim to that of the factory”. On this view, the homeowners are committing a 
self-regarding act (i.e. not an externality), while the factory owner is committing an other-regarding act 
(i.e. an externality). To construe the matter differently is a moral distortion. See Singer “Property Norms” 
in Property and Community 69-70. 
67 Singer “Property Norms” in Property and Community 61. 
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accrues to the State,70 so does the obligation to maintain it, which now falls squarely 
on the public purse. 
The exercise of ownership entitlements inevitably entails externalities in some form or 
another.71 Singer uses the example of refusing to allow a homeless person to use one’s 
empty guestroom.72 The law inevitably protects the owner, by empowering her to deny 
the homeless person (regardless of need) from using her empty guestroom.73 This 
exercise of property rights subsequently results in harm to the homeless person, but 
most property-law regimes will not recognise it as a legally relevant harm.74 As Singer 
explains, systems of private property simultaneously permit owners to impose harms 
on third parties, while also limiting the harms that may be imposed on third parties.75 
The question is, where is the line drawn in a particular system of private ownership 
between the owner’s freedom and non-owner’s security?76 
One must determine when the exercise of an ownership entitlement does cause harm 
to legitimate interests, thus necessitating regulation of the entitlement in question.77 
Singer explains that “[p]roperty norms help answer this question by orientating us in a 
moral universe through background understandings that define legitimate interests that 
deserve legal protection”.78 Norms provide guidance by distinguishing between owners 
and non-owners of entitlements in certain resources, as well as by establishing when 
an owner is obliged to take into account the interests of others and when she may act 
entirely in her self-interest.79 By doing so, norms identify those externalities that warrant 
concern and possibly prevention.80 
The potential impacts of abandonment would appear to be externalities that warrant 
the law’s concern, as well as regulation and prevention. The best way to regulate and 
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manage these externalities will be a key consideration of this thesis. Regulation will 
need to take place in light of the social-obligation norm and the constitutional 
framework that gives effect to it. Suggestions for law reform in this context will be made 
in Chapter 7. The Chapter will now turn to an analysis of the social-obligation norm as 
well as its place in South Africa’s legal framework. 
4. The social-obligation norm and human flourishing 
In his seminal article on the subject, Alexander explores the social-obligation norm in 
the context of human flourishing.81 As it is his conception of the social-obligation norm 
that will inform the conclusions and suggestions of this thesis, it is necessary to set it 
out in more depth. 
4.1 Human flourishing as the basis of social obligation 
As noted, human flourishing is central to Alexander’s conception of the social-
obligation norm.82 Human flourishing requires that the law of property – rather than 
emphasise individual rights over all other rights and interests – allow “individuals to live 
lives worthy of human dignity”.83 The justification for the existence of (and interference 
with) private property rights is to be found in human flourishing, to the extent that such 
rights provide holders with the ability to flourish.84 Beyond justifying the continued 
existence of such rights as a social good, human flourishing also establishes the 
limitations law places on these rights.85 These limitations necessarily extend to the ius 
disponendi, and the circumstances in which one may dispose of her property “in the 
absence of another party who wishes to accept responsibility for it”.86 The unrestricted 
disposal of immovable property would necessarily have consequences for the 
flourishing of others, through the proliferation of neglected properties, and the potential 
drain on the public purse.87 
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Sen notes that wealth (which would include having property rights) is important due to 
what it enables people to do.88 Wealth is not desirable merely for the sake of accruing 
wealth, but for the “substantive freedoms” made available through having such 
wealth.89 Examples of such freedoms include being well-fed, not having to worry about 
avoidable mortality, as well as literacy.90 In Sen’s work, freedoms form the “basic 
building blocks” for individuals and their well-being.91 Sen refers to these substantive 
freedoms as “capabilities”.92 These capabilities enable people to lead lives they value, 
as well as lives they have a reason to value.93 In this respect, he introduces the concept 
of “functionings”, which “reflects the various things a person may value doing or 
being”.94 Functionings may be either relatively simple – acquiring sufficient 
nourishment – or more complex – acceptance and participation in a particular 
community.95 
When one talks of an individual’s capability, what is being referred to are the various 
functionings and combinations available to her.96 Capability refers to her ability to 
exercise choice regarding alternative combinations of functionings.97 One may, for 
example, forego food and fast for religious reasons, despite one’s wealth.98 This choice 
may result in one’s functioning being comparable to that of a destitute person who goes 
hungry due to want.99 Key, however, is that in the first instance, one exercises choice, 
due to enjoying more developed capabilities.100 
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92 Sen Development 74. See A Sen “Capability and Well-being” in M Nussbaum & A Sen (eds) The 
Quality of Life (1993) 30 33; M Nussbaum Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 
(2011) 18.  
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Alexander explains that these capabilities or the resources required to develop them 
cannot be acquired independently.101 Rather, the cultivation of capabilities necessary 
for a well-lived life depends significantly on our dependence on other human beings.102 
Dependence on others remains a critical aspect of human existence, and one even 
remains partially dependent on others as otherwise independent adults.103 Beyond 
mere physical dependence on others, capabilities essential to a well-lived life – such 
as freedom and social interaction – can “exist only within a vital matrix of social 
structures and practices”.104 Even a capability such as freedom depends on social and 
cultural context and the cooperation of others.105 Our communities are thus essential 
for both our physical well-being as well as “our ability to function as free and rational 
agents”.106 
Alexander explains that capabilities are critical to the promotion of human flourishing, 
and as such, encouraging the development of people’s capabilities is an “objective 
human good”.107 Human dignity demands an equal opportunity for each person to 
flourish.108 Equal opportunity necessarily entails that everyone should have access 
both to the capabilities critical to their individual flourishing as well as the resources 
necessary for nurturing their capabilities.109 The nurturing of vital capabilities depends 
heavily on social matrices.110 
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Alexander proceeds to engage with the question as to why one should be concerned 
with the flourishing of others.111 He contends that it would be a self-contradiction, given 
our interdependence on others, to value one’s own flourishing while disregarding the 
flourishing of others.112 One should not only be concerned with one’s own flourishing 
but should assist in enabling others to flourish as well.113 This concern applies in 
respect of the exercise of our property rights, and when those rights may be limited or 
even taken away for the benefit of the community as a whole. 
The limitation of property rights to ensure the ability of others to flourish also extends 
to the circumstances in which owners may dispose of their property, particularly 
through abandonment. The illegal dumping of movables,114 as well as the proliferation 
of neglected buildings,115 serve as drains on the public purse. When there are pressing 
socio-economic priorities, such as in South Africa,116 abandonment has an inevitable 
impact on the ability of others to flourish. 
The emphasis on human flourishing – both one’s own and others – is why Alexander’s 
conception of the role of community differs from that of Dagan’s.117 Dagan views 
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communities as composed of individuals who consensually amalgamate to achieve 
certain goals for their shared benefit.118 Community participation in Alexander’s 
conception cannot be seen as a mere volitional act in securing one’s own interests.119 
Rather, community participation is a critical obligation based on the importance of 
capabilities for living a well-lived life.120 One is morally obligated to support and 
maintain the social matrices that permit people to flourish, so that others may enjoy an 
equal opportunity to flourish.121 This assertion is true even if those whose flourishing 
one is obliged to promote are not those from whom oneself has received any form of 
support.122 Human interdependency means that the obligation to promote flourishing is 
not necessarily reciprocal.123  
An approach which places greater emphasis on community membership and 
obligations to support and maintain social matrices that enable others to flourish better 
fits with the impossibility of abandoning landownership.124 A landowner is not simply 
able to withdraw from ownership “in the absence of another party who wishes to take 
responsibility for it”, 125 and pass on obligations to the community. 
Alexander is careful not to take this emphasis on community participation in social 
obligation, in terms of individual sacrifices, too far.126 While unreciprocated sacrifices 
may be the price of community membership, values such as individual respect and 
fairness must still be protected.127 Nevertheless, contributory obligations cannot be 
restricted to circumstances where the value of the benefit matches that of the 
burden.128 Human flourishing depends not only on social relations that are strategic to 
the individual, but also on those that are non-strategic.129 For example, one may be 
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compelled to remain owner of a piece of land and to maintain it,130 despite accruing no 
immediate benefit.131 However, fairness must be taken into consideration as to whether 
or not one should carry such a burden, particularly in circumstances in which one is 
not responsible for the negative value the land has accrued.132 
4.2 What does the social-obligation norm entail? 
It is necessary to locate the law of abandonment, and the impossibility of abandoning 
landownership in particular, in the social-obligation norm and its impacts on ownership 
entitlements. This is not an issue with which Alexander explicitly engages. In terms of 
Alexander’s conception of the social-obligation norm, there is a moral obligation on an 
owner to share with her community the benefits that are essential to promoting human 
flourishing.133 Alexander defines these benefits as those essential to developing human 
qualities critical to people’s ability to flourish as moral agents.134 Further, these benefits 
must bear some reasonable connection to the land that is burdened.135  
Restrictions on abandonment of property clearly find congruence with the examples 
Alexander provides of the practical effect of the social-obligation norm in property 
law.136 Alexander notes two primary examples in the law of property that can be 
explained using the social-obligation norm. The first are instances where an owner 
must yield an entitlement – or ownership in its entirety – to the community in exchange 
for financial compensation.137 An example of this would be the expropriation of property 
“for a public purpose or in the public interest”.138 The second are instances where the 
owner retains her property, but instead of yielding an interest, is prohibited from making 
use of her property in a manner deemed in conflict with the community’s interests.139 A 
clear example of this would be the law of nuisance, which limits the exercise of an 
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individual’s ownership entitlements on the grounds that her neighbour’s enjoy similar 
entitlements.140 
A restriction (or prohibition) on the abandonment of landownership would fall into the 
second category, although not perfectly. While there is a negative obligation to refrain 
from using property in a manner that conflicts with community interests, it also entails 
positive obligations. That is, the owner retains her property (albeit unwillingly) while 
being obliged to maintain it.141 She is not allowed to let the property to fall into 
neglect,142 which would conflict with community interests. Regardless, such a 
restriction or prohibition appears to be best explained using the social-obligation norm: 
the owner retaining ownership, and thus the obligations to maintain such property, 
means that the costs of maintenance do not fall to the community, thus redirecting 
resources which may otherwise be used to facilitate the flourishing of others. 
5. The social-obligation norm in South African property law 
Restrictions on abandonment find a comfortable fit with the theory of the social-
obligation norm in property law. However, it is most crucial to determine how 
restrictions on abandonment may be justified in South Africa’s constitutional 
framework. This determination is necessary to justify the continued impossibility of 
abandoning landownership in South African law, as well as formulating necessary law 
reform. 
A conception of the social-obligation norm that places significant emphasis on human 
flourishing finds easy concurrence with the values found in the South African 
Constitution.143 These values include equality, human dignity, as well as the promotion 
of freedoms and human rights.144 Alexander states that the property clause, section 
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25, gives expression to the social-obligation norm.145 He explains that the clause 
“incorporates a thick social-obligation norm through its explicit commitment to land 
reform and racial justice”.146 The property clause expressly provides for the limitation 
of property rights, whether this be through deprivation in terms of a law of general 
application,147 or an outright expropriation in the public interest or for a public 
purpose.148 Section 25 also obliges the government to facilitate land reform and rectify 
past injustices in respect of property holdings.149 Consequently, while landowners 
enjoy constitutionally-enshrined protection against the arbitrary deprivation of property, 
the sacrifice of entitlements is clearly envisioned in the new constitutional 
dispensation.150 The entitlement referred to as the ius disponendi,151 which would 
encompass abandonment, would be no exception.152 
The following section will consider the system regulating private property created by 
the Constitution, a system which as has been noted embodies the social-obligation 
norm, with an aim to locating abandonment in this framework and context. It will also 
examine whether unreciprocated sacrifices can be expected of landowners in the 
constitutional framework and if so, under what circumstances. It will also take note of 
the landownership context that prevails in South Africa, which has important 
implications for whether an unrestricted right to abandon can exist in South African law.  
5.1 Limitations inherent to the right or inherent to the system? 
Arguably, there has always been a social-obligation norm in South African property 
law. This contention stands regardless of how such might have been eroded in the 
land law context through the overwhelming power of predominantly white landowners 
over poor black non-owners.153 Even during the colonial and apartheid periods, one 
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was not entitled to use property as one pleased.154 As pointed out in Chapter 2, that 
landownership has always entailed obligations has roots in Roman-Dutch law.155 
Restrictions on the abandonment of landownership existed in Roman-Dutch law.156 
There has never been an unrestricted right to abandon landownership in Roman-Dutch 
law. 
However, this thesis is not concerned with whether a restriction on the right to abandon 
is inherent to the right of ownership or an external imposition. In this respect, the work 
of Van der Sijde is illuminating.157 She engages with the debate as to whether 
ownership is inherently limited, or whether ownership can be described as “absolute”, 
with the consequence that any limitations would have to be viewed as external to the 
right.158 She ultimately notes that this question is of little relevance under the current 
constitutional dispensation.159 Rather, the question is whether the limitation is “inherent 
to the system in which the right functions”.160 Such an approach fits with the “single 
system of law” which has been endorsed by the Constitutional Court,161 and expanded 
upon by Van der Walt in the context of the law of property.162 According to this view, 
“all law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution”.163 Parallel 
systems of law should not be allowed to develop, and existing law should be reconciled 
with the new constitutional dispensation.164 
Ultimately, when evaluating the existing impossibility of abandoning landownership in 
South African law, one does not need to consider whether this limitation is part of 
ownership in land. Instead, one must evaluate whether the limitation (impossibility of 
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abandonment) finds concurrence with the system in which the right and its limitation 
exist.165 Even though this limitation pre-dates the constitutional dispensation, it is 
necessary that it be reconciled with the new constitutional provisions.166 These are 
provisions which embody the social-obligation norm,167 with the consequence that the 
limitation must give effect to the norm as a well. Such reconciliation is in fact compelled 
by the Constitution, which requires existing legislation be interpreted and the common 
law be developed in a manner which promotes the “spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights”.168 How the social-obligation norm is given effect to, and the manner in 
which limitations on the right of ownership have developed in the new constitutional 
dispensation, are discussed in the next section. 
5.2 Unreciprocated sacrifices and the objectives of the property clause 
Restrictions on the unilateral disposal of property through abandonment – including 
that of landownership – have not been subject to evaluation in light of the property 
clause and its objectives as of writing.169 It is thus necessary to look for parallels 
between the unreciprocated sacrifices entailed by the prohibition on abandoning 
landownership and other restrictions on ownership entitlements flowing from the 
Constitution. 
In the new constitutional dispensation, the social-obligation norm is particularly evident 
in the context of unlawful occupation of land. In this context, landowners are often 
expected to sacrifice entitlements until an eviction order, made after considering all 
relevant circumstances, is granted.170 This sacrifice is made without any reciprocal 
advantage, and lasts for an indeterminate period. In some extreme situations, such as 
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in President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd,171 the 
owner may be entitled to compensation when it is not feasible to implement an eviction 
order that has already been granted.172 However, outside these exceptional 
circumstances, no reciprocity exists for the limitation on the owner’s entitlements. This 
makes clear that the constitutional framework aligns with Alexander’s conception of 
the social-obligation norm. That is, one may owe obligations to the community, to 
people unrelated to oneself, while reciprocity is not necessarily forthcoming.173 
The constitutional property clause’s objectives are primarily focused on redistribution 
of land and rectifying skewed property holdings.174 However, section 25’s objectives 
are more extensive than its explicitly redistributive clauses may initially indicate.175 As 
Van der Walt explains, in the current constitutional framework, the “allocation, 
recognition and protection of individual property rights may not result in an environment 
that endangers the health or well-being of the citizenry”.176 The rights of landowners 
will inevitably come into conflict with the equally important constitutional rights of 
others. For example, the environmental rights encapsulated in section 24, which 
provides that “everyone has the right … to an environment that is not harmful to their 
health or well-being” and “to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present 
and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures”. As will 
become clear in the next paragraph, an owner neglecting (or outright abandoning) her 
land has potential ramifications for the right to a healthy environment, particularly in 
the form of a proliferation of neglected properties. 
An unrestricted right to abandon landownership – proverbially washing one’s hands of 
a piece of land the moment circumstances become unfavourable – threatens the right 
to a healthy environment.177 A proliferation of neglected properties can result in unsafe 
buildings and fire hazards, posing a threat to those who live and work in the immediate 
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vicinity.178 Neglected properties also have the potential to become dumping grounds, 
a concern highlighted by Peñalver in his defence of the prohibition on the abandonment 
of land in the United States.179 Beyond the immediate externalities that can result from 
the abandonment of landownership, such abandonment can have implications for 
human flourishing in other ways. It would fall upon the state, particularly local 
authorities, to maintain neglected properties, at a cost to the public purse.180 
Government budgets are already constrained,181 and this is coupled with pressing 
obligations to realise the social-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution.182 As 
such, an unrestricted right to abandon may hamper the government in creating an 
environment that will enable the flourishing of the most vulnerable. 
In these circumstances, owners may be expected to remain owners (and thus 
maintainers) of land, even where such land has a negative value. This would constitute 
an unreciprocated sacrifice, a price for their membership of the community.183 
Nevertheless, values such as fairness and respect for individual rights need to be taken 
into account,184 particularly where the landowner bears no responsibility for the 
negative value the land has acquired. One will need to distinguish between those 
landowners who have caused their land to acquire a negative value, and those who 
have not.185 Where burdens are found to be excessive (such as in the context of 
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unlawful occupation of land in Modderklip), some form of equalisation may be 
warranted, whether through compensation or equalisation186 or a regulated exit from 
ownership.187 
5.3 Sliding scale 
When evaluating whether abandonment of landownership should be permitted, and 
under what circumstances, it is necessary to remember that not all cases are the same. 
Some landowners may bear responsibility for their position as owner of land that holds 
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a negative value,188 while in other cases the burden on an innocent landowner may 
appear to be excessive and require that some form of remedy be provided.189 It is 
necessary to ask how one may make such distinctions in respect of different properties 
and landowners. 
How does one determine when a landowner may be required to make an 
unreciprocated sacrifice or should be provided with some form of equalisation? 
Constitutional jurisprudence reveals that the approach to the property clause follows 
the “sliding scale approach to evaluating the magnitude of social obligation” that 
Alexander has identified as existing in German jurisprudence.190 Such an approach 
distinguishes between different forms of property in establishing the level of social 
obligation that should be placed upon the particular owner.191 It is the very social 
function of property that determines this ordering of property according to category.192 
Thus greater legislative power may be exercised over more socially important assets 
than others.193 For example, greater legislative power may be exercised over corporate 
stocks as opposed to small garden plots.194 
The sliding-scale approach appears from the acknowledgment that a court may 
embark on a proportionality analysis in cases involving the deprivation of property.195 
The most relevant case in this regard is First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank 
v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services (hereinafter the “FNB 
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case”).196 When interrogating the non-arbitrariness requirement to determine the 
validity of a deprivation, it is not necessarily sufficient to establish that there is a rational 
connection between means and ends.197 Depending on the severity of the deprivation, 
proportionality of the means and ends may also need to be evaluated. That is, the 
impact of the deprivation on the owner in question will need to be considered.198 Where 
a deprivation is found to be disproportionate to the infringement of a property right, it 
is likely that such deprivation will be found to be arbitrary.199 
The factors considered in a proportionality enquiry are important to demonstrating how 
the sliding-scale approach manifests in the South African constitutional property law 
context. The FNB case set out the relevant factors.200 Firstly, one must consider “the 
relationship between means employed, namely the deprivation in question, and ends 
sought to be achieved, namely the purpose of the law in question”.201 Secondly, “regard 
must be had to the relationship between the purpose for the deprivation and the person 
whose property is affected”.202 Thirdly, “regard must be had to the relationship between 
the purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the property”.203 This requires a 
consideration of the “extent of the deprivation in respect of such property”.204  
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The social-obligation norm, therefore, finds effect to through the Constitution’s 
provision for deprivation of property as well as the manner in which it is regulated. Not 
only is ownership not absolute, in that an owner may not do with his property as he 
wishes, but ownership entails obligations, particularly unreciprocated sacrifices when 
the rights of the vulnerable are at stake.205 Obligations may be imposed on owners in 
the form of deprivations, following the sliding-scale approach, taking into account the 
relationships implicated by the deprivation in question. 
This contention is even supported by the contractarian view of Dagan.206 Dagan is 
concerned about politically and marginalised groups bearing the brunt of burdens on 
property.207 The imposition of any such burden should be “a proper price of communal 
citizenship” rather than “an unfair sacrifice of the few to the many”.208 The contextual 
analysis of deprivation as developed in the FNB case should assuage such fears that 
some may bear an unfair burden. 
Evidently, the sliding-scale approach to social obligation fits with the constitutional 
property clause and existing jurisprudence. This fit is clear from the proportionality 
analysis that is undertaken when evaluating whether a particular deprivation is arbitrary 
or not. This sliding-scale approach would appear equally applicable to considering 
whether the abandonment of landownership should be permitted, and if so, under what 
circumstances. While an unrestricted right to abandon is likely not feasible, the 
disproportionality of the burden in certain circumstances may warrant some form of 
exit of ownership. 
5.4 The landownership context in South Africa 
Some context needs to be provided for the particularly strong emphasis placed on the 
social-obligation norm in the new constitutional framework, particularly with respect to 
the unreciprocated burdens on landowners. During apartheid, the rights of 
(predominantly white) landowners trumped the interests of (predominantly black) non-
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landowners.209 Despite inroads into the powers of landowners to do with their property 
as they please, landowners still remain in a (relatively) comfortable and privileged 
position.210 Landowners have reaped the benefits of their ownership, largely thanks to 
past racially discriminatory laws.211 Thus, it may be argued landowners should not be 
free simply unilaterally to divest themselves of ownership and concomitant liabilities 
during more difficult periods.  
Nevertheless, it is true that not every landowner is politically or economically strong.212 
Rather, whether a particular landowner should be permitted to divest herself of 
ownership would have to depend on the context and the extent of the burden.213 The 
possible regulation of abandonment of landownership in different contexts – mining, 
inner cities amidst urban decay, historic and protected buildings – will be explored in 
Chapter Six, which will provide suggestions for law reform. These suggestions will be 
made in light of the social-obligation norm and the constitutional framework which gives 
expression to the social-obligation norm. 
6. Social obligation, abandonment of property and possible guidelines 
Counterintuitively, the observations of scholars in respect of the operation of the social-
obligation norm in the context of takings (expropriation) law and distributive justice can 
also be applied in the context of restrictions on the abandonment of property.214 There 
are numerous externalities associated with the abandonment of land, even where such 
abandonment is informal due to the lack of mechanism through which an owner may 
 
209 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 63-64. 
210 While it is not denied that landownership encompasses numerous difficulties in contemporary South 
Africa, particularly in the context of unlawful occupation, landowners remain significantly better off and 
privileged than (particularly black) non-landowners. This situation is clear in the context of the problem 
of spatial injustice, which remains a vexing question in cities such as Cape Town. See M Hungwe 
“Factors Behind Urban Land Justice and Inequality in Cape Town” (2017) 18 ESR Review 5; J van Wyk 
“Can SPLUMA Play a Role in Transforming Spatial Injustice to Spatial Justice in Housing in South 
Africa?” (2015) 30 SAPL 26 29-30. 
211 Van der Walt Property in the Margins 1ff; AJ van der Walt “The Future of Common Law 
Landownership” in AJ van der Walt (ed) Land Reform and the Future of Landownership in South Africa 
(1991) 21 22-25. 
212 See the example of Mrs Fischer in the Fischer cases (note 187 above), who was a pensioner in her 
late 70s when the invasion of her property began (Fischer v Persons Unknown 2014 (3) SA 291 (WCC) 
para 4).  
213 See Chapters 6 and 7 for detailed discussion on the necessity of law reform and what shape such 
reform should take. 
214 For a discussion of “forcings” (compelled ownership) as opposed to “takings” (expropriation), see 




divest herself of ownership. If unrestricted abandonment of landownership were 
permitted, it would fall to the state to maintain abandoned land, thus redirecting 
resources from elsewhere. Inevitably, this could potentially have a negative impact on 
the state meeting its socio-economic obligations, and thus could have a negative 
impact on the human flourishing of others. 
Even an exclusion theorist215 such as Penner, while advocating for a generally robust 
right to abandon one’s property, is forced to concede such a right can never be 
unrestricted.216 He notes that abandonment of property rights will usually entail social 
obligations, such as following the correction waste disposal procedures in respect of 
movables to avoid pollution.217 As one is obliged not to harm others through the use of 
one’s property in general, restrictions will be placed on the manner in which one may 
dispose of property.218 In the case of land, responsibilities that accompany ownership 
cannot simply be avoided by the relinquishment of physical possession.219 
The social-obligation norm finds expression in the current constitutional framework, in 
particular section 25 of the Constitution.220 Despite the explicit emphasis on restitution 
and redistribution found in the provision, it is clear that the goals of constitutional 
property extended further.221 There are competing constitutional rights against which 
the owners’ rights must be weighed. Whether landowners should be permitted to 
abandon their land, and under what circumstances, needs to be evaluated in this 
 
215 For Penner, the right to exclude appears to be the best way to explain ownership, given that one is 
entitled to exclude others from things one not technically using at the moment (Penner The Idea 70). 
While property in terms of the exclusion thesis is characterised “primarily as a protected sphere of 
indefinite and undefined activity”, it is not denied that the actions the owner may carry out can be 
circumscribed (Penner The Idea 134). On the exclusion theory further, see T Merrill & H Smith “What 
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?” (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 357 360ff; H Smith 
“Property and Property Rules” (2004) 79 New York University Law Review 1719 1754ff. 
For a critique of exclusion theories, see L Katz “Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law” (2008) 58 
University of Toronto Law Journal 275. She finds an “emphasis on exclusion leaves us unable to 
describe important structural limits on the owner’s authority” (287). Instead, the defining characteristic 
of ownership is the owner’s entitlement to set the agenda of a particular resource. In Katz’ view, 
“exclusivity of ownership is just one aspect of ownership's character as a position of agenda-setting 
authority” (290). See also Katz (2020) Cornell Journal (forthcoming). 
216 Penner The Idea 78-80. 
217 Penner The Idea 78. 
218 Penner The Idea 79-80. 
219 Penner The Idea 80. 
220 See Alexander (2009) Cornell 782ff. See Section 5 above. 




constitutional context, despite the prevailing legal position pre-dating the constitutional 
dispensation. 
In light of the above theoretical approach and the constitutional context, it is possible 
to set out a number of guidelines for formulating law reform in respect of the 
abandonment of land ownership.222 The unrestricted abandonment of land in South 
Africa is not feasible, given the possible societal costs.223 Nevertheless, there may be 
circumstances in which the abandonment of landownership should be permitted or 
some form of regulated exit from ownership provided.  
The following guidelines are proposed in respect of formulating the circumstances 
under which abandonment should be permitted, if at all. These guidelines have been 
formulated with the social-obligation norm in mind, particularly the manner in which the 
norm is given effect to by the property clause of the Constitution. These factors will 
assist in formulating suggestions for law reform in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The first consideration is the extent of the burden placed on the individual landowner. 
The second consideration is to what extent a third party (such as mining company) 
benefits from the burden to which the individual landowner is subjected. The third 
consideration is existing compensatory mechanisms, and to what extent these alleviate 
the burden on the landowner. The final (and possibly most important) consideration is 
the potential societal cost of abandonment in the relevant circumstances. What makes 
this factor particularly important in a framework informed by social obligation and 
human flourishing are the socio-economic obligations imposed on the state by the 
Constitution.224 The proliferation of neglected properties has budgetary implications for 
government, particularly local government.225 It is contended that the above factors 
would give effect to the sliding scale of obligation.226  
The theoretical approach adopted in this thesis has been set out and considered in 
light of South Africa’s constitutional framework. Further, guidelines for the 
abandonment of landownership have been considered in light of this approach. With 
 
222 See Cramer (2017) SALJ 904-905. 
223 See the contextual overview in Chapter 1 Section 2, as well as Chapter 6 Section 2.1. 
224 See note 116 above. 
225 See discussion in Chapter 6 Section 2.1. 




the social-obligation norm in mind, one can better explain the law’s approach to the 
abandonment of landownership, and also, why approaches may differ in other 
jurisdictions. The following chapter seeks to compare the South African law of 
abandonment with the law that prevails in Switzerland and Scotland using the social-




Chapter 5: Comparative Study – The 
Abandonment of Land in South Africa, 
Switzerland and Scotland 
 
1. Introduction: Rationale for choice of comparative jurisdictions 
It is contended that the abandonment of land is impossible in the South African law.1 
This contention is based on an interpretation of existing law in light of the principle of 
publicity.2 Ultimately there is no rule, either at common law or in legislation, which 
expressly permits or prohibits the abandonment of land. The lack of clarity in respect 
of such an important question is undesirable. The latter chapters of this dissertation 
will make suggestions for law reform on this issue. 
Uncertainty about the possibility of abandoning land in the South African context, 
renders it useful to examine foreign jurisdictions with clearer answers to the same 
question. The differences between the approaches taken by these jurisdictions can 
then be analysed using the social-obligation norm (as detailed in the previous chapter) 
as a tool for explanation. For purposes of this thesis, Switzerland and Scotland are 
chosen as comparative examples. The primary reason for choosing these two 
jurisdictions is that they are opposites in respect of the abandonment of landownership. 
In Switzerland, a landowner is permitted to abandon her land by the Civil Code,3 so 
long as the simple legal requirements are met.4 By contrast, a decision by the Inner 
House of the Court of Session in Scotland found that as the law stands, it is not possible 
 
1 See the conclusions in Chapter 3 Section 4. 
2 See Chapter 3 Sections 2 to 4. 
3 Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB). 
4 See Art 666 Abs 1 and Art 964 Abs 1 ZGB. See also H Rey & L Strebel “Art. 666” in H Honsell, NP 
Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed (2015) 1134 1134-1135; J Schmid & 
B Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht (2017) para 868; H Rey Die Grundlagen des Sachenrechts und das 
Eigentum 3 ed (2007) para 1673ff; P Tuor, B Schnyder, J Schmid & A Jungo Das Schweizerische 
Zivilgesetzbuch 14 ed (2015) § 100 para 33; F Hitz “Art. 666” in M Amstutz, P Breitschmid, A Furrer, D 
Girsberger, C Huguenin, A Jungo, M Müller-Chen, V Roberto, AK Schnyder & HR Trüeb (eds) 
Handkommentar zum Schweizer Privatrecht 3 ed (2006) 166 166-167; P Simonius & T Sutter 




to abandon landownership, in the absence of a mechanism in the legislation providing 
for such abandonment.5 
In examining these jurisdictions, including their respective socio-economic contexts, it 
is not necessarily suggested South Africa adopt wholesale either of the approaches. It 
may be preferable for South Africa to adopt a middle path. However, to examine the 
approaches taken by other jurisdictions remains a useful tool in making suggestions 
for law reform. 
2. Comparative law: A brief theoretical overview 
Comparative law may be described as a discipline which explores “the similarities and 
dissimilarities of different cultural or social phenomena”.6 Through comparative law 
research, one can supply a variety of models on which to base law reform.7 Legal 
systems will often have to tackle similar problems, and one can look to foreign 
jurisdictions as to how the same problem is dealt with differently.8 A foreign jurisdiction 
may provide a more efficient model, from which law reformers can learn.9 
This study will adopt the functionalist approach to comparative law. In terms of this 
approach, the law is viewed as providing solutions to society’s problems.10 The 
relevant jurisdictions are to be evaluated from the perspective of how they address the 
same questions: through not only the rules themselves - but also the possible 
consequences.11 Thus, their responses to real-life situations where owners may feel 
burdened by their continued ownership, but cannot find a third party willing to take 
transfer of said land, will be assessed. 
 
5 The Scottish Environment Protection Agency v The Joint Liquidators of the Scottish Coal Company 
Limited [2013] CSIH 108 para 103. 
6 N Jansen “Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge” in M Reimann & R Zimmermann (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 305 306. 
7 E Örücü “Developing Comparative Law” in E Örücü & D Nelken (eds) Comparative Law: A Handbook 
(2007) 43 55. 
8 Örücü “Developing Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 55; K Zweigert & H Kötz An Introduction to 
Comparative Law 3 ed (1998) 34. 
9 Örücü “Developing Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 55. 
10 Örücü “Developing Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 50-51; M Graziadei “The Functionalist 
Heritage” in P Legrand (ed) Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (2003) 100 100; M 
Siems Comparative Law (2014) 25; Zweigert & Kötz An Introduction 34.. 




A functionalist approach is preferable to what is termed a “strong positivist approach” 
to comparative law,12 which would be deficient for the purposes of research such as 
this. In terms of this approach, the two contrasting sets of legal rules would be 
juxtaposed, with the conclusion being that “these legal systems differ because they 
were enacted by different states”.13 Such an approach would do little more than set out 
the facts of each legal system and compare them.14 This would ultimately provide a 
superficial account of the differences between jurisdictions.15 
The functionalist approach cannot be described as uniform, but there are a number of 
important elements that functionalists accept in general.16 First, the primary focus of 
the functional approach is not on the rules themselves, but their effects.17 Legal 
systems are thus evaluated in the light of their responses to real-life situations.18 
Second, the functionalist approach to comparative law does not only take a functional 
approach.19 It combines this approach with the understanding that objects must be 
evaluated “in light of their functional relation to society”.20 Despite being technically 
separate, both law and society are related to each other.21 Third, function can be an 
example of tertium comparationis itself.22 Institutions can be viewed as comparable so 
long as they “fulfil similar functions in different systems”.23 For example, one may 
compare systems of land registration in different jurisdictions, as they both perform 
essentially the same function, although in different legal settings.  
 
12 Siems Comparative Law 26. 
13 C Valcke “Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence – The Compatibility of Legal Systems” 
(2004) 52 American Journal of Comparative Law 713 730-731; Siems Comparative Law 26. 
14 Valcke 2004 American Journal of Comparative Law 731. 
15 Valcke 2004 American Journal of Comparative Law 731. 
16 R Michaels “The Functional Method of Comparative Law” in M Reimann & R Zimmermann (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook (2006) 339 342. 
17 Michaels “The Functional Method” in The Oxford Handbook 342. 
18 Michaels “The Functional Method” in The Oxford Handbook 342. See also Örücü “Developing 
Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 51. 
19 Michaels “The Functional Method” in The Oxford Handbook 342. 
20 Michaels “The Functional Method” in The Oxford Handbook 342. See also Örücü “Developing 
Comparative Law” in Comparative Law 51. 
21 Michaels “The Functional Method” in The Oxford Handbook 342. 
22 Michaels “The Functional Method” in The Oxford Handbook 342. 
23 Michaels “The Functional Method” in The Oxford Handbook 342. See also Örücü “Developing 




3. Swiss law: A permissive regime 
Switzerland serves as a useful comparative jurisdiction for land law, in general, and 
the abandonment of land. Its land registration system is efficient and well-developed 
in terms of its rules and operation.24 The most important reason for the use of this 
jurisdiction, for the purposes of this thesis, is the direct manner in which the Swiss law 
addresses the abandonment of land (referred to as Dereliktion). The possibility of 
abandoning land in terms of Swiss law is acknowledged by both the courts and 
academics in that jurisdiction.25 This position is in stark contrast to South Africa’s 
Deeds Registries Act which does not contain any such provision.26  
One of the unfortunate features of abandonment of land in South Africa is the absence 
of any clear answers. Despite debate between academics about whether the 
abandonment of land is possible,27 and if so, what the consequences are,28 there are 
few if any clear answers that major property law texts put forward.29 By contrast, there 
appear to be almost no unanswered questions regarding the abandonment 
(Dereliktion) of land in Switzerland. Between the Civil Code and the 
Grundbuchverordnung (GBV),30 as well as the writings of academic commentators, the 
finer details have been worked out and the consequences of abandoning certain rights 
determined. 
 
24 See Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht Chapter 2 for a general overview. 
25 For court decisions, see BGE 129 III 216; BGE 85 I 261; BGE 114 II 32. For the legal literature see 
Rey & Strebel “Art 666” in Basler Kommentar 1134-1135; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 
868; Rey Sachenrechts para 1673ff; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 33; Hitz 
“Art 666” in Handkommentar 166-167; Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 
127. 
26 Act 47 of 1937. See H Mostert “No Right to Neglect? Exploratory Observations on How Policy Choices 
Challenge the Basic Principles of Property” in S Scott & J van Wyk (eds) Property Law Under Scrutiny 
(2015) 11 26-28. 
27 See JC Sonnekus “Abandonnering van Eiendomsreg op Grond end Aanspreeklikheid vir 
Grondbelasting” (2004) TSAR 747 751-756; Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 26-28. 
28 CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Part III – Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 
Law 9 ed (2007) 405 492; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 227; CG van der Merwe “Minister 
van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 2 SA 944 (A)” (1980) TSAR 183 187-188; DL Carey Miller The 
Acquisition and Protection of Ownership (1986) 8-9; JC Sonnekus “Enkele Opmerkings na Aanleiding 
van die Aanspraak op Bona Vacantia as Sogenaamde Regale Reg” (1985) TSAR 121 121ff; JC 
Sonnekus “Grondeise en die Klassifikasie van Grond as Res Nullius of as Staatsgrond” (2001) TSAR 
84 91ff. 
29 G Muller, R Brits, JM Pienaar & Z Boggenpoel Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 6 ed 
(2019) 158-160; Van der Merwe Sakereg 227; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s 
Principles 492. 




3.1 Background: The Land Registration System in Switzerland 
Both the Swiss and South African property law systems observe the principle of 
publicity.31 The principle of publicity dictates that property rights must be evident to 
third parties to be enforceable against the world at large.32 In respect of movables, the 
principle of publicity is served through possession of the thing in question.33 By 
contrast, publicity in respect of land is served through registration in a land register 
(Deeds Registry or Grundbuch respectively).34 Possession is thus insufficient in the 
context of land and rights therein to fulfil the function of publicity. In both jurisdictions, 
the rule that registration is required for the creation of rights in land is not without 
exceptions, for instance original modes of acquisition such as acquisitive 
prescription.35 However, despite these limited number of exceptions, registration 
remains central in giving effect to the principle of publicity in respect of rights in land.36 
The following discussion of the abandonment of land in Switzerland must be preceded 
by a brief overview of the land registration system in which it operates. The key feature 
of land registration in Switzerland is the Grundbuch. The Grundbuch functions as a 
public register in which information on real rights in land is compiled.37 The law 
presumes that the person registered as owner in the Grundbuch is the owner of the 
land in question.38 As such, it gives effect to the principle of publicity in respect of rights 
in land in Switzerland, in the way possession functions with respect to movables.39 Any 
 
31 Muller et al Silberberg 93-95; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 88 para 9. 
32 Muller et al Silberberg 93-95; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 63ff; Tuor et al Das 
Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 88 para 9. 
33 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 63ff.; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 
88 para 9, § 93 para 1. 
34 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 63ff.; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 
88 para 9, § 93 para 1. 
35 On the doctrine of acquisitive prescription in Swiss law, see art 661 and art 662 ZGB. See also Schmid 
& Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 858ff; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 
21ff. The Swiss Civil Code expressly acknowledges other cases in which ownership can be acquired in 
the absence of registration. These include appropriation, inheritance, expropriation and debt 
enforcement or court judgments: see Art 656 Abs 2. See also Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht 
para 837; L Strebel & H Laim “Art. 656” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar 
Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed (2015) 1054 1062ff; Rey Sachenrechts para 314.   
36 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 66; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 88 
para 9, § 93 para 1. 
37 Art. 2 lit b GBV; C Brückner & M Kuster Die Grundstücksgeschäfte (2016) 467. 
38 Art. 937 Abs 1 ZGB; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 367. 
39 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 63ff.; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 




transfer of ownership in land must occur in the Grundbuch.40 Servitudes 
(Dienstbarkeiten), as well as other real rights in land, must also be recorded in the 
Grundbuch for such rights to have legal force.41 It thus logically follows that any 
abandonment (Dereliktion) of land should also occur through registration actions in the 
Grundbuch.42 
In simplified terms, the Grundbuch is little more than a book in which information 
regarding rights in land is compiled.43 However, it is somewhat more complex than this. 
It is actually composed of different constituent components.44  Brückner and Kuster 
identify the four most important components as being the Hauptbuch, 
Vermessungspläne, the Belegsammlung and the Tagebuch.45 The Vermessungspläne 
are the survey plans. These document the topography of land, and the form and extent 
of all pieces of land in relation to their neighbours.46 The Belegsammlung is a collection 
of supporting documents in relation to transactions in the Hauptbuch, such as powers 
of attorney, declarations of consent and authorisations relating to the transfer of land.47 
The Tagebuch serves as a chronological record of the transactions that occur in the 
Grundbuch.48 
The Hauptbuch (main register) is undoubtedly the most important part of the 
Grundbuch.49 It is central to the functioning of the Grundbuch as registration in the 
 
40 Art. 656 Abs. 1 and Art. 971 ZGB; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 367. 
41 See Art. 731 Abs. 1, Art. 746, Art. 776 Abs. 3, Art. 783 Abs. 1 and Art. 799 Abs. 1 ZGB; Schmid & 
Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 367. 
42 Art. 666 Abs. 1 and Art. 964 Abs. 1 of the ZGB. See Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 
1134-1135; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 868; Rey Sachenrechts para 1673ff; Tuor et 
al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 33; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 166-167; 
Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 127. 
43 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 364. 
44 Art 942 Abs 2 ZGB. See Brückner & Kuster Die Grundstücksgeschäfte 480-494; Schmid & Hürlimann-
Kaup Sachenrecht para 437ff. Art 942 Abs 2 ZGB. 
45 Brückner & Kuster Die Grundstücksgeschäfte 480-494. See Art. 942 Abs. 2 ZGB. See also J Schmid 
“Art. 942” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed (2015) 2435 
2435. 
46 Brückner & Kuster Die Grundstücksgeschäfte 481-482; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 
443. See Art. 668 Abs. 1 and Art. 950 ZGB; Art. 2 lit. F and Art. 21 GBV. 
47 Brückner & Kuster Die Grundstücksgeschäfte 485-486; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 
445. See Art. 2 lit. g GBV. See also Schmid “Art. 942” in Basler Kommentar 2437-2438. 
48 Brückner & Kuster Die Grundstücksgeschäfte 487-503; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 
446. See Art. 948 Abs. 1; Art. 2 lit. e GBV. See also Schmid “Art. 942” in Basler Kommentar 2440. 
49 Brückner & Kuster Die Grundstücksgeschäfte 483-484; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 
439-441. See Art. 942 Abs. 2, Art. 945 Abs. 1, Art. 972 Abs. 1 ZGB; Art. 2 lit. d GBV. See also Schmid 




Hauptbuch is a prerequisite for the enforceability of real rights in land in Switzerland.50 
Art. 972 Abs. 1 provides that real rights are established, as well as assigned their rank 
and date, through their entry into the Hauptbuch. 
Switzerland observes as a positive system of land registration.51 As opposed to a 
negative system of registration, in which the contents of the land register are not 
guaranteed to be correct,52 in the Swiss system, good faith acquirers of property or 
real rights are protected.53 So long as one relies on the content of the land register in 
good faith, acquisition of property or real rights is guaranteed.54 However, unlike the 
negative registration system in the South African context,55 this is seen to have no 
bearing on the possibility of abandoning land in Swiss law. This is since abandonment 
occurs through actions in the land register.56 
3.2 Dereliktion 
In Swiss property law, the term Dereliktion is used in respect of both the abandonment 
of movable and immovable corporeal property.57 However, despite this, the 
requirements for the Dereliktion for these two categories are entirely different. 
The term “Dereliktion” will be preferred to the rough English translation “abandonment”. 
This is because the use of the former term in Swiss law does not have the exact same 
 
50 Brückner & Kuster Die Grundstücksgeschäfte 483-484; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht 438-
441. See Art. 971 Abs 1 and Art. 972 Abs. 1 ZGB; Art. 2 lit. c GBV. See also Schmid “Art. 942” 2436-
2437; Schmid “Art. 971” 2645-2648; J Schmid “Art. 972” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler 
Kommentar Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed (2015) 2649 2649. 
51 See Art 973 Abs 1. See also Rey Sachenrechts para 284; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht 
paras 579ff; J Schmid “Art. 973” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar 
Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed (2015) 2656 2658ff. 
52 See Chapter 3 Section 2.2.1 above. See Muller et al Silberberg 256ff; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part 
III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 537; Van der Merwe Sakereg 342ff. 
53 Art 973 Abs 1.  
54 Art 973 Abs 1. This rule is subject to an exception found in Art 973 Abs 2 that the rule does not apply 
to land found in areas designated as permanently vulnerable to ground displacement. 
55 See Chapter 3 Section 2.2.1 above. 
56 See Art 964 Abs 1; Art. 46 and 48 GBV. See also Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 868; 
Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1134-1135; Rey Sachenrechts para 1676; Tuor et al Das 
Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 33; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 166-167; Simonius & 
Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 127. 
57 Art 729 ZGB regulates the Dereliktion of movable property. See Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup 
Sachenrecht para 1137; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 104 para 47; Hitz “Art. 729” 
in Handkommentar 412-414; Rey Sachenrechts para 2020ff. Art 666 Abs. 1 ZGB in conjunction with Art. 
964 Abs. 1 ZGB regulates the Dereliktion of immovable property. See Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup 
Sachenrecht para 868; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 paras 31-34; Hitz “Art. 
666” in Handkommentar 166-168; Rey Sachenrechts para 1673ff; Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches 




meaning as the latter term in South African law. “Dereliktion” would ideally be 
translated as the “abandonment of corporeal property”,58 the constant use of which 
would be clumsy. 
Regarding movable corporeal property, the Swiss doctrine of Dereliktion does not differ 
significantly from abandonment in South African law. Ownership of a movable 
(beweglichen Sache) is not lost unless loss of possession is coupled with the intention 
to relinquish such ownership, making such a movable open to appropriation by 
another.59 Deciding whether such requirements have been met requires scrutinising 
the factual context in which the alleged Dereliktion took place.60 One should examine, 
for example, the relationship between a thing and the location in which it is found in 
determining whether the intention requirement for Dereliktion has been met.61 
The requirements for the abandonment of movable property are, however, irrelevant 
in the context of immovable property in Swiss law.62 This point is in line with the way 
the principle of publicity is served in that jurisdiction. Rather than Dereliktion taking 
place through relinquishing possession, coupled with an intention to forgo ownership 
of the land in question, it takes place through actions in the Grundbuch.63 Verbal 
declarations or otherwise of an intention to abandon land, or prolonged absences 
which may indicate such an intention, are of no consequence.64 In terms of the ZGB 
(Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch, or Swiss Civil Code), the deletion of the entry in the 
Grundbuch is the only requirement for ownership in land to be terminated through 
 
58 The term Dereliktion only applies to corporeal property: Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 
1135-1136; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 34; Rey Sachenrechts paras 
1674a, 1680. 
59 Art. 729. See Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 1120, 1137; I Schwander “Art. 729” in H 
Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed (2015) 1441 1441-1442; 
Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 103 para 47; F Hitz “Art. 729” in M Amstutz, P 
Breitschmid, A Furrer, D Girsberger, C Huguenin, A Jungo, M Müller-Chen, V Roberto, AK Schnyder & 
HR Trüeb (eds) Handkommentar zum Schweizer Privatrecht 3 ed (2006) 412 412-414; Rey 
Sachenrechts paras 2020ff. 
60 See Art. 718 and Art. 729 ZGB. Schmid and Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrechts para 1137; Schwander 
“Art. 729” in Basler Kommentar 1441-1442; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 103 para 
47; Hitz “Art. 729” in Handkommentar 412-414; Rey Sachenrechts paras 2020ff. See in particular the 
case BGE 115 IV 104. 
61 BGE 115 IV 104 109. 
62 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1134; Hitz “Art. 729” in Handkommentar 166-167; Rey 
Sachenrechts paras 1675-1676. 
63 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1134; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 
868; Rey Sachenrechts paras 1675-1676; Art. 666 Abs. 1, Art. 964 Abs. 1 ZGB. 




Dereliktion.65 This is achieved through the submission of a waiver by the registered 
owner of the land in question.66  
3.2.1 The consequences of Dereliktion of immovable property 
Each piece of land has a page in the Grundbuch, which includes an owner’s column,67 
the name of the current registered owner of a piece of land.68 The consequence of 
Dereliktion, and the subsequent deletion of the owner’s name from the owner’s column 
on the relevant page of the Grundbuch, is that the land in question is ownerless.69 As 
such, it may be appropriated by another.70 This is unless there is doubt as to who in 
fact the owner of the land is, in which case appropriation is precluded.71 
The consequences of the abandonment of land in an individual canton72 can be 
prescribed in its implementation law (Einführungsgesetz73).74 As such, while the default 
position in terms of the Civil Code is that land subject to Dereliktion is ownerless and 
open to appropriation, this is not always the case. A few cantons have made the 
decision to direct ownership of abandoned land in their jurisdiction to another legal 
entity.75 For example, Freiburg’s implementation law makes provision for abandoned 
land to become the property of the state (assumedly the canton and not the Swiss 
 
65 Art. 666 Abs. 1 read with Art. 964. Abs. 1. See Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1134-
1135; Schmid and Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 868; Rey Sachenrechts para 1673ff; Tuor et al 
Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 33; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 166-167; 
Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 127. 
66 See Art. 964 Abs. 1; Art. 46 and 48 GBV. See also Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 868; 
Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 1134-1135; Rey Sachenrecht para 1676; Tuor et al Das 
Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 33; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 166-167; Simonius & 
Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 127. 
67 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 367. 
68 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 367. 
69 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167; Rey 
Sachenrechts para 1677. 
70 Art. 658 Abs. 1; Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1134; Rey Sachenrecht para 1678; 
Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 128. 
71 L Strebel & H Laim “Art. 658” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar 
Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed (2015) 1086 1088. 
72 The member states of the Swiss Confederation are referred to as “cantons”. E.g. the Canton of Zurich, 
the Canton of Bern and the Canton of Vaud.  
73 See Art. 49 of the ZGB on supplementary cantonal provisions. 
74 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch 
§ 100 para 15; Rey Sachenrechts para 1554c; Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches 
Immobiliarsachenrecht para 128. 
75 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch 
§ 100 para 15; Rey Sachenrechts para 1678; Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches 




Confederation).76 Similarly, Basel-Stadt’s provides for previously registered land to 
accrue to the canton.77 By and large, however, the default position set out in the civil 
code prevails. 
When the registered owner takes the decision to relinquish ownership of her land 
through Dereliktion, her name is struck from the owner’s column of the relevant page.78 
It is practice to leave a remark reflecting that the land in question is now ownerless.79 
Most often this remark will be “durch Verzichserklärung gelöscht” (lost through waiver) 
or “Dereliktion”.80 
3.2.2 A unilateral legal transaction 
In Swiss law, Dereliktion is conceived of as a unilateral legal transaction.81 As such, 
the decision and power to abandon land, for the most part, lies entirely with the 
registered owner.82 The rights of third parties in the land in question have no bearing 
on the owner’s right to elect to abandon her land,83 and their consent is unnecessary 
to proceed.84 The reason for this is that their rights in the land in question remain 
unaffected by the abandonment and continue to exist even if the land is acquired by 
another.85 It is unnecessary to obtain the consent of third parties, and the owner will 
be successful in abandoning her land so long as the requirements set out in the Civil 
Code and GBV are met.86 However, the landowner only frees herself from real burdens 
attaching to the land, such as servitudes.87  
 
76 See Art. 34 EG ZGB Freiburg. 
77 See § 155 EG ZGB Basel-Stadt. 
78 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135; Hitz “Art. 666” Handkommentar 167; Rey 
Sachenrecht para 1677. 
79 Rey Sachenrecht para 1677; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167; U Fasel Kommentar zur 
Grundbuchverordnung (2013) Art 131 1-7. 
80 Rey Sachenrechts para 1677; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167; Fasel Grundbuchverordnung 
Art 131 1-7. 
81 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 868; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 
100 para 33; Rey Sachenrecht para 1676. 
82 BGE 85 I 261. 
83 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167; BGE 85 
I 261 262-263. 
84 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135; BGE 85 I 261 262-263. 
85 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167; Rey 
Sachenrechts paras 1676, 1679; Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 129. 
86 BGE 85 I 261 262-263. 
87 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167; Simonius 




The power to abandon one’s ownership in land is not, however, unqualified. An 
important restriction exists where the property in question constitutes the family home 
(married couples) or the joint home (registered partnerships).88 The owner in these 
circumstances must first obtain the consent of her spouse or partner in order to effect 
the Dereliktion of her property.89 If unhappy with the withholding of consent by the 
spouse or partner, the owner may petition the court.90 
3.2.3 Dereliktion, corporeality and renunciation of other rights in land 
One of the major differences between the Swiss concept of Dereliktion and the way in 
which the term “abandonment” is used in South African law, is that the former only 
applies to corporeal property.91 In South African law, one may talk of abandoning 
servitudes and other rights in land.92 In Swiss law, similar rights may be renounced 
and ultimately extinguished, but this is not regarded as a Dereliktion.93 Rather, the term 
Verzicht, or roughly translated, renouncement, is preferred.94 
The reason for this distinction between corporeal and incorporeal rights in Swiss law 
is that only the former category may be rendered ownerless and open to 
appropriation.95 Incorporeal rights, once renounced, are ultimately extinguished, or in 
some cases, accrue to third parties.96  
Co-ownership serves as an example of a right which, while possible to renounce, may 
not be subject to Dereliktion as understood in Swiss law. The possibility of renouncing 
one’s co-ownership share has been acknowledged by academics, courts and federal 
 
88 Art 169 lit 1 ZGB; Art 14 lit 1 PartG; Art 10a BGBB; Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommenter 
1135; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 526; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167. 
This rule applies both to heterosexual spouses, as well as partners in a same-sex relationship. 
89 Art 169 lit 1 ZGB; Art 14 lit 1 PartG; Art 10a BGBB; Rey and Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 
1135; Schmid and Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 526; Hitz “Art. 666” Handkommentar 167. 
90 Art 169 lit 2 ZGB; Art 14 lit 2 PartG; Art 10a BGBB. 
91 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135-1136; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische 
Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 34; Rey Sachenrechts paras 1674a, 1680. 
92 Muller et al Silberberg 401; Van der Walt Servitudes 572-580. See Chapter 2 Section 4.3. 
93 Hitz “Art. 655” in Handkommentar 111; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167-168; Rey & Strebel 
“Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135-1136; Rey Sachenrecht paras 1680, 1682. 
94 See Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167-168; Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135-
1136. 
95 Hitz “Art. 655” in Handkommentar 111; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167-168; Rey & Strebel 
“Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135-1136; Rey Sachenrecht paras 1680, 1682. 
96 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135-1136; Hitz “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 167-
168; Rey Sachenrecht paras 1680, 1682; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 869; BGE 129 




practice in Switzerland.97 But it is not regarded as an example of Dereliktion as the co-
ownership share is not corporeal, and thus not open to appropriation by a third party.98 
Instead, in proportion to their shares, the renounced co-ownership share accrues to 
the remaining co-owners.99 
Accrual does not occur in every case that a co-ownership share is renounced, 
however. An example would be where a co-ownership share is subject to a burden in 
favour of a third party, such as a real security right (Pfandrecht100).101 In such 
circumstances, the co-ownership share does not accrue automatically to the remaining 
co-owners. Rather, they are entitled to the share, in proportion with their own share.102 
Other rights in land are also capable of renouncement by their respective holders.103 
Perhaps the most interesting category of limited real rights in land to consider in this 
context are what are referred to as selbständigen und dauernden Rechten,104 or 
 
97 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” 1135-1136; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 869; Tuor et al Das 
Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 34; Hitz “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 167-168; Rey 
Sachenrecht para 1680; BGE 129 III 216 220. 
98 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135-1136; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht 
para 869; Rey Sachenrecht para 1680; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 34. 
99 Rey and Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135-1136; Schmid and Hürlimann-Kaup 
Sachenrecht para 869; Hitz “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 167-168; Rey Sachenrecht para 1680; BGE 
129 III 216 220. 
100 For a general overview, see Schmid and Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht paras 1462ff. 
101 Rey and Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135-1136; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische 
Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 34; Rey Sachenrecht para  1680; BGE 129 III 216 220. 
102 Rey and Strebel “Art. 666” in Balser Kommentar 1135-1136; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische 
Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 34; Rey Sachenrecht para 1680; BGE 129 III 216 220. 
103 Praedial servitudes (Grunddienstbarkeit). See Art. 734; Schmid and Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht 
para 1315; Petitpierre “Art. 734” in Basler Kommentar 1464; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische 
Zivilgesetzbuch § 108 paras 12-13). Such renouncement can be determined implicitly, where the 
servitude is incompatible with further servitudes granted over the land in question. See Schmid and 
Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 1315; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 108 para 13; 
E Petitpierre “Art. 734” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 
ed (2015) 1463 1464; BGE 128 III 265 268-269; BGE 127 III 440 442-443.  
Personal servitudes (Personaldienstbarkeiten) such as an usufruct (Nutzniessung). See Art. 748 ZGB; 
Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 1349; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 
108 para 12-13. A habitatio (Wohnrecht) is subject to the same provisions as an usufruct. See Art. 776 
Abs. 3 ZGB and Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 366. 
Real burdens that require a landowner fulfil an obligation (Grundlasten). See Art. 786 ZGB; Schmid & 
Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 1454; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 110 para 20; 
D Jenny “Art. 786” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed 
(2015) 1661 1662. 
Reservations of ownership (Eigentumsvvorbehalt). See Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 
1118. 
Real rights of security over movable property (Fahrnispfandrechte). See Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup 
Sachenrecht para 1901. 
104 See Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 1327ff; L Strebel & H Laim “Art. 655” in H Honsell, 




independent and permanent rights. An explanation of these rights follows below. What 
makes these rights special is that they are treated in a similar fashion to land 
ownership, as they are granted their own pages in the Grundbuch, and can be 
alienated or even burdened with further property rights.105  
It is possible for particular kinds of personal servitudes (Personaldiensbarkeiten) to 
become independent and permanent rights on the meeting of certain requirements.106 
The first requirement is that the servitude is not created for the benefit of a specific 
person or to serve a dominant tenement.107 The second requirement is that the 
servitude is created for a minimum duration of 30 years or an unlimited duration.108 
Examples of rights that may constitute independent and permanent rights include 
building rights (Baurechten) and planting rights (Pflanzungsrechten).109 
While accorded a similar status to land in the Grundbuch, these rights remain 
incorporeal property by nature. As a consequence, they cannot be subject to 
Dereliktion, since they do not have a physical existence that renders them open to 
appropriation by a third party.110 The holder of the right may elect to renounce it, but 
unlike in the case of land, the page assigned to the right is permanently closed, 
extinguishing the right.111 One qualification is that renouncement requires the consent 
of any party with entitlements in the selbständigen und dauernden Recht.112 
3.2.4 Apartment ownership 
Much in the same way that the Sectional Titles Act does in South Africa,113 the Swiss 
law makes special provision for apartment ownership. Apartment ownership is referred 
 
105 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 1330, 1333; Art 22 Abs 1 GBV. See Art 216 Abs 1 OR 
concerning the formalities required for the sale of land. 
106 Strebel & Laim “Art. 655” in Basler Kommentar 1047-1050. 
107 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht paras 1328-1329; Art 655 Abs 3 ZGB. 
108 Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht paras 1328-1329; Art 655 Abs 3 ZGB. 
109 See Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 1327. 
110 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” Basler Kommentar 1135-1136; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 168; Rey 
Sachenrechts paras 1680-1682. 
111 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1136; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 168; Rey 
Sachenrechts para 1682. 
112 Art 964 Abs 1. See J Schmid “Art. 964” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar 
Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed (2015) 2591 2594; Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1136. 
113 See the Preamble of Act 95 of 1986. For a detailed overview, see GJ Pienaar Sectional Titles and 




to as Stockwerkeigentum, a unique form of co-ownership over immovable property.114 
This form of co-ownership grants co-owners exclusive rights to utilise different parts of 
a building.115 
As with the rights covered in the previous section, apartment ownership is not subject 
to Dereliktion, but rather renouncement.116 When the owner of an apartment elects to 
renounce his ownership, the apartment in question is not rendered ownerless, and thus 
open to appropriation by the first taker. Instead, in proportion to their floor share, the 
renounced apartment falls into the co-ownership of the remaining apartment owners.117 
3.3 Contrast and analysis 
This section compares the Swiss doctrine of Dereliktion and the apparent impossibility 
of abandoning land in South Africa from a legal and a policy standpoint.118 The legal 
analysis focuses on the role of the principle of publicity and on whether registration 
actions are necessary for the abandonment of land.119 The policy analysis focuses on 
whether the permissive approach to abandonment in the Swiss context may be 
appropriate in South Africa. 
3.3.1 Legal analysis 
There seems to be little difference in the way the abandonment of movable property in 
Swiss and South African law occurs. The basic requirements – physical loss of control, 
coupled with an intention to relinquish ownership - are the same.120 Furthermore, in a 
dispute involving the allegation of abandonment of the property in question, the factual 
situation in which the alleged abandonment took place will be scrutinised by the 
court.121 
 
114 Art 712a Abs 1 ZGB. For a detailed overview of Stockwerkeigentum, see A Wermelinger Das 
Stockwerkeigentum (2014) 1ff. See also Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1136; Tuor et al 
Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 34; Rey Sachenrechts paras 1681. 
115 Art. 712a Abs. 1 ZGB. 
116 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135-1136; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 168; 
Rey Sachenrechts paras 1680-1682. 
117 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1136; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 168; Tuor et 
al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 34; Rey Sachenrechts para 1681; BGE 129 III 216 
221. 
118 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the position in South African law. 
119 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 26-28. 
120 See note 59 above and Chapter 2 Section 4.1. 




In respect of the abandonment of land, however, the differences could not be starker. 
While the Swiss approach to the Dereliktion of land is marked by its clarity, the same 
cannot be said for the South African approach. Where the abandonment of land has 
been alleged, the courts in South Africa have proceeded on the assumption that the 
same principles that apply to the abandonment of movables apply to the abandonment 
of immovables.122 This has been done without regard to the absence of any express 
provision in the Deeds Registries Act that would permit and facilitate the abandonment 
of land. Usually, the courts are incapable of moving beyond the intention requirement 
for abandonment, which, given the reluctance of courts to find that valuable property 
has been abandoned,123 cannot be met. However, even if there was an express 
declaration on the part of the owner to the effect that he is abandoning his land, it is 
uncertain how this could be given effect to in the absence of registration actions.124 
By contrast, Swiss law, in line with the principle of publicity, has one simple requirement 
to give effect to the abandonment of land. This is the submission of a waiver to the 
land registrar, which results in the deletion of the owner’s name from the relevant page 
of the Grundbuch.125 Once this is achieved, the land is rendered ownerless and open 
to appropriation by a third party.126 In the context of a modern system of land 
registration, and in line with the principle of publicity, it seems the Swiss approach 
provides the only satisfactory means to achieve the abandonment of land.  
3.3.2 Policy analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the social-obligation approach to ownership provides the 
best explanation for the restrictions on abandoning land.127 As explained by Peñalver, 
despite at first glance seeming to epitomise the powers of ownership, the doctrine of 
abandonment better reflects an “interplay between autonomy and obligation”, rather 
 
122 See for example Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 (2) SA 944 (A), Meintjes NO v Coetzer 
2010 (5) SA 186 (SCA) and Papas N.O. v Motsere Trading CC (46011/2012) [2014] ZAGPJHC 144. 
123 See Chapter 2 Section 4.2.2 and Chapter 3 Section 2.4.1. 
124 See Chapter 3 Sections 2 to 4. 
125 Art. 666 Abs. 1 read with Art. 964. Abs. 1 ZGB. See Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 
1134-1135; Schmid & Hürlimann-Kaup para 868; Rey Sachenrechts para 1673ff; Tuor et al Das 
Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 33; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 166-167; Simonius & 
Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 127. 
126 Art. 658 Abs. 1; Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1134; Rey Sachenrechts para 1678; 
Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 128. 




than the autonomy of ownership.128 Possibly the most useful aspect of the social-
obligation approach is the sliding scale of obligation explained by Alexander.129 It is 
through this sliding scale approach that the existence of a right to abandon land can 
be justified in the Swiss context, while the denial of such a right, or at least an 
unrestricted one, can be justified in the South African context. 
The Swiss approach to the abandonment of land, through the doctrine of Dereliktion, 
clearly favours the right of the individual owner. The owner is free to unburden herself 
of ownership provided she complies with the simple requirement set out in the Civil 
Code and accompanying legislation, such as the GBV. The rights of third parties in the 
land in question ultimately have no bearing on the owner’s decision to abandon her 
land. Furthermore, the interests of wider society do not seem to operate as a check on 
the owner’s decision to abandon her land. The only point at which the interests of the 
wider community is taken into account is regarding the consequences of 
abandonment. Some cantons may opt to direct ownership in land subject to Dereliktion 
to another legal entity,130 assumedly regarding it too valuable a resource to be left 
ownerless. This is of no concern to an owner, whose only interest is freeing herself of 
the obligations that attach to the land in question. 
Dereliktion of land in Switzerland is an infrequent occurrence.131 The primary 
motivation for Swiss landowners to opt for Dereliktion appears to be that continued 
ownership entails a negative value to them. A negative value would usually arise where 
property taxes and other costs associated with ownership become a burden which the 
owner decides no longer justifies continued ownership of her land.132 An example 
would be agricultural land with a low market value that the owner no longer wishes to 
farm.133 The motivation for the abandonment of ownership in land does not necessarily 
 
128 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 193. 
129 G Alexander The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (2006) 138. 
130 Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” 1135; Tuor et al Das Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 100 para 15; Rey 
Sachenrechts para 1678; Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht para 128. 
131 Simonius & Sutter Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenracht 127n306. See also I Bayard “Wenn Eine 
Strasse Niemandem Gehört” (06-01-2014) Tages Anzeiger 
<http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/panorama/vermischtes/Wenn-eine-Strasse-niemandem-
gehoert/story/31312584> (accessed 16-03-2017). 
132 Bayard “Wenn eine Strasse niemandem gehört” Tages Anzeiger. 
133 Author Unknown “Wenn Grundeigentum zur Last Wird” (08-11-2004) Neue Zürcher Zeitung 




differ from the reasons why landowners in South Africa may wish to abandon. 
However, the contexts in which property acquires a negative value to the existing 
owner differ significantly. 
Overall, despite the permissive abandonment regime that exists in Switzerland, the 
societal impact of Dereliktion appears minimal. While concerns have been raised 
where a trend of abandoning worthless agricultural land arose,134 at this time, there do 
not appear to be any suggestions that the law should be changed. The reasons for not 
permitting the abandonment of land in the South African context are completely alien 
to the Swiss context. No city in Switzerland is blighted by problem buildings in any 
manner resembling Johannesburg and other cities in South Africa.135 The existence of 
a right to abandon ownership of land thus does not pose the same threat to public 
order in the Swiss context as it does in the South African context.136 Furthermore, there 
is no significant mining industry in Switzerland of which to speak.137 There is thus no 
concern regarding abandoned mines, which may be left to fester unchecked on 
abandoned land.138 
Geography would also appear to be a determinative factor in limiting abandonment in 
the Swiss context. Settlement is limited by the mountainous areas of the Alps that 
characterise the south of the country.139 Effectively, it is difficult to conceive of a 
situation in which land which has been subject to Dereliktion in Switzerland will remain 
unclaimed for long, or how a proliferation of abandoned, neglected properties may 
arise. 
 
134 Author unknown “Wenn Grundeigentum zur Last wird” Neue Zürcher Zeitung. 
135 See the sources in note 251 and 252 in Chapter 6 Section 3.3. 
136 See Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 26-28. 
137 S Hastorun “The Mineral Industry of Switzerland” in 2016 Minerals Yearbook (2019) 45.1-45.3. A 
Google search of “mining waste in Switzerland” does not return any informative results. 
138 See Chapter 6 Section 3.1 for a discussion of the mining situation in South Africa. 
139 Central Intelligence Agency “Switzerland” (03-04-2019) The World Factbook < 




The Swiss law does not deny the social responsibility that attaches to ownership of 
property (Sozialpflichtigkeit).140 The right to property is guaranteed,141 but such does 
not mean it is unrestricted.142 This is evident from, for example, the way society’s 
interest in the protection of heritage buildings (Denkmalschutz) supersedes the 
owner’s right to do as she pleases with her property.143 Denkmalschutz includes 
bearing maintenance costs as well as restrictions, or outright prohibitions, on 
building,144 should the owner decide to remain the owner of the building in question. 
The social-obligation theory seems consistent with Swiss property law, even though in 
respect of the abandonment of ownership in land, the sliding scale of obligation favours 
the owner. The Swiss socio-economic context and the interests of society do not 
demand that an owner retains ownership against her will in the absence of a third party 
willing to take transfer of her property. 
Peñalver argues that restricting or prohibiting the abandonment of land underlines the 
law’s general suspicion of abandonment of property, in particular the unrestrained 
disposal of that which is no longer wanted, e.g. waste.145 Through such restricting or 
prohibition, the law prevents the creation of unowned spaces, thus effectively negating 
the right to abandon unwanted property in general.146 This appears to be irrelevant in 
 
140 P Hänni Planungs-, Bau und besonderes Umweltschutzrecht 6 ed (2016) 16-17; Tuor et al Das 
Schweizerische Zivilgesetzbuch § 102 para 15; § 97 para 4; Sprecher (2015) SJZ 257-258; P 
Tschannan “Bundesgericht, I. Öfeentlichrechtliche Abteilung, 30.8.1993, Nationale Genossenschaft für 
die Lagerung Radioaktiver Abfälle NAGRA c. Regierungsrat des Kantons Nidwalden und Obergericht 
des Kantons Nidwalden als Verfassungsgericht (1P.830/1992), Staatsrechtliche Beschwerde” (1994) 
AJP 627 627-629; BGE 119 Ia 390 399.  
141 Art. 26 BV; Hänni Planungs-, 18ff. 
142 Hänni Planungs- 18ff. 
143 Hänni Planungs- 40, 439ff; I Häner, A Lienhard, P Tschannen, F Uhlmann & S Vogel Ausgewählte 
Gebiete des Bundesverwaltungsrechts 8 ed (2014) 225. Art. 78 BV makes the protection of such 
heritage buildings the responsibility of the cantons. Individual cantons incorporate more specific rules 
related to such protection into their individual laws. See e.g. § 203-§ 217 PBG ZH. 
144 Hänni Planungs- 40. Denkmalschutz is ultimately a cantonal responsibility (see Art. 78 BV; Hänni 
Planungs- 439ff). The possibility of subsidies from the state for maintenance costs does exist, however. 
For example, the discretion to grant such subsidies is provided in the Canton of Zurich’s own building 
legislation (§ 217 Abs. 2 lit. a PBG ZH).  
In addition, Swiss law recognises the possibility of material (or constructive) expropriation (Art. 26 Abs. 
2 BV; Hänni Planungs- 609ff), which an owner may rely on when the restrictions placed on his property 
through Denkmalschutz. Although Denkmalschutz restrictions are usually regarded as conventional 
property law restrictions (see BGE 91 I 340 341), there are circumstances in which a particular restriction 
may be seen as too great a sacrifice by an individual owner in the public interest (see BGE 112 Ib 263 
269). See further Hänni Planungs- 622-624. See also, for example, the building legislation of the Canton 
of Zurich, which makes provision for compensation for material expropriation where Denkmalschutz 
measures amount to material expropriation (§ 214 Abs. 1 PGB ZH). 
145 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 214ff. 




the Swiss context, however. The Swiss are renowned for being extremely recycling 
conscious.147 Furthermore, Swiss authorities are harsh with those who fall foul of waste 
disposal laws, with effective means of locating and fining offenders they aim to deter 
repeat offences.148 Restraining the abandonment of land is thus unnecessary to restrict 
the illegal disposal of waste. 
One also needs to evaluate the different historical backgrounds of both countries. 
There are unique historical (and thus constitutional) reasons for controlling the 
abandonment of land in South Africa that do not exist in the Swiss context. Unlike 
Switzerland, South Africa’s history is characterised by grave injustices.149 As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the property clause in the South African Constitution embodies the social-
obligation norm and mandates the remedying of historical injustices.150 Some of the 
gravest injustices occurred in respect of land. During apartheid, the property rights of 
the white-landowning class were given primacy over the interests of black non-
owners.151 Although Swiss landowners may also be a privileged class, that society is 
 
147 Author Unknown “Recycling” (13-05-2016) Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
<https://www.eda.admin.ch/aboutswitzerland/en/home/umwelt/natur/recycling.html> (accessed 16-03-
2017). 
148 The New York Times told the experience of a woman who recently moved to the Swiss city of Bern. 
So-called “garbage detectives” go through trash that either looks suspicious or has been improperly 
placed in order to link the trash in question to the wrongdoer. For her first mistake, she received a fine 
of 1000 CHF “illegal and unorderly abandonment of personal waste”, although she was able to reduce 
this to a warning. See L Bauerlein “Learning to Recycle in Switzerland, and Paying for It” (19-02-2016) 
New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/magazine/learning-to-recycle-in-switzerland-
and-paying-for-it.html?_r=0> (16-03-2017). See also H Bachmann “Voices: For Swiss, Recycling is Very 
Serious Business” (07-03-2016) USA Today 
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2016/03/06/voices-swiss-recycling-very-serious-
business/81333110/> (accessed 16-03-2017); M Curtis “I Faced Prison for Plastic in Wrong Recycling 
Bag” (03-12-2013) The Local <http://www.thelocal.ch/20131203/i-faced-prison-for-plastic-in-a-paper-
recycling-bag> (accessed 16-03-2017). 
149 See in general L Thompson A History of South Africa 4 ed (2014); C Feinstein An Economic History 
of South Africa: Conquest, Domination and Development (2005); S Terreblanche A History of Inequality 
in South Africa (2002); R Davenport & C Saunders South Africa: A Modern History 5 ed (2000); L Platzky 
& C Walker The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa (1985). 
150 G Alexander “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745 782ff; Alexander Global Debate Chapter Four. See further R Cramer “The Abandonment of 
Landownership in South African and Swiss Law” (2017) 134 SALJ 870 899ff. Note on the 
aforementioned publication by the author: My Memorandum of Understanding with my supervisor, as 
well as obligations attaching to funding I received through the Swiss-South African Joint Research 
Programme to facilitate my comparative study, required me to publish from my doctoral research. The 
article referenced here is the result of the obligation to publish from my doctoral research. 




not plagued by the same levels of inequality that characterise post-apartheid South 
Africa.152  
This does not mean that all landowners in South Africa can be classified as privileged. 
However, the historical injustices render justifiable the limitation of landowners to 
desert their obligations, the moment ownership is not beneficial to them anymore. Any 
exit from landownership should be more regulated if permitted at all. As Van der Walt 
points out, the objectives of the constitutional property clause do not end at restitution 
and redistribution.153 Rather, the “allocation, recognition and protection of individual 
property rights may not result in an environment that endangers the health or well-
being of the citizenry”.154 
Despite its favouring of the individual owner in general, Dereliktion in respect of land 
still reflects the social-obligation norm of ownership. The social-obligation norm is clear 
from the restriction on Dereliktion of a family home, in which case the consent of the 
spouse or partner is required.155 The owner’s interests weigh more heavily on the 
social-obligation scale than the interests of broader society, but her interests are 
ultimately subordinate to those of her immediate family. Even in the most permissive 
of jurisdictions in respect of the abandonment of land, obligation serves to restrict the 
owner’s entitlement to abandon. 
 
152 See Author Unknown “Confronting Inequality” (2017) New Agenda 28; E Webster “South Africa 
Needs a Fresh Approach to its Stubbornly High Levels of Inequality” (11 December 2017) The 
Conversation <https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-a-fresh-approach-to-its-stubbornly-
high-levels-of-inequality-87215> (accessed 31-01-2019); A Orthofer “South Africa Needs to Fix its 
Dangerously Wide Wealth Gap” (06-10-2016) The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/south-
africa-needs-to-fix-its-dangerously-wide-wealth-gap-66355> (accessed 31-01-2019); A Orthofer Wealth 
Inequality in South Africa: Insights from Survey and Tax Data Working Paper for the Research Project 
on Employment, Income Distribution and Inclusive Growth, 2016, available at < 
http://www.redi3x3.org/sites/default/files/Orthofer%202016%20REDI3x3%20Working%20Paper%2015
%20-%20Wealth%20inequality.pdf> (accessed 31-01-2019). 
153 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 139-140. 
154 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 140. 
155 Art 169 lit 1 ZGB; Art 14 lit 1 PartG; Art 10a BGBB; Rey and Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 
1135; Schmid and Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 526; Hitz “Art. 666” Handkommentar 167. 




3.4 In summary: Lessons from the Swiss approach 
Switzerland serves as an example of a permissive jurisdiction in respect of the 
abandonment of land.156 It is evident that the social-obligation norm of ownership is 
consistent with Swiss property law. The interests of broader society often limit 
ownership significantly.157 Nevertheless, such interests do not appear to demand an 
owner remain such against her will. The only qualification to the otherwise unrestricted 
right to abandon land through Dereliktion is where a family home is implicated.158 
The permissive Swiss approach to the abandonment of land operates in a different 
socio-economic context than South Africa. In this respect, it is difficult to suggest the 
Swiss approach as a model for law reform. Nevertheless, juxtaposing the permissive 
Swiss approach with the apparent impossibility of abandoning land in South Africa is 
useful. It can help explain why South African law does not provide a specific 
mechanism through which land is abandoned. The interests of the individual landowner 
cannot be given priority over those of broader society in the South African socio-
economic context. 
The Swiss model is not feasible in the South African context. But a valuable lesson 
can be drawn from Swiss law, which is to provide clear answers to questions 
concerning the unilateral termination of ownership in land. Regardless of the 
appropriate approach, it is critical that landowners and local authorities know their 
rights and duties. Even if the abandonment of landownership in South African should 
not be permitted, the prohibition should be stated expressly. This may discourage 
reckless behaviour by landowners who seek to abandon their land by neglecting their 
obligations attached to such ownership.159 
 
156 See L Strahilevitz “The Right to Abandon” (2010) 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 355 390ff on the different types 
of regimes that exist concerning the abandonment of property. 
157 See the sources notes 140 to 144 and analysis in Section 3.3.2 above. 
158 Art 169 lit 1 ZGB; Art 14 lit 1 PartG; Art 10a BGBB; Rey and Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 
1135; Schmid and Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht para 526; Hitz “Art. 666” Handkommentar 167. 
159 See Strydom J & Viljoen S “Unlawful Occupation of Inner-City Buildings: A Constitutional Analysis of 




4. Scotland: No mechanism, no abandonment 
Scotland provides a useful comparative jurisdiction for South Africa in general, due to 
both jurisdictions serving as examples of mixed legal systems.160 However, beyond 
their shared civilian and common law heritage, it is in the context of property law that 
the two jurisdictions perhaps have the most similarities.161 Both jurisdictions draw 
heavily from the Roman law and the ius commune in property law.162 This shared 
heritage is reflected through numerous shared concepts and principles.163  
Nevertheless, there are a number of critical differences, particularly in the context of 
land law.164 For example, South Africa observes a negative system of land 
registration165 while Scotland has recently shifted to a positive system.166 A further 
factor is that, until relatively recently, Scotland observed the feudal system of land 
tenure.167 The abolition of the feudal system has, however, seen the law of immovable 
property in Scotland take on a more civilian character.168 
 
160 R Zimmermann “‘Double Cross’: Comparing Scots and South African Law” in R Zimmermann, K Reid 
& D Visser (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in 
Scotland and South Africa (2005) 1 3; R Zimmermann & D Visser “Introduction” in R Zimmerman & D 
Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 1 2-3. 
161 K Reid & CG van der Merwe “Property Law: Some Themes and Some Variations” in R Zimmermann, 
K Reid & D Visser (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in 
Scotland and South Africa (2005) 637 638. 
162 Reid & Van der Merwe “Property Law” in Mixed Legal Systems 641. 
163 Reid & Van der Merwe “Property Law” in Mixed Legal Systems 638-641. 
164 Reid & Van der Merwe “Property Law” in Mixed Legal Systems 642-644. 
165 See Chapter 3 Section 2.2.1. 
166 Reid & Van der Merwe “Property Law” in Mixed Legal Systems 642; G Gretton & A Steven Property, 
Trusts and Succession 3 ed (2017) 7.68-7.76. 
167 Reid & Van der Merwe “Property Law” in Mixed Legal Systems 643; Gretton & Steven Property A.19; 
Lord Eassie, HL MacQueen, A Anderson, D Bain, D Cabrelli, G Cameron, M Combe, C Ervine, N Grier, 
S Lamont-Black, D Nichols, R Paisley, A Simpson, M Sundara Rajan & Lady Wise Gloag and Henderson 
The Law of Scotland 14 ed (2017) 34.02. See section 1 of the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) 
Act 2000. The appointed day was the 28th of November 2004. See Combe and Rudd’s comments in this 
regard, that in the feudal system that if “the dominium utile was abandoned the titled would revert up the 
feudal chain”. The concept of abandonment in a feudal system was conceptually difficult, and “could not 
have been conceived in the current sense”. Combe M & Rudd M “Abandonment of Land and the Scottish 
Coal Case: Was it Unprecedented?” (2018) 22 The Edinburgh Law Review 301 304-305. 
The feudal system is explained briefly in Eassie et al Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland: “The 
historic system of land tenure in Scotland was until recently feudal: under which there was a hierarchy 
of interests in the same land, the greatest of which was that of the Crown. For a given piece of land, 
beneath the Crown there might be several persons, each holding the land under his feudal superior and 
obliged to observe the feuing conditions imposed on him by his superior.” See Eassie et al Gloag and 
Henderson 34.02. 




Beyond the characteristics that make Scotland a useful comparative jurisdiction for 
property law in general, it is a particularly useful jurisdiction in the context of the 
abandonment of landownership. As discussed in Chapter 3, it does not appear 
possible to abandon land in South African law due to the absence of a specific 
mechanism in the relevant legislation.169 A similar position exists in Scottish law, as 
established by a recent decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session.170 In the 
case of The Scottish Environment Protection Agency v The Joint Liquidators of the 
Scottish Coal Company Limited,171 it was found that there is no right to abandon 
landownership as the law in Scotland currently stands.172 The reasoning for this, 
discussed in more detail below, is that the law does not provide a means through which 
landownership may be abandoned.173 
4.1 Background: The Land Registration System in Scotland 
As with South Africa and Switzerland, Scots law observes the principle of publicity.174 
The principle is given effect through the requirement of an external act, either delivery 
in respect of movables or registration in respect of land.175 Possession is insufficient to 
give effect to the principle of publicity in the context of land.176 Unlike the other two 
jurisdictions, however, acquisitive (positive) prescription does not operate as an 
exception to the registration requirement for land ownership.177 For ownership of land 
to be acquired through prescription in Scotland, ten years of possession is required,178 
 
169 See Chapter 3 Sections 2-4. 
170 The Court of Session is effectively a combination of two courts. These are the Inner House and Outer 
House, the former primarily an appellate court while the latter serves as a court of first instance. 
Decisions can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom with the permission of either 
the Inner House of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. See Eassie et al Gloag and Henderson 
paras 2.01-2.05. 
171 [2013] CSIH 108 (CSIH). 
172 Eassie et al Gloag and Henderson para 33.03n30. 
173 Eassie et al Gloag and Henderson para 33.03n30. 
174 Gretton & Steven Property paras 4.19-4.21, 7.1. 
175 Gretton & Steven Property para 4.19. 
176 Gretton & Steven Property paras 4.19-4.21, 7.1. 
177 See the sources in note 35 above (Switzerland) and Chapter 3 Section 2 (South Africa). 




as well as a registered disposition.179 Servitudes, however, may still be acquired 
through peaceful possession without the requirement of registration.180 
At present, two registers for land exist in Scotland. These are the Sasine Register and 
the Land Register.181 The prevailing piece of legislation governing land registration is 
the Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012 (LRA 2012). 
As with the Swiss Grundbuch,182 the Scottish Land Register is divided into constituent 
parts.183 The first of these parts is the cadastral map. The cadastral map uses the 
Ordinance Survey Map (a topographic map) over which title boundaries are 
superimposed.184 As the Land Register is not yet complete, due to properties still being 
transferred to it from the Sasine Register, at present the cadastral map has been 
described as a “half-completed jigsaw”.185 The second part of the Scottish Land 
Register is the title sheet record. A title sheet186 exists for each registered title unit.187 
The title sheet record can be defined as the entirety of all title sheets.188 The archive 
record is a repository in which the Keeper places (1) copies of documents 
accompanying the submission of a registration application (or in respect of 
rectifications) and (2) data regarding previous positions reflected in the register.189 The 
former is of critical importance, being the basis of what is reflected in the title sheets.190 
 
179 Gretton & Steven Property para 6.8; Eassie et al Gloag and Henderson para 34.30. See section 1 of 
the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. It is particularly burdensome for a would-be acquirer 
to get the prescriptive clock to start running in the first place. Section 43 of the Land Registration etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2012 (LRA 2012) only permits the Keeper to register such a disposition when (1) the 
acquirer has possessed the land for one year and (2) attempts have been made to locate the owner of 
the land. On failing to locate the owner, the Crown should be notified. 
180 Gretton & Steven Property para 13.27; Eassie et al Gloag and Henderson para 34.48. See section 3 
of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. 
181 Gretton & Steven Property para 7.3; Eassie et al Gloag and Henderson para 34.01. 
182 See Section 3.1 above. 
183 Gretton & Steven Property paras 7.26ff, 7.2; 
184 Gretton & Steven Property paras 7.27-7.29. 
185 Gretton & Steven Property para 7.28. 
186 Each title sheet has four sections, being (1) the property section, (2) the proprietorship section, (3) 
the securities section and (4) the burdens section. Section 5 of the LRA 2012. See Gretton & Steven 
Property paras 7.31ff for further detail. 
187 Gretton & Steven Property para 7.31. 
188 Section 3(3) of the LRA 2012. See Gretton & Steven Property para 7.31. 
189 Section 14 of the LRA 2012. See Gretton & Steven Property para 7.43. 




The final part of the Land Register is the application record. This consists of (1) pending 
applications for registration and (2) extant advance notices.191 
4.2 Abandonment of ownership 
An overview of the abandonment of ownership in Scots law, in contrast to Swiss law, 
is relatively brief. The abandonment of ownership in property is touched on very briefly 
in major texts in Scots law. There are two primary reasons for this. First, movable 
property is rendered bona vacantia (i.e. accrues to the state) on abandonment, thus 
making unowned movables not possible.192 Secondly, the possibility of abandoning 
landownership has only recently been subject to litigation, this being the Scottish 
Environmental Protection Agency case which found that such abandonment is not 
possible.193 
4.2.1 Abandonment of movable property 
In Scots law, movable property may be abandoned.194 However, unlike in South African 
and Swiss law, the consequence is not that the property is rendered res derelictae and 
thus open to appropriation by the first taker.195 Abandoned (or previously owned) 
property becomes bona vacantia, thus vesting in the Crown.196 Unowned movable 
property is thus not possible.197 As a result, the scope of occupatio is far more restricted 
in Scots law, only finding application in the context of unowned things which have never 
 
191 Section 14 of the LRA 2012. See Gretton & Steven Property para 7.45. Advance notices can be 
placed in the Land Register prior to settlement and create an interim period of protection upon 
registration of a disposition, trumping any adverse entries made in the Land Register. For example, it 
would protect a buyer in the event of the seller deciding to sell the property to two different parties, 
avoiding a situation in which the first buyer is “pipped at the post”, i.e. the other buyer registers first. See 
Gretton & Steven Property paras 5.14, 7.55ff. 
192 Gretton & Steven Property para 3.7; K Reid The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 547. 
193 CSIH para 103. 
194 Gretton & Steven Property para 3.7; Reid The Law of Property para 547. 
195 See  
196 DL Carey Miller Corporeal Movables in Scots Law 2 ed (2005) 18-19; Eassie et al Gloag and 
Henderson para 31.04; Gretton & Steven Property para 3.7; Reid The Law of Property para 540. 
197 Carey Miller Corporeal Movables 18-19; Eassie et al Gloag and Henderson para 31.04; Gretton & 




previously been owned.198 Wild animals are the exception to this rule, as they once 
again become unowned once they escape and regain their natural liberty.199 
4.2.2 Abandonment of immovable property 
The abandonment of landownership, and the possibility of such, have only recently 
attracted attention in Scots law. Until the recent Scottish Environmental Protection 
Agency decisions by the Outer and Inner Houses respectively,200 there had been no 
case law engaging with the question. Furthermore, the major academic texts predating 
these decisions do not discuss the issue.201 Given the absence of case law, as well as 
the dearth of academic commentary, the following discussion primarily focuses on the 
two Scottish Environmental Protection Agency judgments. 
4.2.2.1 Scottish Environmental Protection Agency: Background 
The facts of the case aptly demonstrate how land can acquire a significant negative 
value in the mining context. The Scottish Coal Company (SCC) conducted mining 
operations at open-cast mines in Scotland. At the time of litigation, the company was 
in the process of being wound up. Mining operations at the sites owned by the company 
had also since ceased. A problem facing the liquidators was the costs of meeting the 
environmental obligations attached to the land. Maintaining the sites in line with these 
obligations would cost an estimated £478 000 per month.202 It was estimated that 
existing funds would provide for the sites to be maintained for between 20 and 22 
months at most.203 Inevitably, there would be nothing left for the SCC’s unsecured 
creditors, as preference would be accorded to the costs of meeting its obligations to 
 
198 Carey Miller Corporeal Movables 18-19; Eassie et al Gloag and Henderson para 31.04; Gretton & 
Steven Property para 9.2; Reid The Law of Property para 540. 
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200 Joint Liquidators of the Scottish Coal Company Limited [2013] CSOH 124 (CSOH); The Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency v The Joint Liquidators of the Scottish Coal Company Limited [2013] 
CSIH 108. 
201 The first mention (found by the author) of the possibility of abandoning landownership can be found 
in the 2017 edition of Gloag and Henderson The Law of Scotland. Unsurprisingly, this was prompted by 
the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency case, which is the subject of discussion. See Eassie et 
al Gloag and Henderson para 34.03n30. See also Combe & Rudd (2018) The Edinburgh Law Review 
301. 
202 Para 6. See also Author Unknown “Liquidators Escape £73m Clean-up Bill for Scottish Coal” (17-07-
2013) BBC News <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-23348222> (accessed 14-01-2020). 




restore the land.204 However, if the liquidators were simply allowed to relinquish 
ownership of the sites, the costs of restoring the land would fall to local authorities and 
relevant statutory bodies, and thus ultimately, the taxpayer.205 
The liquidators also sought to abandon statutory licenses and thus the compliance with 
the conditions attached thereto.206 While the Outer House found that it was possible to 
abandon such licenses,207 the Inner House on appeal found that it was not.208 Due to 
space constraints and relevance, this reasoning will be not discussed. 
Much of the two judgments delve into questions around Scottish and English 
insolvency law and are thus not relevant for the purposes of this thesis. The two 
relevant questions that the liquidators put to the court were (1) whether it was possible 
to abandon the sites (with the consequence that they would become bona vacantia) 
and (2) what procedure was to be followed in effecting such an abandonment.209 As 
the Inner House answered the first question in the negative, it is unnecessary to 
provide an answer to the second question.  
4.2.2.2 The judgment of the Outer House of the Court of Session 
The court acknowledged that there was no statutory provision which expressly 
empowered a liquidator of a company registered in Scotland to disclaim onerous 
property.210 In the absence of case law or academic commentary, it was a case without 
precedent or authority in Scots law.211 
The court noted that, in Roman-Dutch law, it was apparently possible to abandon land, 
except where the intention was to escape liabilities attaching to the property.212 The 
court also pointed to the example of section 928 of the German BGB,213 which provides 
 
204 CSOH paras 6-8. 
205 CSOH para 10. 
206 CSOH paras 5-9.  
207 CSOH para 26. 
208 CSIH paras 101-103.  
209 CSOH para 9. 
210 CSOH para 14. Whereas section 178 of the Insolvency Act 1986 empowers a liquidator to do so in 
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211 CSOH para 14. See Combe & Rudd (2018) Edinburgh Law Review 301-302. 
212 CSOH para 22. See DL Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership (1986) 8 relying 
on Grotius 2.32.3, Van Leeuwen Commentaries 2 3 12 and Van der Keessel Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni 
ad Hugonis Grotii 2 32 2. 




a procedure through which a landowner may abandon his property.214 This, however, 
is a specific statutory mechanism. In the absence of any authority in Scots law, the 
court drew on the Roman-Dutch approach, which it saw as the closest analogy.215 As 
this approach prohibits the abandonment of landownership for the purpose of avoiding 
obligations and liabilities, abandonment would have to be regulated by the courts, due 
to the absence of some other mechanism provided by law.216 
The prevailing legislation at the time was the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979 
(LRA 1979), as the LRA 2012 had yet to come into force.217 Since section 3 of the LRA 
1979, concerning the effect of registration, made no provision for the registration of 
abandonment, the respondents argued that it was not possible.218 However, section 
2(4) of that same Act states that any transaction capable under a rule of law which 
affects “the title to a registered interest in land” shall be registrable.219  
Section 4(1) of the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000 (Abolition Act) 
states that ownership in land passes on registration in the land register. However, 
subsection 2 states that the “section is without prejudice to any…rule of law, by or 
under which ownership may pass”. In the court’s view, the effect of these legislative 
provisions was that the abandonment of landownership was possible, since other rules 
of law could still operate.220 
The court also was of the view that ownerless land was a possibility. With the abolition 
of the feudal system, in which the Crown was the “ultimate superior”, the Crown may 
waive its right to bona vacantia, thus creating ownerless land.221 In the court’s view, 
this is possible both in common law and according to statute.222 The prerogative rights 
of the Crown were preserved by section 58 of the Abolition Act.223 But the Crown is not 
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220 CSOH para 23. 
221 CSOH para 24. The court relies on ARG MacMillan The Law of Bona Vacantia in Scotland (1936) 
10-12 in this regard. 
222 CSOH para 24. See for example section 1013(1) of the Companies Act 2006 which empowers the 
Crown to disclaim property in Scotland which it would acquire through the dissolution of a company. 




compelled to retain ownership in land simply due to the prerogative through which it 
acquires it since it is able to waive such prerogative.224 Thus ownerless land that is 
open to occupatio is a possibility in Scots law.225 
To summarise the court’s view, it is possible to abandon landownership, and if the 
Crown disclaims that land, it is rendered ownerless.226 In the opinion of the court, the 
absence of a statutory mechanism for abandonment does not preclude it. It is possible 
to abandon corporeal movables, and as such, the abandonment of land should also 
be possible. However, the absence of a statutory mechanism does mean that such 
abandonments should be regulated by the courts.227 The purpose of such regulation is 
to prevent would-be abandoners from avoiding liabilities attaching to land.228 
Finally, the court had to consider the appropriate mechanism for the abandonment of 
landownership. The court’s recommendations were qualified, as full argument had not 
been heard on the matter, with the suggested mechanism being based predominantly 
on the suggestions of the applicants.229 The applicants suggested the completion of a 
notice by the liquidator, identifying the property in question, which would be sent to 
interested parties. These include various statutory bodies, the local authority and 
anyone benefitting from a servitude over the property.230 The court endorsed these 
suggestions as reasonable while suggesting that there may be further interested 
parties who need to be informed.231 It was also suggested that safety issues at the 
sites to be abandoned required advertisement in local newspapers.232 Finally, notice 
should be sent to the Keeper, so that the title sheet in the land register can be amended 
to reflect the new factual situation.233 
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4.2.2.3 The judgment of the Inner House of the Court of Session 
The decision of the Outer House was subsequently appealed. The Inner House 
overturned the finding of the court a quo, ruling out the possibility of abandoning 
landownership. 
The court noted that it is important to distinguish between abandoning property in the 
physical sense, i.e. to relinquish physical control, and abandoning ownership in the 
legal sense, i.e. divesting oneself of ownership.234 Ownership, as a legal relationship 
between a person and a particular piece of property, must be regulated by law.235 
Consequently, the law must regulate the manner through which ownership may be 
terminated.236 
Unlike the court a quo, which stated that since it is possible to abandon movables it 
should be possible to abandon land, the Inner House drew an important distinction 
between the two categories of property.237 Ownership in movables may be abandoned 
through the relinquishment of physical control and the intention to divest oneself of 
ownership.238 By contrast, landownership is manifested in the written record.239 This 
“renders the fact of ownership public and, subject to the operation of law, 
permanent”.240 
Given that this permanency is subject to the operation of law, one must look to the law 
to establish the circumstances in which ownership may be terminated.241 The law 
provides for a number of circumstances in which landownership may be brought to an 
end.242 Examples include a forced sale in order to realise a real security right, 
expropriation or, the most common example, transfer to another person.243 A bilateral 
transfer between parties is provided for by statute,244 whereas the law simply does not 
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provide a procedure for the “transfer of land into oblivion”.245 In the absence of such a 
mechanism, it is simply not possible to abandon a real right of ownership.246 
On the point of whether ownerless land can exist, the Inner House agreed that it is 
possible. However, the Inner House took a different view of what constitutes ownerless 
land than the court a quo. It pointed out that land could be rendered ownerless where 
the previous owner of the land ceased to exist.247 But it is through being rendered 
ownerless that land becomes bona vacantia.248 In the court’s view, it would be incorrect 
to describe the Crown’s prerogative to property that has become bona vacantia as 
creating a “real right of ownership…in the private law sense”.249 Rather, the right has 
its origins in public law.250 The Crown may take possession of ownerless property and 
administer it in line with the community’s interests.251 While a real right in ownerless 
movables may be acquired from the Crown taking possession,252 the prerogative does 
not necessarily involve the Crown acquiring title to the ownerless land.253 Instead, it is 
empowered to administer the land.254 The Crown may exercise this entitlement, but is 
not obliged to do so, and can waive the right both in terms of common law and 
statute.255 In the event of non-exercise or waiver of the right, it may be acquired by 
following the requirements for prescription in Scots law.256 The latter point precludes 
the possibility of acquiring such land through occupatio, as the court a quo had 
suggested. 
4.2.2.4 Co-ownership 
It was established in Chapter 3 that, in South African law, undivided co-ownership 
shares in land cannot be abandoned, based on an interpretation of the relevant law.257 
In this chapter, it has been noted, however, that undivided co-ownership shares can 
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be renounced in Swiss law (effectively abandoned, though not regarded as 
Dereliktion).258 It is thus necessary to touch on co-ownership shares in the context of 
Scots law. 
As in South African law,259 a distinction is drawn between the undivided shares of the 
co-owners and the co-owned property.260 A co-owner is free to alienate or encumber 
her undivided share as she sees fit, without the consent of her fellow co-owners.261 
Nobody is bound to remain in a co-ownership relationship and a co-owner can demand 
an end to the co-ownership relationship.262 Bar a few exceptions, a court is unable to 
refuse such a demand.263  
Does this entail an entitlement to abandon that undivided share in respect of land? The 
academic texts appear silent on this point. Section 7(1)(b) of the LRA 2012 requires, 
in the case of co-ownership, that not only the names of the co-owners are reflected on 
the title sheet, but also their respective shares. Given that co-ownership in land is also 
manifested in the written record, it seems reasonable to deduce that the Inner House’s 
remarks on ownership in land also apply to undivided co-ownership shares in land. 
That is, such rights are “public and, subject to the operation of law, permanent”.264 In 
the absence of a mechanism providing for the abandonment of such shares, it is not 
possible to do so. 
4.3 Contrast and analysis 
Analysis is warranted both from legal and policy-based standpoints. From a legal 
standpoint, analysis will focus on how the Inner House’s judgment can provide support 
for the interpretation of the relevant South African law in Chapter 3. Policy analysis will 
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focus on the similar reasons that exist in South African and Scots law for not permitting 
the unrestricted abandonment of landownership. 
4.3.1 Legal analysis 
As established in the judgment of the Inner House, the prevailing legal rules in Scotland 
render the abandonment of landownership impossible. As ownership is a legal 
relationship, the circumstances in which it is terminated must be regulated by the 
law.265 Land may be rendered ownerless, in the sense that it is bona vacantia, where, 
for example, the owner ceases to exist or dies without heirs.266 However, in the 
absence of a specific mechanism through which landownership can be abandoned, it 
is not possible.267 
The decision of the Inner House provides an important comparative source in 
answering the question as to whether the abandonment of land is possible in the South 
African context. As explained in Chapter 3, in line with Mostert’s argument,268 it is not 
possible to abandon landownership in the absence of a specific mechanism for such 
in the relevant legislation.269 The views of the Inner House appear to support such a 
proposition in the context of a modern system of land registration. The same 
requirements for the abandonment of corporeal movables are simply not appropriate 
in the context of land.270 In a property law system where registration is a central feature 
of landownership, ownership is manifested in the written record thus making “the fact 
of ownership public and, subject to the operation of law, permanent”.271 
While the court did not explicitly mention the principle of publicity, its reasoning for 
denying a right to abandon land in the absence of a specific mechanism is in line with 
the principle. The relinquishment of possession – applicable in the case of movable 
property – is simply not sufficient to terminate the ownership relationship in respect of 
land, regardless of intention. In the absence of such a mechanism, landownership – 
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embodied as it is in the written record – is ultimately permanent, as there is no external 
act that gives proper effect to the principle of publicity.272 
Despite South African law observing a negative system of land registration, in contrast 
to the positive system in Scots law,273 these observations are equally relevant. 
Regardless, rights in land may be acquired (and thus lost) through original modes of 
acquisition in both positive and negative systems of registration, in the absence of 
actions in the land register.274 It would seem, however, that ownership cannot be 
unilaterally terminated without some form of specific mechanism, regardless of 
whether one is concerned with a negative or positive system of registration. 
4.3.2 Policy analysis 
The impossibility of abandoning landownership in Scots law also warrants 
consideration in light of the social-obligation norm. As Alexander’s sliding scale of 
obligation275 could assist in explaining the differences between the Swiss and South 
African legal positions, it can also help explain the similarities between South African 
and Scots law. However, the social-obligation norm finds interesting expression in 
recent Scots legislation, particularly in the context of derelict and (informally) 
abandoned land.  
The problems that plague landownership in South Africa do not exist on any 
comparable scale in the Scottish context. However, the mining context of the Scottish 
Environmental Protection Agency case provides strong policy reasons for not allowing 
a landowner simply to abandon ownership.276 This contention is true even though the 
licenses (that the liquidators of the Scottish Coal Company also sought to abandon) 
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were the primary source of the obligations that would incur the significant monthly 
expenditure in maintaining the land. These sites pose significant dangers to the 
environment and to the health and safety of surrounding communities.277 In this 
context, owners cannot simply walk away from their obligations. The social-obligation 
norm requires them to retain ownership, with the consequence that they incur 
significant expense in maintaining the land. 
Outside of the mining context, the impossibility of abandoning landownership in 
Scotland may appear less justifiable. However, it does not appear that there are any 
calls for a change in the law to permit the free abandonment of landownership. Rather, 
there have been recent legislative shifts towards empowering communities to acquire 
derelict or (informally) abandoned land in their area. To this end, the Community 
Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 (CEA) was enacted.278 Before this Act, rural 
community bodies enjoyed a right of pre-emption stemming from the Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003 (LRA 2003).279 Such a right of pre-emption depended on whether 
the owner was willing to sell in the first place.280 However, the CEA amended the LRA 
2003 to extend the right to buy to the whole of Scotland.281 As such, the right now 
applies to urban areas as well.282 In addition to extending this right to urban areas, 
community bodies may now compel the purchase of certain categories of land and 
buildings which are abandoned, neglected or otherwise having a detrimental impact 
on “the environmental wellbeing of a relevant community”.283 The exercise of the right 
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depends on ministerial consent, however,284 and the Ministers must be satisfied that 
such an acquisition is both in the public interest and “compatible with furthering the 
achievement of sustainable development”.285 
Effectively, the law in Scotland addresses the issue of the abandonment of 
landownership, in the mining context and outside it. Landownership may not be 
abandoned, forcing owners to comply with their obligations. However, where a local 
community wishes to acquire land, which is (informally) abandoned or derelict, they 
are empowered to do so, permitting them to put such land to more sustainable use.286 
The social-obligation norm is thus not only given effect through restraining owners from 
avoiding their obligations. It is also given effect to through allowing communities to 
acquire land, which is informally abandoned, even where the landowner may wish to 
retain such ownership. 
4.4 In summary: Lessons from Scots law 
In contrast to the permissive Swiss approach to the abandonment of landownership, 
Scotland provides an example of a jurisdiction in which landowners are not permitted 
to walk away from ownership as they please. The social-obligation norm operates not 
through an express prohibition, but through the withholding of an entitlement. This 
ultimately serves the interests of society at large, particularly in the mining context. 
While the socio-economic contexts of Scotland and South Africa are significantly 
different, this does not necessarily mean that the law in the former grants landowners 
a right to divest themselves of ownership. In any event, there does not seem to be any 
particular demand for such an entitlement outside of the mining context. Instead, 
legislation has been enacted to permit community bodies to acquire ownership of land 
left (informally) abandoned or derelict by negligent owners, in the interests of 
sustainable development.  Such acquisition can occur against the will of the owner.  
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Scots law provides important lessons about the nature of landownership, as well as 
the circumstances in which it may be terminated. As ownership is a legal relationship, 
the law must provide for its termination. In the absence of such provision it seems that 
it is not possible to do so. This again brings us back to the principle of publicity, a 
founding principle of all three jurisdictions surveyed in this thesis. 
5. Abandonment of landownership: A contextual entitlement 
Through comparative analysis, it becomes apparent that the entitlement to abandon 
land is not an inherent part of landownership. The entitlement only seems to be present 
where the societal cost of abandonment of landownership appears to be minimal and, 
even then, it is not completely unfettered. Neither South Africa nor Scotland, 
jurisdictions in which there is cause to restrain owners from walking away from their 
liabilities, permit the abandonment of landownership, even if no express prohibition 
exists. However, in Switzerland, there appears to be little reason to force landowners 
to retain title to land. Abandonment, or Dereliktion, ultimately does not appear to cause 
any societal harm. The above overview affirms Peñalver’s assertion that the doctrine 
of abandonment reflects the “interplay between autonomy and obligation”.287 
The right to abandon is an entitlement that needs to be expressly bestowed on 
landowners through the provision of a mechanism that facilitates the striking of the 
owner’s name from the entry in the land register. Even if abandonment is not explicitly 
prohibited, the publicity principle renders abandonment impossible in the absence of a 
mechanism provided by law.288 This position is due to the permanent nature of 
landownership in a modern system of land registration, embodied as it is in the written 
record.289 This is affirmed by the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session 
in the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency case. As the court pointed out, 
ownership is a legal relationship, and thus the circumstances in which it is terminated 
need to be regulated by law.290 
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At this point in the thesis, it has been established that (1) the abandonment of 
landownership is not possible in South African law and (2) the unrestricted 
abandonment of landownership should not be permitted. However, this does not mean 
that there should never be some form of exit for landowners in circumstances where 
their land carries a significant negative value. Often such landowners may not be 
responsible for the state of affairs. The circumstances and mechanisms for such an 
exit from landownership, in light of the social-obligation norm and the constitutional 





Chapter 6: Motivating for Reform 
 
1. Introduction  
Abandonment of landownership is not possible in South African law in light of the 
principle of publicity.1 The principle of publicity requires that the existence and content 
of real rights (as well as changes thereto) be determinable by third parties.2 The 
importance of the principle of publicity in respect of achieving the abandonment of 
landownership is clearly recognised in foreign jurisdictions, as discussed in Chapter 5.  
In Switzerland, the law permits one to abandon landownership (Dereliktion) through 
the submission of a waiver to the relevant land registry.3 The owner’s intention – when 
expressed through means other than a waiver or prolonged absences from the land in 
question – is simply not relevant.4 The submission of the waiver by the registered 
owner is the only means through which land can be abandoned.5  
Scots law, by contrast, has no equivalent mechanism to Swiss law, with the 
consequence that the Inner House of the Court of Session has found abandonment of 
landownership to be impossible.6 As the Inner House stated, landownership is 
manifested in the written record.7 This “renders the fact of ownership public and, 
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subject to the operation of law, permanent”.8 Being a legal relationship, the law must 
provide for the circumstances in which ownership is extinguished.9 
With the above established, it is now necessary to evaluate whether the South African 
law should provide for abandonment of landownership, and if so, under what 
circumstances. Even if an unrestricted right to abandon is not feasible, there may be 
circumstances in which, due to the burden on an individual landowner, some form of 
regulated exit from ownership is justifiable. This Chapter evaluates three areas in which 
some reform is required in this respect. The first is the mining context, with a focus on 
owners on whose land mining operations are being conducted (Section 3.1 below). 
The second is the heritage-building context, in which a landowner finds a protected 
building prohibitively expensive to maintain as well as not being able to put it to any 
form of profitable use (Section 3.2 below). The final scenario is that of individual 
landowners being unable to make use of their properties due to conditions giving rise 
to either urban decay or unlawful occupation (Section 3.3 below). 
This Chapter is structured along the following lines. First, this Chapter sets out the 
necessity for reform (section 2.1) as well as the parameters within which reform should 
take place (section 2.2). Secondly, the contexts in which abandonment or some form 
of regulated exit may be justified are explored, with attention being drawn to the 
shortfalls of existing remedies for landowners (section 3). 
2. The case and parameters for reform 
It is not possible to abandon landownership in South African law. The absence of a 
mechanism in the Deeds Registries Act or other legislation means there is no way one 
can strike one’s name from the title deed of a piece of land.10 Ownership, being a legal 
relationship, requires that the law provide a mechanism through which it can be 
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terminated.11 In the absence of such a mechanism, no effect is given to the principle 
of publicity,12 which is essential for advertising the existence of real rights to third 
parties.13 
2.1 The necessity for reform 
The law should provide a mechanism through which ownership in land can be 
abandoned (meaning it will be bona vacantia14), which would give effect to the principle 
of publicity,15 provided that certain conditions prevail. However, such a mechanism 
cannot operate as an unrestricted right to abandon. 
In the event of abandonment of landownership, the obligation to maintain the 
abandoned land would most likely fall on local government.16 The Constitution states 
that the objects of local government include promoting a safe and healthy 
environment.17 Local government already regulates buildings, including problem 
buildings through by-laws.18 By-laws provide for the municipality19 to pursue owners 
(or those in charge of a building) through civil litigation and criminal prosecution.20 If 
landowners were able to wash their hands off problem properties, passing them onto 
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the State, municipalities would be obliged to maintain such properties. Municipalities 
would also not be able to recover expenses, assuming the resources even exist to fund 
such maintenance.  
Maintaining buildings forsaken by their owners potentially conflicts with the socio-
economic obligations placed by the Constitution on local government, by creating 
additional burdens on already constrained budgets. The Constitution requires that 
municipalities “structure and manage [their] administration and budgeting and planning 
processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community”.21 Additionally, 
municipalities must further socio-economic development of their communities.22 These 
duties tie in with the various socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights that the State is 
obliged to realise progressively, within available resources, through both legislation 
and other measures.23 Evidently, private owners passing their obligations to local 
government may redirect resources from achieving important socio-economic goals. 
In view of the severe budgetary constraints already existing at local-government 
level,24 an unrestricted right to abandon land does not appear viable. These budgetary 
constraints at local government level were exacerbated in the 2018 Budget, in which 
the local government budget was cut by R3.2 billion.25 Rather, attention must be paid 
 
21 Section 153(a). 
22 Section 153(a). 
23 See sections 26(2), 27(2) and 29(1)(b). 
24 X Potelwa “Budget Squeeze Pushing South African Cities Back to Bond Market” (18-02-2016) 
Bloomberg <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-18/budget-squeeze-pushing-south-
african-cities-back-to-bond-market> (accessed 10-04-2018); K Magubane “Gauteng Metros Struggle to 
Deliver Services on Tight Budgets” (03-08-2017) Business Day 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-08-03-gauteng-metros-struggle-to-deliver-services-
on-tight-budgets/> (accessed 13/09/2018); C Mailovich “Struggling Metros Need a Bailout” Business 
Day (17-04-2019) 3; L Ensor “Local Government Underfunded, Says Advisory Body” Business Day (02-
07-2019) 2; L Donnelly “Western Cape Fights ‘Unrealistic’ Budget Cuts” Business Day (01-11-2019) 3. 
25 National Treasury Budget Review 2018 70. Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2018/review/FullBR.pdf (accessed 
13/09/2018). Local government is seen as one of the big losers in the financing of fee-free higher 
education and National Health Insurance. See K Magubane “Provincial and Local Government 
Allocations Fall in Gigaba’s Budget” (22-02-2018) Business Day 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/2018-02-22-provincial-and-local-government-allocations-
fall-in--gigabas-budget/> (accessed 10-04-2018); K Heese & K Allan “Budget Adds to Problems in 
Delivery to the Poor” (01-03-2018) Business Day <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-03-
01-budget-adds-to-problems-in-delivery-to-the-poor/> (10-04-2018). See also the 2019 Budget in which 
only 9.1 per cent was allocated to local government. National Treasury Budget Review 2019 65. 
Available at <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2019/review/FullBR.pdf> 
(accessed 19-02-2020). In the 2019 Budget, municipalities were urged to “ease their dependence on 




to the particular contexts in which abandonment or a form of regulated exit from 
ownership would be justified. 
While the prevailing legal position is undesirable and often unfair to many owners, an 
unrestricted right to abandon is a poor remedy to the problems that plague 
landownership in South Africa.26 If an unrestricted right to abandon were introduced in 
the current context, it would pose a threat to the already fragile public order.27 As 
Mostert explains, unrestricted abandonment would “annihilate both municipalities’ 
expectations of responsible behaviour by landowners, and landowners’ expectations 
of sound processes and support from government”.28 Social chaos could result from 
the breakdown of the relationship between landowners and municipalities.29 Urban 
decay would most likely accelerate, while greater strain is put on the State’s resources 
to meet its social-economic obligations.30 
Ideally, the law should make it clear that the unrestricted abandonment of 
landownership is not possible in South African law. It is important that such a legal 
position be precisely stated rather than inferred. Nevertheless, a form of abandonment 
of landownership should be provided to landowners in circumstances in which the 
burden stemming from the negative value of the land is deemed excessive. It is 
submitted that reform should take the shape of a piece of legislation with the express 
purpose of regulating abandonment, or perhaps more correctly, regulated exit from 
landownership. The manner in which this piece of legislation will operate is explored in 
 
of incentives that reward good governance”. See Author Unknown “Municipalities Must Diversity 
Funding Sources” Witness (21-02-2019) 6. 
26 See discussion of mining land, heritage-buildings, and problem-buildings/unlawful occupation in 
Section 3 below. 
27 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 27. 
28 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 27. 
29 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 27. 
30 The mass departure of big business and capital from Johannesburg’s inner city for locations such as 
Sandton from the 1987s onwards already accelerated urban decay in the area. See M Murray Taming 
the Disorderly City: The Spatial Landscape of Johannesburg After Apartheid (2008) 66ff. The existing 
strain on government’s resources can be seen in the growth of service delivery protests which have 
become a common occurrence in South Africa. See R Davis “Why Counting Service Delivery Protests 
is More Complicated than it Seems” (13-07-2018) <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-07-13-
why-counting-service-delivery-protests-is-more-complicated-than-it-seems/> (accessed 24-01-2019); S 
Reddy “The Politics of Service Delivery in South Africa: The Local Government Sphere in Context” 
(2016) 12 The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa <https://td-
sa.net/index.php/td/article/view/337/351#CIT0011_337> (accessed 24-01-2019); O Dassah “A Critical 
Analysis of Factors Underlying Service Delivery Protests in South Africa” (2012) 1 Journal of African & 




Chapter 7. The parameters for the proposed reform will be explored in the following 
section. 
2.2 Parameters for reform 
Chapter 4 sets out the social-obligation norm, conceptualised by Alexander.31 The 
theory underlies the interpretation in this thesis of existing law, as well as forms the 
basis for suggestions for law reform. Alexander’s formulation of the social-obligation 
norm places particular emphasis on human flourishing.32 Human flourishing requires 
that the law allow “individuals to live lives worthy of human dignity”.33 One of the 
consequences of this theory is that the law of property entails obligations, which oblige 
owners to support those social matrices and institutions that have facilitated their own 
flourishing.34 These obligations are necessary to provide others with the means to 
flourish as well.35 
The social-obligation norm finds expression in the property clause of the Constitution.36 
As noted, the objectives of the property clause extend beyond simply restitution and 
redistribution.37 Van der Walt explains that the “allocation, recognition and protection 
of individual property rights may not result in an environment that endangers the health 
or well-being of the citizenry”.38 One consequence of the social-obligation norm being 
embedded in the property clause is that unreciprocated sacrifices on the part of owners 
are anticipated.39 However, it is still necessary to take account of the extent of the 
burden placed on an individual owner, and whether some form of compensation or 
equalisation should be available to alleviate the burden. In this respect, the sliding-
 
31 G Alexander “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745; G Alexander Property and Human Flourishing (2018); G Alexander & E Peñalver An Introduction 
to Property Theory (2012) Chapter 5; G Alexander & E Peñalver “Properties of Community” (2009) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127. 
32 Alexander (2009) Cornell 760ff; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing; Alexander & Peñalver 
Property Theory Chapter 5; Alexander & Peñalver (2009) Theoretical 134ff. 
33 Alexander (2009) Cornell 748. See also Alexander Property and Human Flourishing 5; Alexander & 
Peñalver Property Theory 89. 
34 Alexander (2009) Cornell 745; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing xv; Alexander & Peñalver 
Property Theory 95. 
35 Alexander (2009) Cornell 745; Alexander Property and Human Flourishing xv; Alexander & Peñalver 
Property Theory 95. 
36 Section 25 of the Constitution, 1996. 
37 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 139-140. 
38 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 140. 




scale approach to social obligation was identified,40 which appears compatible with 
constitutional jurisprudence on deprivations.41 This approach distinguishes between 
different forms of property42 in establishing the level of social obligation that should be 
placed upon the particular owner.43 
It is in view of the social-obligation norm and the sliding-scale approach to social 
obligation that a number of factors that constitute guidelines are suggested in Chapter 
4. The law concerning the abandonment of landownership is to be evaluated in light of 
these factors. The guidelines are as follows. First, the extent of the burden placed on 
the individual landowner must be considered. Second, it must be asked whether a third 
party derives a benefit from the burden to which the landowner is subjected. Third, one 
must ask whether there are existing compensatory mechanisms on which the 
landowner may rely, and to what extent these mechanisms are adequate given the 
burden. Finally, and most critically, the potential societal cost of abandonment (or exit) 
in the relevant circumstances needs to be evaluated.44 In this context, the burden 
refers to the ownership of land that has accrued a negative value to the owner45 – such 
as in the scenarios explored below. 
With the parameters for reform established through these guiding factors, it is 
necessary to identify contexts in which abandonment or regulated exit from 
landownership may be justified. Following the examination of these contexts and the 
relevant legal frameworks that accompany them, this chapter will proceed to suggest 
what legislation governing the law of abandonment should resemble. 
3. The case for reform in three contexts 
An unrestricted right to abandon is not feasible in the South African context. 
Nevertheless, abandonment or a regulated exit from ownership is justified in certain 
 
40 G Alexander The Global Debate Over Constitutional Property (2006) 138. 
41 Chapter 4 Section 5.3. 
42 Alexander points out that “[g]reater legislative power is recognised over socially important assets like 
corporate stock than over small garden plots used for leisure”. Alexander Global Debate 138. Similarly, 
in the South African context, more significant obligations may attach to a property purchased for 
development purposes by a juristic person than a modest house owned and resided in by a private 
person. See discussion in Section 3.2 below. 
43 Alexander Global Debate 138. 
44 See Cramer (2017) SALJ 905. 
45 Regarding the nature of negative value property, see note 8 in Chapter 1 above. In particular, see N 




circumstances. The burden on a particular owner may be excessive and ultimately 
unfair considering the guidelines provided in section 2.2. Three contexts in which 
abandonment or regulated exit may be justifiable are (1) mining, (2) heritage buildings 
and (3) problem buildings marking urban decay. The motivation for the choice of these 
three contexts is that they provide examples of scenarios in which land can potentially 
accrue a negative value for the owner. 
3.1 The mining context 
The mining context may give rise to circumstances in which a landowner finds out that 
her land has accrued a negative value or is effectively sterilised for her intended 
purposes. The legal framework creates a situation in which a landowner not only 
exercises little to no agency in respect of whether mining or related activities occur on 
her land.46 She is also not provided with any real guarantee of having the land restored 
to her in a rehabilitated state, or at least to the extent rehabilitation is possible.47 
A key feature of contemporary South African mineral law, following the enactment of 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act,48 is that the State is the 
custodian of the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources.49 These resources must be 
 
46 E van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum (2016) 581ff. 
47 See Section 3.1.2 below. 
48 Act 28 of 2002. 
49 Section 3(1). A consequence of this legislative intervention is that rights in minerals exist apart from 
landownership, unlike in the previous dispensation in which severance of mineral rights from ownership 
of the land was necessary. Under the previous dispensation, minerals embedded in the land were the 
property of the landowner. The landowner could impart the entitlements to prospect and mine to third 
parties, where she lacked the inability or inclination to mine herself. The landowner’s rights stemmed 
from the Roman-Dutch law maxim of cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, which 
meant that the owner was entitled to everything above and underneath her land. Mineral rights could be 
severed from the land under which minerals were found through various means. These include (1) the 
owner reserving mineral rights against the title deed, (2) the transferring of the land to a new owner, and 
(3) registering a notarial deed of cession, which would transfer the mineral rights to a third party while 
remaining owner of the land itself. The practice of severance was confirmed by case law in the late 
nineteenth century, as well as entrenched in legislation. See H Mostert Mineral Law: Principles and 
Policies in Perspective (2012) 7-8, 10-11; Van der Schyff Property 19-20, 46-48; H Mostert & M van den 
Berg “Roman-Dutch Law, Custodianship, and the African Subsurface: The South African and Namibian 
Experiences” in DN Zillman, A McHarg, A Bradbrook & L Barrera-Hernandez (eds) The Law of Energy 
Underground: Understanding New Developments in Subsurface Production, Transmission, and Storage 
(2014) 75 79; Van der Merwe Sakereg 551; M van den Berg “Ownership of Minerals Under the New 
Legislative Framework for Mineral Resources” (2009) 20 Stell LR 139 141-143. 
Despite the common-law position outlined above, the State has always exercised a great deal of control 
and intervened in respect of the rights of both landowner and mineral right holder (Mostert & Van der 
Berg “Roman-Dutch Law” in The Law of Energy Underground 76-80. For detailed overviews, see 
Mostert Mineral Law Chapters 3-5 and Van der Schyff Property 97ff. See also Van den Berg (2009) Stell 




utilised for the benefit of all South Africans.50 In its role as custodian, the State is 
empowered to grant – through the Minister of Mineral Resources – rights in terms of 
the MPRDA’s provisions.51 Thus, in effect, third parties may be granted rights to mine 
and prospect over another’s land, without the latter exercising any agency in this 
regard. 
3.1.1 The shortfalls of existing protections for landowners under the MPRDA 
While the landowner does not exercise any agency in respect of whether mining or 
prospecting takes place on her land, the MPRDA does require that she be notified and 
consulted, as well as providing for compensation (although such compensation is not 
automatic or compulsory52). In addition, the common law may provide some protection 
for the landowner, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the MPRDA.53 In deciding 
whether the mining context provides an example of a situation in which abandonment 
or regulated exit from landownership is permitted, it is necessary to evaluate these 
existing protections. This evaluation will determine the extent to which these existing 
protections are adequate in equalising the burden placed on the landowner through 
the conducting of mining operations on her land. 
Before mining or prospecting may commence, the landowner must be notified and 
possibly compensated.54 However, as noted, compensation under the MPRDA is not 
 
50 Section 3(1). 
51 Section 3(2)(a). 
52 Meepo v Kotze 2008 (1) SA 104 (NC) para 8; PJ Badenhorst “Conflict Resolution Between Owners 
of Land and Holders of Rights to Minerals: A Lopsided Triangle?” (2011) TSAR 326 334-335; Van der 
Schyff Property 589-592. 
53 Van der Schyff Property 594-597; Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 333-334. 
54 In terms of section 5A(c), a landowner must be given at least 21 days written notice before prospecting 
or mining may begin. Section 16(4)(b) states that once an application for a prospecting right has been 
accepted by the relevant regional manager, the applicant must consult with the landowner in the 
prescribed manner. The result of the consultation with the landowner must be included in the 
environmental reports (mandated by Chapter 5 of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998 (NEMA). Sections 22(4)(b) and 27(5)(a) require the same consultation and reporting procedure in 
respect of applications for mining rights and mining permits respectively.  
The court in Meepo v Kotze 2008 (1) SA 104 (NC) has stated that the consultation provisions in the 
MPRDA should be widely construed, being the only mechanism “whereby a land owner is to be 
appraised of the impact prospecting [or mining] activities may have on his land and, for instance, his 
farming activities” (para 13). See Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 328. Section 50 provides that the Minister 
may instigate an investigation into the presence of minerals on land, and the nature and extent of those 
minerals (subsection 1). The owner in such circumstances must be notified of the intention to enter her 
land and conduct the investigation (subsection 4), and must be entitled to compensation for loss or 
damage (subsection 2). See also Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 
(4) SA 113 (CC) para 63-67 on the requirement of consultation. The Constitutional Court stated that 




automatic nor compulsory.55 A key aspect of the prevailing legal regime under the 
MPRDA is what Badenhorst has referred to as a “lopsided triangle”.56 The State grants 
rights to prospect and mine,57 a process over which the landowner is unable to exercise 
any control.58 As Van der Schyff points out, landowners only derive a benefit from 
mineral exploitation in their capacity as members of the public, despite bearing the 
burden of mining as landowners.59 That is, unless the landowner is also the right 
holder. In addition to lacking agency in the granting of rights and not accruing any direct 
benefit, the landowner will also find that her rights and interests are trumped by the 
right holder’s.60 This is subject to the requirement that the right holder exercise her 
entitlements reasonably.61 
With the landowner’s rights being subordinate to that of the right holder, the landowner 
may not deny access to the right holder and her employees.62 Access includes the 
right to bring any necessary machinery and equipment, as well as to construct any 
necessary infrastructure for conducting mining or prospecting operations.63 
There are circumstances in which a landowner may be entitled to compensation; e.g. 
where conflict arises between the landowner and right holder regarding access to the 
land in question as well as the conditions attached thereto.64 In such circumstances, 
 
between the parties is required to see if accommodation is possible. A failure to reach an agreement 
with the landowner may result in the right holder being required to compensate the landowner at a future 
point (see section 54 of the MPRDA). The court also stressed the importance of notification for the 
landowner, so that the landowner is adequately informed to make representations and of the remedies 
available to her. See T Humby “The Bengenyama Trilogy: Constitutional Rights and the Fight for 
Prospecting on Community Land” (2012) 15 PER 166 177-178, 182-183. See further Van der Schyff 
Property 583ff; Aquila Steel SA (Pty) Ltd v South African Steel Company (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 0531 (GNP) 
paras 9-10, 36. 
55 Meepo v Kotze 2008 (1) SA 104 (NC) para 8. 
56 See Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 326. See also Van der Schyff Property 601ff. 
57 Section 3(2). 
58 Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 328; Van der Schyff Property 601. The only protection that would seem to 
exist, in light of the Maccsand case, is that a landowner could block mining where her land is not zoned 
for mining purposes. Olivier, Williams and Badenhorst suggest this would protect an owner against the 
Department of Minerals Resources from granting a prospecting or mining right in respect of land 
unsuitable for such purposes. See NJJ Olivier, C Williams & PJ Badenhorst “Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City 
of Cape Town 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC)” (2012) 15 PER 538 558. See also Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of 
Cape Town 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC) para 49.  
59 Van der Schyff Property in Minerals 601. 
60 Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 329ff; Van der Schyff Property 581ff. 
61 Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 332; Van der Schyff Property 596. 
62 Section 5(3)(a). See Van der Schyff Property 581ff. See further Aquila Steel SA (Pty) Ltd v South 
African Steel Company (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 0531 (GNP) paras 31ff. 
63 Section 5(3)(a). See Van der Schyff Property 581ff. 




the relevant regional manager must request that the landowner make representations 
concerning the points of contention raised by the right holder.65 Should the regional 
manager then conclude that the reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations 
may cause loss or damage, she must ask the parties to attempt to reach an agreement 
concerning compensation.66 The landowner may also initiate the process that may lead 
to compensation.67 The protection provided by this section has been improved by 
recent confirmation by the Constitutional Court that a right holder may not bring an 
interdict against interference with the exercise of its rights until such time that the 
process envisaged by section 54 has been exhausted.68 The process of section 54 
may only be circumvented with an interdict if the landowner unreasonably refuses to 
cooperate and enter into negotiations with the right holder.69 
The regional manager may decide, after considering the issues raised by the right 
holder and the representations put forward by the landowner, that continued 
negotiation may detrimentally affect certain objects of the MPRDA.70 In these 
circumstances, the regional manager may recommend that the Minister take steps to 
expropriate the land in terms of section 55 of the MPRDA. Of central importance for 
this thesis is that none of the grounds on which the decision to recommend 
expropriation may be triggered relate to the continued economic viability of the land for 
 
65 Section 54(2)(a). 
66 Section 54(3). Where the “parties fail to reach an agreement, compensation must be determined by 
arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Act” 42 of 1965. Compensation may also be determined 
by a competent court. 
67 Section 54(7). 
68 Maledu v Itereleng Bakgatla Mineral Resources (Pty) Limited and Another 2019 (2) SA 1 (CC) paras 
85-97. 
69 Paras 87-88; Joubert v Maranda Mining Co (Pty) Ltd 2010 (1) SA 198 (SCA) para 16-17. 
70 Section 54(5). These objects include section 2(c) (“promote equitable access to the nation's mineral 
and petroleum resources to all the people of South Africa”); section 2(d) (“substantially and meaningfully 
expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons, including women and communities, to enter 
into and actively participate in the mineral and petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation 
of the nation's mineral and petroleum resources”); Section 2(f) (“promote employment and advance the 
social and economic welfare of all South Africans”); section 2(g) (“provide for security of tenure in respect 
of prospecting, exploration, mining and production operations”). Section 55 of the Act adds an additional 
ground on which the decision to expropriate may be triggered, that being conflict with the object of the 
Act found in section 2(h) (“give effect to section 24 of the Constitution by ensuring that the nation's 
mineral and petroleum resources are developed in an orderly and ecologically sustainable manner while 
promoting justifiable social and economic development”). 
See the comments of the court in Joubert v Maranda Mining Co (Pty) Ltd 2010 (1) SA 198 (SCA), to the 
effect that an unreasonable denial of access on the part of the landowner does not trigger the discretion 
to expropriate the land in question (paras 16-17). See further Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v 





the landowner’s purposes. In fact, not even the land accruing a negative value to the 
landowner will trigger the possibility of an expropriation. 
The effect of the above provisions is that a landowner may be entitled to compensation 
for mining and related operations on her land. However, unless one of the grounds that 
triggers the discretion to expropriate her land is established, the landowner may remain 
saddled with a piece of land that is no longer economically viable for her intended 
purposes. Ultimately, there is no guaranteed exit for a landowner whose land is now 
subject to mining. The absence of such an option for the landowner is one of the 
reasons why Badenhorst refers to the relationship between State, mineral right holder 
and landowner as a “lopsided triangle”.71 Even a statutory mechanism that may result 
in the possible compensation of the landowner – that being section 54 of the MPRDA 
– still primarily protects the interests of the State and the mining right holder.72 
This is not to say that the rights of the landowner are completely disregarded by the 
MPRDA. As Badenhorst has pointed out, there are a number of common law principles 
that protect the landowner and are consistent with the MPRDA.73 The MPRDA only 
precludes reliance on common-law principles that are inconsistent with the Act,74 while 
simultaneously not prescribing the principles that will regulate conflicts between 
landowners and right holders.75 At common law, the general principle from case law 
was that the interests of mineral right holders prevailed over the interests of the 
landowner.76 This principle was tempered, however, by the requirement that the 
mineral right holder must be acting civiliter modo, that is, reasonably and bona fide, in 
the exercise of her rights.77  
 
71 Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 340-341. 
72 Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 340-341. 
73 Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 333-334. Van der Schyff is a bit more hesitant to conclude that the common-
law principles automatically apply in the legal framework established by the MPRDA. These principles 
developed when the owner was regarded as everything beneath the surface. Whether the application 
of these principles in the current legal framework would be just and equitable is open to question, as 
they may be applied in a manner detrimental to the landowner who no longer exercises control over the 
granting of mineral rights. See Van der Schyff Property 597, 601ff. 
74 Section 4(2). 
75 Van der Schyff Property 594-595. 
76 Van der Schyff Property 70. 
77 Van der Schyff Property 70; Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 332-333; Olivier, Williams & Badenhorst (2012) 
PER 557-558. What constitutes civiliter modo in the mining context was discussed in the case of Trojan 
Exploration co (Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 1996 (4) SA 499 (A). Factors to be considered 




The civiliter modo principle will restrict the decisions of right holders regarding the 
manner in which they conduct mining, taking into account the interests of the 
landowner.78 For example, while open-cast mining would not have to be specifically 
authorised by an agreement with the landowner, it may only be conducted where it is 
reasonably necessary to facilitate the extraction of minerals.79 It must, however, be 
conducted in a manner that is least injurious to the interests of the landowner.80 
The common-law protections, however, do not seem to provide adequate protection in 
a context in which landowners exercise no agency in respect of mining on their land 
and only benefit in their capacity as members of the public.81 These common-law 
protections do not address the possibility of land being effectively sterilised for the 
landowners purposes, or the land accruing a negative value to the landowner, so long 
as the right holder conducts mining operations in a reasonable manner. In this respect, 
Van der Schyff’s concerns that reliance on common law principles that developed in a 
different legal framework to that which prevails under the MPRDA are valid.82 
A further issue that is of serious concern for landowners is the possibility of being held 
responsible for land use violations by the holder of a right in terms of the MPRDA.83 A 
number of municipal by-laws make it an offence for a landowner not to take 
“reasonable” steps to prevent the land from being used in a manner that contravenes 
the zoning scheme.84 This could foreseeably result in landowners being held 
 
ore concerned and the depth at which it is located, (3) the current state of the markets, (4) the extent to 
and manner in which minerals are mixed, (5) the available technology for extraction and refinement, and 
(6) whether new ore-bearing deposits have been discovered (Van der Schyff Property 70). 
It was established in the case of Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 
(SCA) that the principle of lateral support, established in neighbour law, does not regulate the 
relationship between landowners and the holders of rights that mine on the very same land (para 14). A 
right to minerals is of the nature of a quasi-servitude, and as such, we are not concerned with the 
competing rights of owners (para 16). 
78 Van der Schyff Property 70; Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 332-333; Olivier, Williams & Badenhorst (2012) 
PER 557-558. 
79 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) para 22. See also Van 
der Schyff Property 83-84; Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 332-333. 
80 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 363 (SCA) para 22. See also Van 
der Schyff Property 83-84; Badenhorst (2011) TSAR 332-333. 
81 Van der Schyff Property 601. 
82 Van der Schyff Property 596-597. 
83 Thanks must be extended to Louie van Schalkwyk for bringing this particular issue to my attention. 
See CL van Schalkwyk A Legal Perspective on the Role of Municipalities in Navigating the Relationship 
between Land Use Planning and Mining PhD thesis University of Cape Town (2019) 173n1167, 183. 
84 See for example section 86(2) of the Stellenbosch Land Use Planning By-Law, 2015 (Western Cape); 
section 60(2) of the Sol Plaatjie Local Municipality Municipal Land Use Management By-Laws, 2015 




responsible for zoning scheme violations by those who conduct prospecting and 
mining on the landowner’s land. Since landowners have no agency in whether rights 
to prospect and mine on their land are granted, the imposition of such a responsibility 
would appear unjustified. 
Nevertheless, as aforementioned, there is no guarantee of an exit from landownership, 
even where the land is no longer viable for the landowner’s intended purposes, or for 
any purpose for that matter. Given that the landowner exercises no control over the 
granting of rights in terms of the MPRDA,85 this may appear unjustifiable.  
In theory, despite exercising little to no agency in the process that leads to the granting 
of the right to mine or prospect on her land, the landowner should at least receive a 
rehabilitated piece of land back at the conclusion of the operations. However, as will 
become clear from the following section, there is little to no guarantee of this occurring 
in practice, despite the existence of strong environmental protections on paper. 
3.1.2 Unrehabilitated mining land 
Holders of rights granted in terms of the MPRDA bear the obligation of having to 
rehabilitate the land and retain the environmental liabilities that stem from mining.86 
Such responsibilities do not rest with the landowner. The National Environmental 
Management Act87 (NEMA) requires that right holders must rehabilitate the mined- or 
prospected-upon land “as far as is reasonably practicable” to (1) either the land’s 
“natural or predetermined state” or (2) “to a land use which conforms to the generally 
accepted principle of sustainable development”.88 The right holder also remains liable 
for any environmental damage as well as pollution stemming from her operations.89 
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However, despite statutory requirements that, if given proper effect to, would see the 
eventual rehabilitation of the mined-upon land, South Africa has a poor record of mine 
closure.90 As Milaras, Ahmed and McKay point out, historically mine closure in South 
Africa has been “environmentally inept”.91 Even following the enactment of strong 
environmental legislation,92 mine rehabilitation and closure in South Africa is 
characterised by poor compliance and enforcement.93 
There are a roughly between 5700-6000 derelict mines in South Africa, which will take 
800 years in total to rehabilitate.94 The cost of this rehabilitation is estimated to cost 
R100 billion.95 While the inadequate environmental regulations which pre-date the 
MPRDA are to blame for a majority of derelict mines, the Act’s otherwise well-meaning 
provisions have not had a great deal of success in practice.96 Ultimately there is a clear 
“disconnect between policy and practice concerning mine closure”.97 
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The problem of South Africa’s derelict mines and their rehabilitation is a pressing 
matter that warrants urgent attention. However, providing a solution to the rehabilitation 
of thousands of “orphaned” mines98 is not the focus of this thesis. The focus is rather 
that the continued failure to achieve adequate mine closure provides further 
justification for providing landowners with some form of exit from that ownership. 
Mining and prospecting right holders must provide financial provision for rehabilitation 
and closure of mines.99 This financial provision may be increased on an annual basis 
to the satisfaction of the Minister.100 Furthermore, the Minister responsible for mineral 
resources may opt to retain a portion of the financial provision to manage “latent, 
residual or any other environmental impacts”.101 Nevertheless, it remains difficult to 
estimate accurately the true cost of rehabilitation years down the line,102 and the 
landowner is never guaranteed to receive the mined-upon land back in an 
economically-viable state. This contention is evidenced by the “practical impossibility” 
of being issued a closure certificate,103 due to the residual environmental impacts for 
which the State is unwilling to take responsibility.104 
Perhaps one of the most significant contributing factors in the failure to achieve 
sustainable closure of mines is the problem of larger mining companies on-selling 
mining operations, to smaller concerns.105 These smaller concerns lack the resources 
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for rehabilitation and closure and thus fail to meet their environmental obligations.106 
Humby points out that, in terms of sections 11 and 43 of the MPRDA, the obligations 
to meet closure obligations do not trigger when a larger company cedes or transfers a 
mining or prospecting operation to a smaller, and less-resourced, concern.107 The 
Minister is required to give her consent to such a cession or transfer so long as the 
cessionary or transferee is deemed “capable of carrying out and complying with the 
obligations and the terms and conditions of the right in question”.108 The discretion of 
the Minister in this regard will likely be difficult to challenge on review.109 With the 
transfer or cession of the relevant mining or prospecting right comes the environmental 
liabilities, which ultimately rest with the last right holder.110 This right holder is likely the 
least well-resourced corporate entity, whose financial position is far more precarious 
than that of its predecessors.111 The rule of law, through the thwarting of the purpose 
of the legislation, is effectively undermined by a situation in which the last company 
working a particular piece of land does not apply for a closure certificate as required.112 
This situation further exacerbates the problem of achieving effective mine closure and 
environmental rehabilitation in South Africa. 
Critically, the landowner exercises no agency in respect of transfers or cessions of 
rights to smaller concerns, just as in the case of the granting of the right in the first 
place. A landowner, already unable to exercise any control of a mining company 
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proceeding to conduct operations on her land, is also not able to prevent such a 
company playing “pass-the-parcel”113 to avoid its liabilities. 
Furthermore, even if statutory requirements for rehabilitation and mine closure are 
complied with, there is no denying that “it is a fundamental reality that many types of 
mining activity will effectively sterilize some of the land surface from virtually all other 
use”.114 Regardless of advancements in technology for the purposes of rehabilitating 
mined-upon land, land being permanently altered through mining is unavoidable.115 
Beyond the slim hope of effective rehabilitation, a further problem plagues abandoned 
and closed mines in the South African context. These sites often attract illegal artisanal 
mining activities.116 Even in circumstances in which there has been some degree of 
mine closure, illegal miners will take extreme measures to gain access, including using 
explosives to blast through sealed entrances to mine shafts.117 As a result, even after 
large-scale mining has concluded, a landowner is not guaranteed to receive secure 
control of her land.  
The above issues relating to the rehabilitation of land, and the failures in achieving 
such, ultimately stem from a use of the land permitted and facilitated by the State. The 
State accrues royalties therefrom, while the landowner exercises little agency beyond 
being consulted and possibly compensated for actual damage and loss suffered.118 
The landowner only stands to benefit from the mining operations in her capacity as a 
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member of the public, while bearing the burden of the operation in her capacity as 
landowner. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make suggestions for how to enforce 
environmental compliance in mining better, particularly with concerning the 
rehabilitation of mining and achieving mine closure. What is key is that a landowner is 
never guaranteed to receive a rehabilitated and utilisable piece of land back, even if 
mine closure is achieved, particularly due to the nature of mining.119 A landowner who 
no longer wishes to remain owner of such a piece of land should be entitled to a 
regulated form of exit from such ownership. It would not seem justifiable to force a 
person to remain owner of mining land against their will based on a vague (and 
unlikely) hope of return of rehabilitated land in the future. 
3.1.3 Regulated exit under the Minerals Act 
The above legal position is in contrast to the previous dispensation which prevailed in 
the old Minerals Act,120 when rights to minerals (and consequently access to the land 
under which they are located) stemmed from landowners or existing holders of mineral 
rights.121 In the previous dispensation, landowners exercised a great deal more control 
in acquiring compensation through granting mineral rights or cooperating in the 
severance of such rights from their landownership.122 The limits of mining operations, 
as well as compensation for any damage caused to the land in the process of mining, 
would also be addressed when rights were granted or severed.123 While, ultimately, 
mineral rights could only ever be exercised once the State had granted authorisation 
to proceed,124 landowners nevertheless enjoyed far greater protection and agency in 
respect of third-party mining on their land than exists under the MPRDA.125 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the previous regime, for this thesis, is that the 
Minerals Act offered the possibility of an exit from landownership for the burdened 
landowner. Section 42 of the Minerals Act made provision for the acquisition of land by 
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the state where a mining operation “prevents or hinders or is likely to prevent or hinder 
the proper use of such land or such portion for farming purposes”.126 This provision 
could operate at either the request of the landowner or the person who held the 
entitlement to mine the land.127 Kaplan and Dale point out that this section was only 
relevant to land on which farming was in fact hindered or prevented.128 Where farming 
was not possible on the land to begin with, or the land was being used for a purpose 
other than agriculture, the section was not applicable.129 In the event that the Minister 
of Agriculture reached the decision that the State should acquire the land, it would be 
regarded as necessary for a public purpose.130 As a result, the Expropriation Act131 
would apply to the acquisition.132 
Section 42 was not perfect, as it did not protect all landowners from the sterilising of 
their land for purposes other than agriculture (and only if it was their intention to use 
said land for agriculture).133 Nevertheless, the section operated in a legal framework 
characterised by greater agency on the part of the landowner, even if it was open to 
the State to interfere with those rights.134 
3.1.4 The need for exit under the MPRDA 
Badenhorst is correct to argue for a review of section 54 of the MPRDA, given the 
prevailing lack of balance between the interests of State, right holder and landowner.135 
Section 42 under the old Minerals Act evidently provided some degree of protection for 
landowners in limited circumstances,136 providing for the possibility of exit from said 
ownership when land was rendered uneconomic for agricultural purposes.137 
Badenhorst suggests that a way to stabilise the “lopsided triangle” (State, right holder, 
landowner), and balance the interests of all parties, is to recognise “an independent 
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statutory claim for damage or loss caused by mining operations”.138 In addition, 
compensation should be agreed upon before mining or prospecting operations begin 
in the first place, not only when conflict between landowner and right holder arises.139 
However, beyond a statutory claim for damage or loss, some form of exit from 
landownership should be provided for landowners who are no longer able to utilise 
their land for their intended purposes. This is particularly important in light of the poor 
record of mine closure that prevails in South Africa.140 The adequate rehabilitation of 
mining land is unfortunately not a guarantee, despite statutory requirements regulating 
mine closure.  
Ideally, landowners would be entitled to be expropriated in such circumstances, 
providing them with just and equitable compensation for their land.141 Evidently, mining 
and prospecting operations can severely limit the landowners entitlements, and 
effectively sterilise the land for other purposes, which may on the face of it have the 
effect of an expropriation. However, such a remedy is unlikely to be forthcoming. The 
legislature is unlikely to provide such a remedy, and in addition, it remains unlikely that 
constructive expropriation will be expressly recognised by our courts,142 particularly 
given the requirement for state acquisition to raise a deprivation to the level of 
expropriation.143 Concerns also relate to the possibility of a doctrine such as 
constructive expropriation being used to hamper efforts at reform.144 Mineral law, 
intertwined with a history of skewed landownership patterns stemming from colonial 
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conquest and discriminatory legislation,145 is a context in which there is an urgent need 
for reform to redress historical injustices and persisting racial imbalances.146 
However, simply because expropriation of such land, at the expense of the public 
purse, is not viable, does not mean that landowners should not be provided with an 
exit. Abandonment or regulated exit of some form in the mineral law context appears 
necessary. Whether some form of equalisation payment for the landowner should be 
coupled with this regulated exit is not considered, being beyond the scope of this 
chapter and thesis in general.147  
In line with the guidelines set out in section 2.2, the balance of these factors would 
favour the landowner in the mining context. The extent of the burden is considerable. 
Landowners no longer exercise any control over the granting of rights to prospect and 
mine on their land.148 While common-law principles may temper the impact of mining149 
– in that rights in terms of the MPRDA will need to be exercised civiliter modo150 – this 
would appear insufficient, particularly in light of South Africa’s poor record of mine 
closure and rehabilitation.151 Furthermore, a third party152 is evidently deriving a benefit 
from the burden to which the landowner is subjected. By and large, the legal framework 
favours the interests of the right holder over the landowner, however much the impact 
of mining may be tempered by common-law principles such as civiliter modo.  
Existing compensatory mechanisms unfortunately do not appear adequate in the 
circumstances. While a landowner may be entitled to compensation in certain 
circumstances under section 54 of the MPRDA, this is not coupled with the option to 
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have her land expropriated due to it no longer being economically viable for her 
purposes. This is particularly problematic where the rehabilitation of her land is not 
guaranteed, despite being provided for strongly by legislation. 
There is the societal cost of abandonment that needs to be considered. If a landowner 
is permitted to divest herself of ownership, the State will most likely need to step in and 
assume responsibility for the land. However, it would appear the burden on the 
landowner in this case is excessive and must be given priority over the societal cost. 
Overall, the prevailing legal framework already benefits both the State and the mineral 
right holder.153 
Evidently, the mining context provides an example of a situation which demands an 
exit for the landowner. However, it is not the only context in which it may appear 
justifiable to provide for abandonment of landownership. Attention is now turned to the 
heritage building context, another example in which property may accrue a negative 
value and be an excessive burden to the landowner. 
3.2 The heritage-building context 
The heritage-building context provides unique challenges to landowners, where the 
need to preserve buildings which are important to the community’s heritage conflicts 
with the owner’s entitlement to demolition.154 The relevant legislation is the National 
Heritage Resources Act (NHRA).155 Restrictions on demolition and alterations may 
effectively sterilise land for the landowner’s purposes. Furthermore, an owner may be 
able to do very little with her property once formal protection is accorded thereto, 
without the permission of the relevant heritage authority.156 In addition to having the 
property potentially sterilised, the owner may be compelled to maintain the building in 
question at her own expense,157 through the issuing of compulsory repair orders.158 
Applications for permits to demolish – whether in whole or in part – are often 
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unsuccessful.159 As Strydom points out, the legal framework established by the NHRA 
creates “another layer of limitations on ownership”, adding to the limitations already 
imposed by legislation such as the Building Standards Act.160 
The NHRA divides buildings that are to form part of the “national estate” into three 
groups.161 The first relates to buildings of importance to a cultural group or 
community.162 Secondly, there are buildings demonstrating “unique aesthetic, 
architectural, technical or other qualities”.163 Finally, there are buildings possessing 
historical relevance.164 The categories created by the Act permit the preservation of 
buildings for reasons other than historic or aesthetic value.165 In addition, the NHRA 
provides for the grading of buildings: (1) Grade I heritage resources which are of 
“special national significance”;166 (2) Grade II heritage resources which are “significant 
within the context of a province or a region”;167 and (3) Grade III which is a catch-all 
grade for “[o]ther heritage resources worthy of conservation”.168 The South African 
Heritage Resource Agency is responsible for Grade I heritage resources.169 Provincial 
heritage authorities are responsible for Grade II heritage resources.170 Local authorities 
are responsible for Grade III heritage resources.171 A provincial heritage resources 
authority is also empowered to set out more detailed assessment criteria concerning 
Grade II and Grade III heritage resources.172 For example, Heritage Western Cape 
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divides Grade III heritage resource authorities into three further subcategories, these 
being IIIA (high significance), IIIB (medium significance), and IIIC (low significance).173 
Formal protection in terms of the NHRA, which restricts what the owner may do with 
her property without the permission of the relevant heritage resources authority,174 can 
be accorded to buildings.175 Section 27 of the NHRA empowers both national176 and 
provincial177 heritage bodies to identify those sites worthy of conservation and to 
accord protection thereto. Prior to the declaration of a site as protected, the owner and 
other interested parties must be notified.178 The owner must be provided with a 
reasonable opportunity to make representations prior to notification.179 Importantly, the 
moment notice is served on the owner, protection in terms of the NHRA is accorded to 
the site until six months from service of the notice elapses or the notice is withdrawn, 
whichever being shorter.180 That is unless the site is then formally declared as 
protected, rendering such protection permanent.181 A consequence of such protection 
is that significant inroads are made into the landowner’s rights. The landowner may no 
longer “destroy, damage, deface, excavate, alter, remove from its original position, 
subdivide or change the planning status of any heritage site without a permit issued by 
the heritage resources authority responsible for the protection of such site”.182 Similar 
restrictions apply where a site is accorded provisional protection for the purpose of 
protecting a heritage resource that is considered threatened or to allow a heritage 
resource authority to investigate whether to accord formal to the resource in 
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question.183 Violation of such restrictions by the owner may see her served with a 
compulsory restoration order.184 
The NHRA, in section 34(1), further requires a permit to demolish or alter a structure 
that is more than 60 years old.185 Such a permit is issued by the provincial heritage 
resources authority of the province in which the structure is located.186 This is a “catch-
all” provision, providing protection for buildings that have not been expressly identified 
as heritage resources for the purposes of the NHRA.187 Should the relevant heritage 
resources authority refuse to issue a permit, it must then proceed to consider whether 
formal protection should be accorded to the site.188 As Marques puts it, as a result of 
this section, “a man’s house is no longer his castle. Where the ‘castle’ is of cultural 
importance, it becomes an asset to be preserved.”189 
The courts have confirmed that, in granting a demolition permit in terms of section 
34(1), the relevant heritage authority may attach conditions, even if the property is not 
formally protected under the NHRA.190 These conditions are imposed in terms of 
section 48(2). In Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape,191 the 
 
183 Provisional protection lasts for a maximum of two years where granted it is by the South African 
Heritage Resources Agency or a provincial authority (section 29(1) or three months where granted by a 
local authority (section 29(2). Section 29(10) provides that no person “may damage, deface, excavate, 
alter, remove from its original position, subdivide or change the planning status of a provisionally 
protected place or object without a permit issued by a heritage resources authority or local authority 
responsible for the provisional protection”. See Strydom A Hundred Years 187. 
184 Strydom A Hundred Years 187. 
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Resources Authority, Eastern Cape v Gordon 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) in which the court stated that the 
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Resources LLB research paper University of Cape Town (2012) 5. 
188 Section 34(2). 
189 Marques The Right to Neglect Property 5. 
190 Strydom A Hundred Years 196-201. Furthermore, as Strydom points out, courts are very reluctant to 
interfere with the discretion of the relevant heritage resource authority concerning the granting of permits 
and the conditions attached thereto. See Strydom A Hundred Years 205-210. See also the case of 
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number of conditions to the development of the property following the demolition, including that the plans 
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Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) stated that conditions imposed by Heritage Western 
Cape, in terms of a partial demolition permit, were “in line with the principles of heritage 
resources management” found in the NHRA.192 The court confirmed that the imposition 
of conditions in a permit is both within the parameters and the overall scheme of the 
NHRA, even though the site in question has not been accorded formal protection.193 
This approach was confirmed in Gees v Provincial Minister of Cultural Affairs and 
Sport, Western Cape.194 
Beyond the potential sterilisation of the property for the owner’s intended purposes, 
ownership of a heritage building comes with potentially steep costs. Maintenance of 
the site becomes a significant obligation. In particular, the relevant heritage resources 
authority is empowered to issue a compulsory repair order to the owner of a heritage 
site under certain circumstances.195 Such an order can only be issued in respect of 
sites classified as Grade I or Grade II (national and provincial heritage sites 
respectively).196 A compulsory repair order can be issued where the owner is permitting 
the site to fall into a state of disrepair for the purpose of achieving demolition or 
development of the site.197 However, ulterior motives on the owner’s part are not 
necessary for the issuing of a compulsory repair order. If the site is considered as being 
neglected “to such an extent that it will lose its potential for conservation”, a compulsory 
repair order may be issued to the owner.198 The repair order requires the owner to 
repair or maintain the site in question.199 Repairs and maintenance must be done to 
the satisfaction of the relevant heritage resources authority and at the owner’s 
expense.200 Should the owner fail to comply with the order within the time specified, 
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the authority itself may take steps to ensure that the necessary repairs or maintenance 
take place.201 The costs of such repairs are to be recovered from the owner.202  
As Strydom points out, the NHRA does provide some (potential) alleviation of the 
burden placed on landowners.203 The NHRA empowers the South African Heritage 
Resource Agency to provide loans or grants, which contribute to the purpose of the 
Act.204 Such financial assistance can be bestowed on approved bodies or individuals. 
The NHRA also provides for the conclusion of heritage resource agreements between 
the SAHRA or provincial agencies and provincial or local authorities, conservation 
bodies, individuals or communities.205 These agreements are intended to “provide for 
the conservation, improvement or presentation of a clearly defined heritage resource”, 
but require the consent of the owner.206 Such agreements may result in the relevant 
provincial authority or local authority being appointed guardian of the site.207 Heritage 
agreements may provide for both the maintenance and management of the site in 
question, in addition to the payment of expenses incurred by the owner in the 
maintenance of the site.208 Simultaneously, however, it may place further restrictions 
on the owner’s use of the property.209 Assumedly payment of expenses incurred by the 
owner may be balanced against the restrictions placed on the use of the property. 
However, it is not compulsory for a heritage resources authority to enter into such an 
agreement with a landowner.210 As such, there is no automatic mechanism available 
to the landowner through which the burden may be alleviated. 
Where buildings have not been granted the status of being either a national or 
provincial heritage site, but rather a grade III rating, making municipalities the 
authorities responsible thereof, an impasse may prevail.211 The landowner may refuse 
to maintain the property, and the relevant authority may refuse to grant permission to 
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demolish while being unable to compel the upkeep of the building.212 As noted, 
compulsory repair orders may only be issued in respect of Grade I and Grade II 
heritage resources.213 A local example that demonstrates this impasse is the Highclere 
saga.214 
Highclere is a seaside cottage built in the late 19th century located in Bloubergstrand, 
Cape Town.215 It was built out of crushed seashells.216 Its current owner – BPH 
Properties – has permitted the property to fall into a dilapidated state – its roof having 
collapsed and its walls allowed to crumble – by refusing to spend any money on its 
maintenance or restoration.217 However, due to the property not being a grade I or II 
heritage site, it is not possible to compel the owner to restore the property through a 
compulsory repair order.218 Despite not being accorded the status of a provincial 
heritage site, BPH’s repeated attempts to be granted a permit for demolition have 
proved fruitless.219 The desire of the local community to see the seaside cottage 
preserved has proved to be a particularly difficult obstacle to BPH’s attempts to 
demolish the site.220 When BPH was initially granted a demolition permit by Heritage 
Western Cape, it was an appeal by interested neighbours that resulted in the reversal 
of the decision.221 The situation thus appears to be at an impasse. As Marques puts it, 
the building is effectively being slowly demolished through neglect.222 
The property was graded IIIA by the City of Cape Town, while Heritage Western Cape 
regarded the property as being worthy of the grade of IIIC.223 Since the City is the 
competent authority to award such a grading, it must be taken that the grading is IIIA.224 
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Since Heritage Western Cape has not declared the property a provincial heritage site, 
it appears evident that the body does not regard Highclere as being deserving of such 
a classification.225  
The Highclere saga has been subject to recent litigation.226 The facts directly relevant 
to the case are that in 2011, BPH Properties applied for a demolition permit, which was 
required to demolish a structure that is more than 60 years old.227 The Built 
Environment and Landscapes Committee of Heritage Western Cape awarded BPH 
Properties with the requisite permit. However, this decision was challenged by 
interested neighbours of BPH Properties, who took the matter to the appeals 
committee of Heritage Western Cape. The appeals committee upheld the appeal, 
reversing the decision to award the demolition permit to BPH. On a subsequent appeal 
by BPH Properties, an independent appeals tribunal (IAT) confirmed the decision of 
the appeals committee, ultimately leaving BPH Properties without the desired 
demolition permit. The IAT had found that Highclere should be preserved as a heritage 
resource.228 Furthermore, it recommended that Heritage Western Cape look into 
according formal protection of the property, as well as issue BPH Properties a 
compulsory repair order to restore the property.229 
That the decision of the IAT constituted administrative action was not in dispute.230 
However, BPH Properties failed to initiate proceedings for judicial review within 180 
days as required by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.231 Nevertheless, the 
court a quo considered the explanation for the delay to be reasonable.232 BPH 
Properties was ultimately successful in setting aside of a decision by the IAT.233 This 
decision was subsequently appealed. 
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The appellant was the Habitat Council, a voluntary association whose aim is to 
conserve the built environment.234 The appeal was primarily concerned BPH 
Properties’ failure to institute review proceedings within the prescribed timeframe.235 
On appeal, the court did not accept BPH Properties’ reasons for failing to institute 
review proceedings in the prescribed timeframe, and in any case, its prospects of 
success in setting aside the decision were regarded as poor.236 Since the property was 
not a national nor a provincial heritage site, effect could not be given to the IAT’s advice 
that a compulsory repair order be issued to BPH Properties.237 Nevertheless, this did 
not (in the court’s view) provide BPH strong prospects of succeeding on the basis that 
such advice “tainted” the decision of the IAT in its entirety.238 
BPH have made threats to abandon the property, although they did not indicate what 
they meant by abandonment.239 Do they mean informally abandon (i.e. allow to fall into 
further neglect) or seek to divest unilaterally ownership of the property (which is not 
possible in South African law240). The possibility of donating the property to the City 
was also raised by BPH’s attorney, but BPH did not revert to the City about this 
possibility.241 The failure to proceed in making a formal offer for a donation of the 
property to the City would seem to indicate a reluctance to let go of the property by 
BPH Properties, or at least just while the possibility of succeeding with litigation 
existed.242 However, the case does raise the question as to whether, in the event such 
an offer be made and the rejected by the City, should abandonment be an option for 
BPH Properties. 
This appears an unhappy situation for all parties. On the one hand, the owner is 
saddled with a property with which it cannot do anything, and is content to permit to 
fall into a further state of disrepair.243 On the other hand, those who would see the 
property maintained for its heritage value can do little to compel the owner to restore 
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the property to an acceptable state, where the site is not considered important enough 
for a Grade I or II rating.244  
The problem of developers allowing heritage buildings to fall into states of disrepair – 
with a view to being eventually granted a demolition order – is undoubtedly a serious 
one.245 It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to suggest how such properties 
can be better protected from landowners who seek to demolish important heritage 
buildings by stealth. The focus is rather whether a landowner, finding herself unable to 
make use of a building accorded heritage protection, should be entitled to abandon, 
particularly in circumstances in which maintenance of such a property is an excessive 
burden. 
It is necessary that developers who deliberately neglect property be held to account. 
As Strydom points out, the Constitutional Court has yet to decide a dispute concerning 
the constitutionality of the NHRA as far as its restrictions on demolition and alterations 
are concerned.246 Inevitably, it is part and parcel of ownership of a historic building that 
an owner may not necessarily be entitled to the “most beneficial use of their property 
available for exploitation”.247 However, legislation does not provide sufficient 
safeguards for owners who may find themselves saddled with a property (1) they 
cannot use for any gainful economic purpose and (2) is expensive to maintain. Such 
property may ultimately hold a negative value for the landowner. 
The heritage building context thus provides another example of a situation in which 
some form of regulated exit should exist for landowners, whether this be abandonment 
or otherwise. It gives rise to circumstances in which landowners may be subject to 
unjustifiable burdens, even in light of the social-obligation norm. 
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It is necessary to evaluate the heritage building context in light of the guidelines from 
section 2.2. In some contexts, it is conceivable that the burden could be excessive, 
particularly where the landowner is not a developer who purchased the property 
knowing the risks associated with acquiring ownership of a building that could qualify 
for protection. Where the property is a national or provincial heritage site, the burden 
is exacerbated by the possibility of being issued with a compulsory repair order to 
repair or maintain the property to the satisfaction of the relevant heritage resources 
authority.248 The property in such circumstances could easily attain a negative value, 
with no third party willing to take transfer thereof.  
A third party, in the form of a heritage resources authority or municipality, would appear 
to be deriving a benefit from the burden to which the landowner is subjected. As the 
landowner must bear the costs associated with maintenance, to preserve properties 
that fall into the national estate, heritage authorities are not required to do so. This links 
with the inadequacy of existing compensatory mechanisms in the heritage building 
context. Of particular concern is that it is not mandatory for a heritage resources 
authority to enter into a heritage agreement with a landowner to cover the costs 
associated with maintenance of the property.249 
Finally, the societal cost of abandonment of heritage buildings needs to be considered. 
Inevitably, allowing a landowner to pass responsibility for her property onto the State 
will require that resources from elsewhere are directed towards its maintenance, since 
heritage authorities are predominantly funded from the public purse.250 However, 
depending on the circumstances, the rights and interests of the landowner may prevail. 
One needs to take into consideration whether the landowner acquired the property 
aware of the risk that the building had heritage value and may be subject to protection 
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in terms of the NHRA. The balance of the above factors would weigh against a 
developer who gambled on the possibility of eventually being able to demolish or 
substantially alter such a building. An individual landowner, however, who did not 
acquire the property cognisant of such a risk should probably be entitled to abandon. 
3.3 The context of problem buildings and unlawful occupation 
The context of problem buildings and unlawful occupation of land is an important one 
to consider in justifying a statute facilitating abandonment. The two issues often go 
hand in hand, as problem buildings are often unlawfully occupied.251 Accordingly, these 
issues are discussed in the same section.  
The issue of problem buildings is particularly prevalent in large cities such as 
Johannesburg,252 while unlawful occupation is a problem throughout South Africa.253  
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Some properties may, due to their locale, acquire a negative value, which a landowner 
cannot hope to alleviate through her individual efforts.254  
Likewise, outside the inner-city context, the extent of the unlawful occupation may 
render eviction no longer a viable option.255 There have been cases in which the 
numbers of unlawful occupants have numbered in the tens of thousands, resulting in 
circumstances in which the cost of carrying out the eviction order exceeded the value 
of the land.256 As such, circumstances may arise where a landowner may wish to divest 
herself of such ownership, and the liabilities attached thereto, even if she would not 
receive any form of compensation for her property. 
This section does not engage with the debate as to whether landowners, particularly 
those in the inner-city, are being arbitrarily deprived of property when denied eviction 
orders (and the giving effect thereto) for an indefinite time.257 Rather, the concern is to 
evaluate the existing law and factual situation and consider whether as a remedy of 
last resort, landowners should be entitled to abandon their property. 
Problem buildings are regulated by municipal by-laws.258 By-laws of various 
municipalities are consistent in their definitions of problem properties. These are 
properties that (among other things) appear to be (1) abandoned by the owner thereof, 
(2) fail to comply with legislation as well as health and safety by-laws, (3) are 
overcrowded, (4) appear to be a haven for criminal activities, (5) are illegally occupied, 
 
254 A Cox “Losing the Battle Against Urban Decay” Star (2012-05-04) 8; TimesLive “Hijacked Buildings 
– What They Are, and What City of Johannesburg is Doing About Them” (05-07-2017) TimesLive 
<https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-07-05-hijacked-buildings-what-they-are-and-
what-city-of-johannesburg-is-doing-about-them/> (accessed 16-01-2019); Strydom & Viljoen (2014) 
PER 1222. See in general Murray Taming the Disorderly City. 
255 See discussion of Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers 2018 (2) SA 228 (WCC) below. 
256 See, for example, President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) 
SA 3 (CC) para 9. Although the potential cost of eviction is not mentioned in Fischer v Unlawful 
Occupiers 2018 (2) SA 228 (WCC), it is safe to assume that the cost of eviction in those circumstances, 
given the extent of unlawful occupation, would be similarly astronomical. 
257 See for example Strydom & Viljoen (2014) PER 1207; M Kruger “Arbitrary Deprivation of Property: 
An Argument for the Payment of Compensation by the State in Certain Cases of Unlawful Occupation” 
(2014) 131 SALJ 328. 
258 Part B of Schedule 4 of the Constitution makes building regulations a local government matter, to the 




(6) are sites of dumped or accumulated waste without valid approval, and (7) constitute 
a threat to both the safety of occupiers or the public in general.259 
These municipal by-laws seek to hold owners of problem buildings responsible, or in 
the event that the owner cannot be found, anyone who appears to be responsible for 
such a building. The City of Johannesburg By-Law on Problem Properties defines 
“responsible person” to include both the registered owner of a building,260 as well as 
the person or body “seemingly in charge of the property”.261 Such a person can include 
one who has taken over a building without the landowner’s consent.262 Any person 
falling within the definition of “responsible person” may be issued with a compliance 
notice.263 Such a person may be subject to penalties or criminal prosecution for failure 
to comply with a compliance notice,264 and may also be subject to civil action for failing 
to comply with the provisions of the by-law.265 Critically, the wording of the by-law does 
not preclude the City from taking action against the registered owner, even where 
another party may fall within the definition of “responsible person”.266 This is not 
precluded even where the “responsible person” became such by taking over the 
property against the wishes of the owner.267  
The City of Cape Town Problem Building By-Law similarly brings the person in charge 
of a problem building within the definition of owner.268 Unlike the Johannesburg By-
Law, it does not expressly note that such a person includes one who took over the 
building against the will of the owner. Nevertheless, the wording “person in charge of 
 
259 See section 7(1) of the City of Johannesburg By-Law on Problem Properties, 2014; section 1 of the 
City of Cape Town Problem Building By-Law, 2010; section 1 of the eThekwini Problem Building By-
Law, 2015. 
260 Section 2(8)(a). This definition includes the directors of a company which is the registered owner of 
the problem property. 
261 Section 2(8)(b). Reasons for pursuing the person or body seemingly in charge of the property include 
that it is (a) abandoned by its registered owner, (b) the owner is either absent from the Republic of South 
Africa or her whereabouts are presently unknown, (c) the property in question has been taken over by 
the person seemingly in charge “with or without the consent of the registered owner”, (d) the responsible 
person is receiving rent for the occupation of the building, and (e) the person has been appointed 
responsible for the property by the owner thereof. 
262 Section 2(8)(b). 
263 Section 8. 
264 Section 11. 
265 Section 12. 
266 See Cramer (2017) SALJ 871n5. 
267 See section 2(8)(b)(iii) of the City of Johannesburg By-Law on Problem Properties, 2014. 




such a building” is capable of including such a person.269 Due to falling within the 
definition of owner in the by-law, the person in charge of the building may also be 
served with a compliance notice,270 and face penalties and prosecution.271 As in the 
case of the Johannesburg By-Law, the wording of Cape Town By-Law does not 
preclude the City opting to pursue the registered owner, even if there is another person 
in charge of the building. The definition is intended to expand the pool of potential 
parties who may be held responsible for a problem building. 
The eThekwini Problem Buildings By-Law, by contrast, only holds those in control of 
the building responsible, in lieu of the owner, where the owner is either (1) not present 
in South Africa or (2) the municipality has been unable to locate the owner.272 In all 
other circumstances, the landowner would be the person responsible for the 
maintenance of the building. As such, even when others are occupying the building 
(even against the owner’s will), the owner will be the one required to act in terms of 
notices to rehabilitate the building.273  
The obligations and penalties stemming from problem-building by-laws thus put 
registered owners in an unenvious position. These by-laws, on their wording, do not 
temper their provisions to provide for circumstances in which rehabilitation of a building 
is difficult (or even impossible) due to locale or unlawful occupation. Where other 
parties may be held liable, the intention does not absolve the registered owner of 
responsibility, but to expand the pool of parties who may be held responsible.274 The 
burden of a problem building, which cannot be rehabilitated without great cost 
(including protracted legal proceedings to secure an eviction order), would be 
unjustified where the landowner bears no responsibility for the prevailing 
circumstances. This is especially applicable to circumstances in which the building is 
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located in a context characterised by widespread urban decay such as the 
Johannesburg inner city.275 
Closely related to the problem-building issue is unlawful occupation of land in 
general.276 The courts have made it clear that in some circumstances landowners must 
tolerate unlawful occupation for a limited time until it is just and equitable to evict.277 
However, it cannot be the obligation of private landowners to provide free housing to 
unlawful occupiers for an indefinite time.278 Nevertheless, circumstances do arise in 
which eviction is simply not feasible, due to the extent of the unlawful occupation.279 
These circumstances mean that a landowner will in effect have to accept the loss of 
her land as a fait accompli, despite remaining the registered owner of such land. 
The situation described above was what developed in the Fischer saga.280 It 
culminated in the most recent judgment in the case of Fischer v Unlawful Occupiers281 
- in which three applications by different applicants were considered together.282 The 
area occupied by the first respondents is known as Marikana in Phillipi East, Cape 
Town.283 The applicant in the first application, the 86-year old Mrs Fischer, became 
aware of the occupation of her property in May 2013.284 What followed involved the 
removal of structures by the City of Cape Town Anti-Land Invasion Unit, the erection 
of further structures by unlawful occupiers, as well as litigation related thereto.285 The 
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other two applications – by landowners in the same area – have similar factual 
backgrounds, in which attempts to prevent and reverse the unlawful occupation of the 
properties in question failed.286 Ultimately, the informal settlement in question 
burgeoned to 60 000 people, and the eviction of whom was simply not feasible.287 
In the applications, eviction of the unlawful occupiers was only sought in the 
alternative.288 The main relief sought in the three applications was a declaration that 
the City of Cape Town and other State respondents had violated the applicants’ section 
25 right by failing to protect their properties from unlawful occupation.289 As a 
consequence of this finding, the court was asked to order that the City and other State 
respondents purchase the properties from the applicants.290 The court ultimately 
awarded the applicants the relief they sought, with the City of Cape Town ordered to 
enter into good-faith negotiations with the applicants regarding the purchase of their 
properties.291 
The City of Cape Town indicated its intention to appeal the matter to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal.292 The question, which is briefly evaluated here, is whether courts 
may order organs of state to expropriate or purchase property in circumstances in 
which eviction is not feasible.293 This question has come before the courts in the past, 
where due to the number of people to be evicted and the lack of suitable alternative 
accommodation, it was simply not just and equitable to order an eviction.294 In the 
Modderklip case, an eviction order had been granted by the High Court, but the number 
of unlawful occupiers present made the eviction not feasible, due to the cost of carrying 
out the eviction order.295  
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The Modderklip case, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), was the first 
instance in which a court raised the possibility of ordering the State to expropriate 
property subject to massive unlawful occupation.296 The SCA found that the violation 
by the State of the rights of the occupiers (section 26(1) resulted in the violation of the 
rights of the landowner (section 25(1).297 The court noted that the best solution to the 
impasse would have been for the State to expropriate the property in question, and 
thus assume the burden of owning the property.298 However, the court did not explore 
this possibility further, doubting the appropriateness of a court ordering an organ of 
State to expropriate land.299 Instead of making such a far-reaching order, the SCA 
ordered the payment of damages300 to Modderklip, compensating the landowner for 
what was lost, and for the advantage gained by the State in not having to accommodate 
the occupiers itself.301 Damages were to be calculated in terms of section 12(1) of the 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.302 
While the relief granted by the SCA was upheld on appeal by the Constitutional Court 
(CC), the CC opted to hinge its decision on section 34 of the Constitution.303 Section 
34 guarantees the right of access to the courts, stating that everyone “has the right to 
have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public 
hearing before a court”. In line with this right, the State was under an obligation “to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that Modderklip was…provided with effective relief”.304 In 
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the circumstances, the State could have taken steps to expropriate the land in question 
or have provided alternative land to the unlawful occupiers.305 The State’s failure to 
take any reasonable measures to provide Modderklip with effective relief amounted to 
a violation of Modderklip’s right under section 34.306 The court agreed with the SCA on 
the relief to be granted, that being damages calculated in terms of section 12(1) of the 
Expropriation Act. 
The CC touched on the possibility of ordering the State to expropriate the property, 
although it found it unnecessary to decide the point. Attention was drawn to the 
argument that such an order may amount to a violation of the separation of powers.307 
However, on the current facts, it was unknown whether the State perhaps did have 
alternative land available – which would render the expropriation of Modderklip’s land 
unnecessary.308 In any case, the award of compensation formulated by the SCA was 
seen to be the most appropriate remedy on the facts. 
The Modderklip remedy will not be satisfactory to every landowner, with expropriation 
subject to just and equitable compensation appearing the most ideal remedy.309 This 
would see the State stepping into the landowner’s shoes to fulfil directly its obligations 
to the occupiers.310 
However, as Dugard311 has pointed out, the SCA has aligned itself against court-
ordered expropriation in Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Dada NO.312 This was 
an appeal against an order by the High Court in Johannesburg in which the municipality 
in question had been ordered to purchase land on which an informal settlement was 
located.313 Besides the issue of the proprietary of a court making such an order, the 
court a quo was not in fact requested by the parties to make such an order.314 Rather, 
it appeared the court a quo had made the order seemingly out of the belief it was 
 
305 Para 51. 
306 Para 51. 
307 Para 63. 
308 Para 64. 
309 Dugard (2018) PER 8. 
310 Dugard (2018) PER 8. 
311 Dugard (2018) PER 9. 
312 2009 (4) SA 463 (SCA). 
313 Ekurhuleni Metropolian Municipality v Dada NO 2009 (4) SA 463 (SCA) para 1. See Dada v Unlawful 
Occupiers of Portion 41 of the Farm Rooikop and Another 2009 (2) SA 492 (W). 




appropriate to hasten the realisation of the right of access to housing.315 This order 
conflicts with the requirement of due judicial deference that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and Constitutional Court have emphasised in previous decisions.316 While the 
court a quo was empowered to grant “appropriate relief” in terms of section 38 of the 
Constitution, ordering the municipality to purchase the property clearly falls outside 
these bounds, and ultimately the courts’ powers.317 The appeal was, therefore, upheld 
and the relevant part of the order of the court a quo set aside.318 
In Dolpire v South African National Road Agency Ltd,319 the applicant (a private 
landowner) sought to compel the Minister of Transport to expropriate a portion of his 
land in terms of the provisions of the National Roads Act.320 The portion of the land in 
question was subject to an encroachment resulting from the N2 national road.321 
Among the reasons for rejecting the relief sought by the applicant, the court argued 
that such an order would have the effect of usurping “the discretionary powers of the 
Minister and in the most intrusive manner encroach into the terrain of the executive 
sphere of government”.322 A court should leave decisions concerning expropriation to 
the executive, thus observing the doctrine of the separation of powers.323 
In Van der Walt’s view, the decisions reached in Ekurhuleni and Dolpire are correct.324 
He points out that the discretion to expropriate is granted to specific administrators in 
terms of legislation, and that it is not the courts’ place to “direct the expropriator in its 
exercise of the discretion” to expropriate or not.325 While the validity of an 
administrative decision to expropriate may be open to attack, it is not open to a 
landowner to compel an administrator to expropriate.326  
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The Court in Fischer was cognisant of the separation-of-powers issues.327 However, it 
distinguished the Fischer case from that of Ekurhuleni, the latter being concerned with 
a small group of people whose relocation should pose no significant challenges.328 In 
the former matter, alternative accommodation for such a large number of occupiers 
was clearly not possible.329 As such, the occupiers had to remain where they were, but 
this had to be achieved in a manner that did not violate the right of the landowners 
under section 25(1).330  
The Court in Fischer further distinguished the matter from that of Modderklip, in which 
the CC had decided it was not necessary to decide the question as to whether it was 
possible to order the State to expropriate.331 In Modderklip, information concerning the 
availability of alternative land was not put before the court.332 If such land were 
available, it would not be appropriate for the court to order the State to expropriate 
Modderklip’s land.333 In Fischer, the only land on which it was feasible to accommodate 
the occupiers was that of the applicants.334 In line with existing emergency housing 
policy,335 privately owned land may be acquired for emergency housing situations.336 
In a situation where the City is failing to uphold the constitutional rights of both 
occupiers and landowners, an order to purchase the land in question could fall within 
the scope of appropriate relief, in the court’s view.337 
While noting the drastic nature of such an order, Dugard argues that the prevailing 
circumstances in South Africa may require such an approach to address the “systemic 
failure of the state…to fulfil its section 26 housing rights-related obligations”.338 Careful 
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manoeuvring around the doctrine of the separation of powers may be necessary to 
ensure the rights of all parties are vindicated – including the right of the landowner to 
an effective remedy in terms of section 28 of the Constitution.339 Expropriation of such 
property could provide all parties concerned with much needed legal certainty.340 
Evidently, as Dugard argues, the remedy formulated by the court in Fischer is a 
transformative one, which addresses the prevailing housing crisis in South Africa.341 
Importantly for this thesis, it also vindicates the rights of the landowner, divesting her 
of land that has accrued a negative value or cannot be used by the landowner. 
However, it remains to be seen whether the relief granted in Fischer will be upheld on 
appeal. As noted, the SCA has set itself against court-ordered expropriation.342 
However, Ekurhuleni is distinguishable on its facts from Fischer.343 Given the prevailing 
uncertainty, landowners in such circumstances are not guaranteed the granting of this 
remedy for the time being.  
The problem-building context, as well as large-scale unlawful occupation of land in 
general, thus provide potential justification for permitting landowners to abandon where 
the land accrues a negative value. The burden is evidently excessive, with the 
landowner losing the use and enjoyment of her land, while effectively undertaking the 
State’s duty to provide housing to the occupiers.344 The burden in the problem-building 
context is augmented by the potential liability that may accrue in terms of municipal by-
laws, even when a third party exercises control over the property. A third party, the 
State, is benefitting from the burden to which the landowner is subjected, as the private 
landowner is carrying the cost of the State’s duty to realise the occupiers’ housing 
rights.345 Existing compensatory mechanisms are not adequate unless the remedy 
formulated in Fischer is upheld on appeal. Even so, this remedy only finds application 
in very particular factual circumstances.346 Finally, the individual landowner’s interests 
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in this case would appear to outweigh the societal cost of abandonment or a regulated 
exit from landownership. This would amount to a turning over of land to the State, 
which may be used for the purpose of fulfilling the State’s obligation to realise the 
housing rights enshrined in the Constitution.347 
3.4 Further contexts: The question of climate change 
The issue of negative value property, and who is responsible for such negative value 
and the accompanying liabilities is an incredibly complex issue. The contexts analysed 
above, while themselves often complex as far as according responsibility to the 
appropriate party, may be relatively simple compared to other situations. It is beyond 
the limitations of scope of this thesis to engage with all the possibilities which may lead 
to land accruing a negative value. However, some general comment in this respect of 
one particularly complex issue is necessary. 
With unabated climate change,348 for example, properties may begin to accrue 
negative values for reasons far beyond the control of landowner, or even the individual 
State.349 For instance, a combination of wildfires and droughts have made parts of 
southern California highly susceptible to mudslides in the event of heavy rains.350 
Following massive costs to insurers as a result of property damage,351 it is not unlikely 
that it may be impossible to acquire or retain home insurance for high-risk properties 
in future.352 It is foreseeable that particularly high-risk properties may accrue a negative 
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value, as a result of being rendered uninsurable for an increasing risk of damage and 
destruction that is difficult (or impossible) to prevent. 
South Africa faces similar challenges in respect of climate change,353 particularly with 
respect of water.354 The City of Cape Town already came close to reaching “day zero” 
in 2018, meaning that the critical shortage of water would have required the shutting 
off of the municipal water supply.355 This would have necessitated residents of the City 
to queue for their water allocations.356 Such a fate has already effectively befallen parts 
of the Eastern Cape province,357 such as Grahamstown.358 
The impact of climate change (such as more frequent, prolonged droughts) will 
inevitably have serious consequences for the value of immovable property in the 
hardest hit regions. Whether landowners should be permitted to abandon (or exit from) 
ownership in these circumstances will be a delicate balancing act of competing 
interests. Climate change is beyond the power of the South African State to remediate 
alone (although its contribution to combatting climate change is indeed lacking359). 
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However, especially in the context of scarce water resources, mismanagement by the 
relevant authorities is a crucial factor in exacerbating climate disaster.360 Further 
research in respect of such scenarios is essential.  
4. Conclusion 
An evaluation of the contexts above makes it clear that there are circumstances in 
which some form of abandonment or regulated exit would be justified in South African 
law. The burdens placed on owners in these circumstances may be excessive while 
existing compensatory mechanisms often fall short. In the mining context, the State 
grants rights to third parties over privately-owned land. However, it is also strong in the 
context of heritage buildings, as well as the context of problem buildings and unlawful 
occupation, where the landowner often is not responsible for the property accruing a 
negative value. Following these conclusions, it is necessary to consider the vehicle 
through which reform is to be achieved. 
The best tool would be a piece of legislation, enacted to give effect to a right to abandon 
landownership in limited circumstances. This will provide a specific mechanism to give 
effect to the principle of publicity, while balancing the interests of the individual 
landowner with the broader community. Suggestions for what kind of provisions such 
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Chapter 7: Reforming the Law of 
Abandonment 
 
1. Towards a Statute on Abandonment  
Following an evaluation of the above contexts, there are evidently circumstances in 
which the continued burden of landownership can be considered excessive. 
Landowners in such circumstances should be entitled to abandon ownership, or be 
provided with some form of regulated exit, regardless of how one interprets the 
mechanism through which ownership is divested.1 However, in the absence of a legal 
mechanism that gives effect to the principle of publicity,2 legislation will be required. 
The question that follows is what shape such legislative reform should take. 
As an unrestricted right to abandon is not viable in the South African context,3 the 
Swiss example would not be an option for reform. As discussed in Chapter Five, in 
Swiss law, all that is required for land to be abandoned (Dereliktion) is that the owner 
submits a waiver at the relevant land registry.4 Upon submission of the waiver, the 
registrar removes the abandoning owner’s name from the owner’s column of the page 
of the Grundbuch assigned to the piece of land in question.5 The land is then rendered 
ownerless and open to appropriation.6 
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6 Art. 658 Abs. 1 ZGB; Rey & Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1134; Rey Sachenrecht para 1678; 




The socio-economic context in South Africa, one in which Government is already 
subject to severe budgetary constraints in meeting its obligations to the populace,7 
renders a permissive approach unviable.8 Any legislative reform should give effect to 
the guidelines identified in light of the social-obligation norm.9 As previously noted, the 
social-obligation norm is given effect to by the property clause of the Constitution, that 
being section 25.10 It is thus contended that these identified guidelines are compatible 
with the property clause and its objectives.11 How these guidelines may be effected in 
legislation will now be considered. 
Given the nature of the factors to be considered, the legislation should provide for a 
landowner to approach a court for relief in seeking to abandon her property. Unlike in 
the Swiss context, in which the owner’s decision to abandon her property cannot be 
challenged,12 abandonment in the South African context will be more complicated than 
a landowner merely deciding to abandon. However, as the following Chapter shows, a 
court will only become involved following a landowner’s attempt to ameliorate her own 
circumstances and reach a satisfactory agreement regarding the property with the 
State. The courts thus, in the abandonment context, only operate as impartial 
adjudicators where the relevant parties have failed to reach an agreement. 
This chapter explores what form an abandonment statute should take. While it makes 
a case for permitting an aggrieved landowner to make an abandonment application to 
a competent court, it also suggests prerequisites with which the landowner must first 
comply. Whether the statute should permit subdivision of the land in question, where 
the landowner wishes to retain part thereof, is also considered. This is followed by a 
consideration of the potential consequences of a successful abandonment application. 
 
7 See Chapter 4 Section 4.1 (particularly the sources in note 116) and Chapter 6 Section 2.1.  
8 For an example of a permissive approach, see the discussion of Switzerland in Chapter 5 Section 3. 
9 See Chapter 4 Section 6. 
10 G Alexander “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745 782ff; G Alexander The Global Debate Over Constitutional Property (2006) 149ff. See further R 
Cramer “The Abandonment of Landownership in South African and Swiss Law (2017) 134 SALJ 870 
899ff. Note on the aforementioned publication by the author: My Memorandum of Understanding with 
my supervisor, as well as obligations attaching to funding I received through the Swiss-South African 
Joint Research Programme to facilitate my comparative study, required me to publish from my doctoral 
research. The article referenced here is the result of the obligation to publish from my doctoral research. 
11 See Chapter 4 Sections 5 and 6. 
12 Rey and Strebel “Art. 666” in Basler Kommentar 1135; Hitz “Art. 666” in Handkommentar 167; BGE 




Two final issues are canvassed. Firstly, this chapter briefly outlines how – based on 
existing law – responsibilities will be passed on a successful abandonment application. 
Finally, given current events,13 this chapter discusses whether an abandonment statute 
would still be relevant should a moderate form of expropriation without compensation 
become a reality. 
1.1 Abandonment prerequisites 
A statute empowering a landowner to divest herself of ownership unilaterally would 
likely only be used in circumstances where the affected property has accrued a 
negative value.14 Because of such a negative value, the landowner may be unable to 
find another private party willing to take transfer of the land. The landowner may have 
limited options in the circumstances. Nevertheless, any abandonment statute should 
have prerequisites that must be met before the landowner approaches the court for 
relief. 
Before the landowner may resort to abandonment, she should exhaust the options of 
either transferring the property to local government or another government department. 
She should also have exhausted all compensatory avenues available to her,15 to try 
ameliorate the otherwise negative value of the property for herself. Effectively, before 
involving the court in the matter, a landowner should have attempted to ameliorate her 
situation through the avenues available to her. 
The intervention of the courts in these circumstances is analogous to their role in the 
expropriation context. In the expropriation context, courts decide or approve the 
 
13 See discussion of recent moves towards expropriation without compensation below in section 3. See 
also T Mahlakoana “ANC Goes Radical on Land Question” Business Day (21-12-2017) 1; S Njobeni & 
K Koko “Heated Land Reform Debate Degenerates into Fist Fight” Cape Argus (22-12-2017) 4; B 
Phakathi “ANC, EFF Join Hands on Land Expropriation” Business Day (28-02-2018) 1; C Ramaphosa 
“This is No Land Grab” (24-08-2018) Business Day <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-
08-24-exclusive-this-is-no-land-grab-writes-cyril-ramaphosa/> (accessed on 19-10-2018); M Merten 
“ANC’s Executive Proposal on Expropriation Without Compensation Obscures Already Vast Ministerial 
Powers” (28-01-2020) Daily Maverick <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-01-28-ancs-
executive-proposal-on-expropriation-without-compensation-obscures-already-vast-ministerial-
powers/> (accessed 30-01-2020); S Grootes “Land Issue: Once More at Front and Centre of the ANC’s 
Internal Politics” (27-01-2020) Daily Maverick <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-01-27-
land-issue-once-more-at-front-and-centre-of-the-ancs-internal-politics/> (accessed 30-01-2020). See 
the Draft Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill, 2019 (in Government Gazette 42902 of 13-12-2019). 
14 See the discussion of the mining, heritage building, and problem building contexts in Chapter 6 
Section 3. 




amount of compensation to the expropriated owner where the affected parties have 
failed to reach an agreement.16 As in the proposed abandonment statute, there would 
be a number of important factors to be considered by the court in deciding on the 
amount of compensation payable.17 Courts should not be burdened with unnecessary 
litigation, but given the importance of the factors to be considered in an abandonment 
statute, failure to arrive at an agreement would necessitate involving the courts, as in 
the expropriation context. 
A landowner should be required by legislation to try to come to an agreement with the 
relevant municipality regarding the property she seeks to abandon. A good example of 
this is the “abandonment agreements” entered into by the City of Johannesburg with 
property owners.18 As previously noted,19 the use of the term “abandonment” to 
describe such an agreement is incorrect, given that these agreements are in fact 
bilateral acts, involving two cooperating parties, as well as a quid pro quo.20 
In coming to an agreement concerning the transfer of the property to the municipality, 
the landowner and the municipality should attempt to reach an agreement on arrears 
of municipal rates, if applicable, and the costs of the transfer. Once such an agreement 
is concluded with the municipality, the landowner is divested of ownership, such 
ownership being transferred to the municipality. 
Where the relevant municipality does not wish to enter into an agreement to acquire 
the property in question, the landowner should attempt to reach an agreement with the 
most appropriate government department. The relevant department is determined on 
the basis of which Minister would exercise the discretion to expropriate in a particular 
 
16 Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and section 14 of the 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. See AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 509-510; G 
Muller, R Brits, JM Pienaar & Z Boggenpoel Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 6 ed 
(2019) 656ff. 
17 Section 25(3). See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 509ff. 
18 H Mashaba “City of Joburg to Expropriate Derelict Buildings” (27-02-2018) The Johannesburg Inner 
City Partnership <http://www.jicp.org.za/news/city-of-joburg-to-expropriate-derelict-buildings/> 
(accessed 20-02-2018); H Mashaba “City of Johannesburg to Expropriate Derelict Buildings” Joburg 
<https://www.joburg.org.za/media_/MediaStatements/Pages/2018%20Press%20Releases/City-of-
Joburg-to-expropriate-derelict-buildings.aspx> (accessed 20-11-2018); JC Sonnekus “Abandonnering 
van Eiendomsreg op Grond end Aanspreeklikheid vir Grondbelasting” (2004) TSAR 747 748–749, 753–
755. See Chapter 3 Section 2.3.1. 
19 See Chapter 3 Section 2.3.1. 
20 Papas NO v Motsere Trading CC (46011/2012) [2014] ZAGPJHC 144 (6 June 2014) para 7; Sonnekus 




context, should grounds that trigger such discretion arise. For example, the 
Department of Arts and Culture has authority in the heritage building context and the 
Department of Mineral Resources in the mining context.21 Again, the agreement should 
cover issues such as the landowner’s outstanding debts stemming from ownership of 
the land (such as municipal rates) as well as the costs of transfer. This transfer is not 
an expropriation, and hence compensation beyond transfer costs and outstanding 
debts will not be in question. 
As previously stated, landowners should also make use of any existing compensatory 
mechanisms, to ameliorate the negative value of the property for themselves. For 
example, the landowner could reach a mutually satisfactory heritage agreement with a 
relevant heritage authority. Such an agreement has the potential to cover the costs of 
maintaining the property,22 and pass guardianship of the property to the relevant 
heritage resources authority.23 However, the negotiation of and assent to a heritage 
agreement by the relevant heritage resources authority is not compulsory.24 
While compensatory mechanisms, such as those found in the National Heritage 
Resources Act25 (NHRA) and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act26 (MPRDA), already have their own procedures,27 this is not the case for where a 
landowner wishes to transfer her property to the State. It is a daunting prospect for an 
individual landowner to attempt to approach the relevant public authorities with a view 
to negotiating such an agreement. It is necessary for an abandonment statute to 
provide for a streamlined process on which the landowner could rely. What such a 
process would resemble, and who would administer it, is difficult to determine, 
however. There are numerous public authorities with which it will be necessary for the 
owner to engage, depending on the context. Perhaps the ideal way to streamline the 
process is for an abandonment statute to prescribe that the relevant public authorities 
must provide procedures for the receipt of requests from landowners who wish to 
 
21 See the definitions of “Minister” in section 1 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) and section 2 of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (NHRA). 
22 Section 42(9)(a), (h). 
23 Section 42(8). 
24 Section 42(6). 
25 Act 25 of 1999. 
26 Act 28 of 2002. 




negotiate the transfer of their land to the State. The statute should provide that such 
requests should be evaluated considering the factors set out in Chapter 428 (and 
repeated below29), as well as provide timeframes within which a response is to be 
issued to the landowner. Such provisions will clearly situate the completion of the 
prerequisites within administrative law, and thus require that public authorities engage 
with landowners in a procedurally fair manner.30 
A process such as that envisaged above will also formalise the otherwise ad hoc 
entering into of “abandonment” agreements, as practiced by City of Johannesburg.31 
The entering into of such agreements absent a formal process, in the context of 
administrative law, may raise the legitimate expectation doctrine.32 This doctrine, with 
its origins in English law, can arise in two circumstances, these being (1) “an express 
promise on behalf of a public authority” or (2) “the existence of a regular practice which 
the claimant can reasonably expect to continue”.33 This doctrine applies even where 
the person seeking to attain a benefit has no legal right thereto, but despite this, she 
may have a legitimate expectation of being bestowed such a benefit by a public 
authority.34 It was the decision in Administrator, Transvaal v Traub35 which saw the 
complete recognition of the doctrine in South African law.36 The doctrine, while not 
 
28 Chapter 4 Section 6. 
29 Section 1.3. 
30 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) provides that “[a]dministrative action 
which materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be 
procedurally fair” (section 3(1). As noted in Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 
2005 (3) SA 589 (CC), “decision-makers who are entrusted with the authority to make administrative 
decisions by any statute are therefore required to do so in a manner that is consistent with PAJA” (para 
101). See also C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 367-368; Bengwenyama 
Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 113 (CC) para 61. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss what constitutes procedural fairness in the administrative 
law context, however see Hoexter Administrative Law Chapter 7. 
31 City of Johannesburg “New Inner City Scheme” Joburg 
<https://www.joburg.org.za/media_/Newsroom/Pages/2013%20articles/2011%20&%202012%20%20A
rticles/New-inner-city-scheme.aspx> (accessed 27-03-2019); Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 748-749, 753-
755; Papas N.O. v Motsere Trading CC (46011/2012) [2014] ZAGPJHC 144 [2]. 
32 See Hoexter Administrative Law 39ff. 
33 See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 943-944, 
referred to by Hoexter Administrative Law 394-395. 
34 Council of Civil Service Unions and others v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 943-
944. 
35 1989 (4) SA 731 (A). 




expressly endorsed by the final Constitution in section 33, is now found in the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.37 
Conceivably, the City of Johannesburg entering into “abandonment” agreements with 
some landowners of properties with a negative value could give rise to a legitimate 
expectation on the part of other landowners in a similar situation that they will be 
entitled to the same benefit. At the very least, they should be entitled to make their 
case (i.e. be heard) as to why an offer to enter into an abandonment agreement should 
be extended to them.38 Potentially, unnecessary litigation could result, as aggrieved 
landowners challenge the decision to not extend such an agreement to them. It is 
preferable that the process is formalised, with factors guiding the decision-maker 
regarding every request submitted by a landowner wishing to divest herself of land that 
has a negative value. 
Failure to agree on the transfer of the land, when complying with the above 
prerequisites, coupled with the inadequacy or failure of any existing compensatory 
mechanisms, should entitle the landowner to approach a court for relief. This will 
effectively operate as an in-built review process where the landowner is unhappy with 
the relevant authority’s decision to not take transfer of the property purely on the merits 
of the matter, absent other grounds for judicial review.39 The manner in which this 
should be conducted is considered below.  
1.2 Procedure 
Motion proceedings40 in which the relevant local authority and government department, 
as well as the Registrar of Deeds, are joined as respondents would appear to be most 
appropriate for a procedure in terms of an abandonment statute. However, any party 
with an interest in the matter should be entitled to be joined. In this respect, the would-
 
37 See section 3(1). 
38 Hoexter Administrative Law 395. 
39 See section 6(2) of PAJA for grounds on which a decision make be taken on judicial review.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss judicial review in the administrative law context, however 
see Hoexter Administrative Law Chapter 3. 
40 Motion proceedings, or application proceedings, are one of the two most important means to approach 
a court of first instance in the South African legal system. The other is action proceedings, which involves 
to giving of oral evidence by witnesses. By contrast, motion proceedings are “decided on the papers 
placed before the court”. The evidence on which a party to motion proceedings wishes to rely must be 
in these papers. See S Pete, D Hulme, M du Plessis, R Palmer, O Sibanda & T Palmer Civil Procedure: 




be abandoner should inform her immediate neighbours, as well as any holders of 
limited real rights in the land, of her intention to proceed with abandonment 
proceedings. The would-be abandoner should also publicise such intention with a 
notice in a community newspaper as well as a national newspaper. 
1.3 Factors to be considered 
An abandonment statute should provide guidelines for the court when considering 
whether to permit abandonment on the facts before it. The guidelines formulated in 
Chapter 441 and reiterated in Chapter 642 can be utilized for this purpose. Furthermore, 
the factors have been considered in detail in respect of the contexts explored above. 
As such, they will only be briefly repeated here.  
The statute should provide that a court, in determining whether a landowner be 
permitted to abandon (and thus pass ownership of her property onto the State), 
consider (1) the extent of the burden to which the landowner is subjected, (2) whether 
a third party derives a benefit from the burden to which the landowner is subjected, (3) 
whether existing compensatory mechanisms are adequate in easing the burden on the 
landowner, and (4) the societal cost of abandonment. A court should also be 
empowered to consider any other relevant circumstances, even though any relevant 
circumstance should already have been considered in terms of the factors expressly 
listed. 
1.4 Permitting subdivision 
One issue to be considered in respect of abandonment of landownership are 
circumstances in which the landowner does not wish to abandon the land in its entirety, 
but only a portion thereof. Such circumstances may arise in the mining context – for 
example, where mining or prospecting operations are only being conducted on a 
portion of a farm. Similarly, in the heritage building context, the protected building may 
be located on part of the property in question, while the landowner wishes to develop 
the remainder. It is thus necessary to consider whether an abandonment statute should 
 
41 Chapter 4 Section 6. 




make provision for subdivision and abandonment of a parcel of land, as opposed to an 
erf43 in its entirety. 
Subdivision refers to the practice of “cutting off a portion or portions of the parent 
property”.44 In principle, any landowner is entitled to subdivide her property, although 
in practice this entitlement is heavily restricted.45 Subdivision of land is regulated by 
both national and provincial legislation.46 The most important of these pieces of 
legislation is the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act,47 which prescribes the 
requirement of ministerial permission before agricultural land may be subdivided.48 
While the Act has been scheduled for repeal in terms of the Subdivision of Agricultural 
Land Act Repeal Act49 twenty years ago, this has yet to occur.50 Subdivision of land is 
also regulated by both old-order and new-order provincial legislation.51 
An abandonment statute should permit subdivision and the abandonment of a parcel 
of land, in certain circumstances. The statute would need to provide for the decision-
maker to weigh up the landowner’s rights and interests against those of society at 
 
43 Section 102 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 defines “erf” (“erven” for plural) as “means every 
piece of land registered as an erf, lot, plot or stand in a deeds registry, and includes every defined 
portion, not intended to be a public place, of a piece of land laid out as a township, whether or not it has 
been formally recognized, approved or proclaimed as such”. 
44 J van Wyk Planning Law 2 ed (2012) 380; HS Nel Jones Conveyancing in South Africa 4 ed (1991) 
165; Author Unknown “Chapter 6 Subdivision of Land” in Conventional Deeds Manual/Deeds Practice 
Manuals (RS, 2018) 1-275. 
45 H Mostert, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk “Land” in WA Joubert (founding ed) LAWSA 14 3 ed (2010) para 
92; “Chapter 6” in Conventional Deeds Manual/Deeds Practice Manuals 1-275-1-293. 
46 Van Wyk Planning 380; Nel Conveyancing 165-175; “Chapter 6” in Conventional Deeds 
Manual/Deeds Practice Manuals 1-275-1-293. 
47 Act 70 of 1970. 
48 Section 3. 
49 Act 64 of 1998. 
50 Van Wyk Planning 380; Mostert et al “Land” in LAWSA para 93. 
51 Van Wyk Planning 383. Section 1 of Schedule 6 of the Constitution, 1996, defines “old order 
legislation” as “legislation enacted before the [interim] Constitution took effect”. This definition would 
include old provincial ordinances which correspond to the boundaries of the four provinces that existed 
pre-1994. Section 2(1) states that such law continues in effect unless repealed or amended, so long as 
it is consistent with the Constitution. New order legislation refers to legislation enacted following the 
coming into force of the interim Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 
1993). This would include provincial legislation passed by the provincial legislatures of the new 
provinces.  
For an example of old-order legislation, see the Division of Land Ordinance 20 of 1986 (T), which 
remains in force in the provinces for Gauteng, Limpopo and Mpumalanga. Examples of new-order 
legislation includes the Western Cape Land Use Planning Act No. 3 of 2014 (see section 36) and the 
KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act No. 6 of 2008 (see Chapter 3). 
The subdivision of land is listed in Schedule 1 of the Spatial Planning and Land Use Development Act 
16 of 2013 (SPLUMA) as a matter to be addressed in provincial legislation. This includes the repeal or 
amendment of provincial legislation concerning subdivision, as well as the formulating of procedures for 




large. It should not allow the creation of new erven which, even when some form of 
rehabilitation has taken place, would remain economically unviable in perpetuity due 
to the size and location of the land in question. The creation of economically unviable 
erven would not only be a concern in the agricultural context, but also in the urban 
context, in which housing remains a problem.52 
An abandonment statute should address how it would interact with legislation 
regulating the subdivision of land. Regarding subdivision in general, the input of the 
relevant municipality (already joined as a party to proceedings) is essential, since 
municipalities grant approval for subdivision in terms of planning by-laws.53 The 
municipality would be best placed to inform the court of the potential impact of the 
subdivision in question, as well as whether such division is compatible with its spatial 
development framework.54 
Land that falls within the ambit of the definition of agricultural land in the Subdivision 
of Agricultural Land Act presents a more challenging issue.55 It would be necessary 
that the Minister of Agriculture be joined as a party to the proceedings. The question 
arises how an abandonment statute should address the possibility of the Minister 
refusing to grant consent for subdivision of the land in question. There is the possibility 
of the statute granting the court the power to override the Minister’s decision on this 
matter. However, it would not seem appropriate, given the separation of powers,56 as 
well as the national importance of preventing the fragmentation of agricultural 
holdings.57 In the absence of grounds on which the Minister’s decision to grant 
 
52 A Osman “South African Urgently Needs to Rethink its Approach to Housing” (04-06-2017) The 
Conversation <https://theconversation.com/south-africa-urgently-needs-to-rethink-its-approach-to-
housing-78628> (accessed on 22-10-2018); K Wilkinson “The Housing Situation in South Africa” (09-
05-2014) AfricaCheck <https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-the-housing-situation-in-south-
africa/> (accessed 22-10-2018).  
53 See for example Part 4 of the City of Cape Town Municipal Planning By-Law, 2015 and Part 4 of the 
City of Johannesburg Municipal Planning By-Law, 2016. 
54 Concerning spatial development frameworks, see chapter four of the SPLUMA. Also see Van Wyk 
Planning 274-276. 
55 See section 1 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act. As noted by Van Wyk, this definition is 
peculiar, as defines “agricultural land not in terms of what it is, but what it is not, according to exceptions”. 
See Van Wyk Planning 380-382. See also Mostert, Pienaar & Van Wyk “Land” in LAWSA para 94. 
56 On the separation of powers in the South African context, see S Seedorf & S Sibanda “Separation of 
Powers” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) The Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 5 2013) 12-
1-12-98. 




subdivision may be set aside on review, it is submitted that the Minister’s decision in 
respect of granting or refusing consent for subdivision should stand. 
Which party should bear the costs associated with subdivision,58 in the event the court 
finds subdivision justifiable in the circumstances? The answer depends on the relevant 
circumstances. Where the landowner wishes to abandon a portion of her land as a 
result of the State granting a third party a right over it (such as in the mining context), 
it is contended that the State should bear the costs associated with subdivision. 
Alternatively, where a third party (for example a mining company) is benefitting from 
the burden upon the landowner, such a third party should then bear the associated 
costs.  
The imposition of costs on the State or a third-party would not always be a simple 
matter. For example, in the heritage context, one would need to account whether the 
landowner should reasonably have known that a building on the land would be subject 
to protection at the time of purchase. It would not seem appropriate for the State to 
bear the costs of subdivision. In fact, such knowledge on the part of the landowner at 
the time of purchase would probably weigh heavily against permitting any 
abandonment in the first place, given the factors outlined above. Abandonment should 
not serve as an exit from a gamble taken by a developer who had hoped to be granted 
permission to demolish a property. 
Nevertheless, a court should be given a broad discretion to make a just and equitable 
decision concerning the associated costs of subdivision in abandonment proceedings. 
There are important factors that will need to be weighed up in making such a 
determination. 
1.5 Consequences 
The standard view among South African property law academics is that abandoned 
land is rendered bona vacantia, meaning it accrues to the State.59 Sonnekus provides 
 
58 See Law Society of South Africa Conveyancing Fees Guidelines (in operation for instructions received 
from 01-06-2019). Available at <https://www.lssa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Conveyancing-
Fees-Guidelines-November-2019-2.pdf> (accessed 06-02-2020). 
59 CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Part III – Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African 




a dissenting view, arguing that abandoned land is res derelictae, meaning it is open to 
appropriation by the first taker.60 For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that the 
standard view is correct.61 However, even if it is not correct, it can simply be confirmed 
through an abandonment statute, which directs abandoned property into the ownership 
of the State. 
It should be open to the State to direct ownership of the property in question to a third 
party, such as the mining company conducting operations on the land in question, 
should the two come to an agreement to do so. Following registration of the property 
in favour of the State, it could then grant the land to the relevant third party.62 But in 
the absence of such an agreement, the State would remain owner. 
The way the operation of an abandonment statute will interact with the Deeds 
Registries Act upon a successful application to abandon must be considered. The 
relevant section of the Deeds Registries Act would appear to be section 31, which 
concerns land transferred to or vested in the State through expropriation or statute. 
Where ownership has vested in the State or a local authority, through statute, a deed 
of transfer must be executed in favour of the State (transferee).63 
A final issue to consider with regard the consequences of a successful application in 
terms of an abandonment statute is the status of limited real rights in the land in 
question, real security rights in particular. Limited real rights, such as servitudes, 
should remain unaffected by the landowner’s decision to abandon her landownership. 
In any case, section 31(4)(b) of the Deeds Registries Act, concerning land vesting in 
the State through statute, already provides that the deed of transfer “shall be registered 
subject to all existing conditions affecting the land in question which have not been 
 
van Landbou v Sonnendecker 1979 2 SA 944 (A)” (1980) TSAR 183 187-188; DL Carey Miller The 
Acquisition and Protection of Ownership (1986) 8-9. 
60 JC Sonnekus “Enkele Opmerkings na Aanleiding van die Aanspraak op Bona Vacantia as 
Sogenaamde Regale Reg” (1985) TSAR 121 121ff; JC Sonnekus “Grondeise en die Klassifikasie van 
Grond as Res Nullius of as Staatsgrond” (2001) TSAR 84 91ff. 
61 See Chapter 2 Section 4.2.1. 
62 See section 18(2) of the Deeds Registries Act. 




expropriated or vested in the transferee”.64 Such a right is simply not extinguished upon 
abandonment by the landowner. 
More attention will need to be paid to mortgage bonds, given the financial stake 
mortgagees have in the property in question. Section 56(1) of the Deeds Registries 
Act provides that land subject to a mortgage bond may not be transferred until such 
time as the bond is cancelled. 65 Cancellation is not necessary where transfer is 
provided for “in any other law specially provided or as ordered by the court”.66 As such, 
a court order, as provided for in an abandonment statute, could potentially permit the 
registration of the property in favour of the State despite the absence of cancellation 
of the bond in the deeds office, assuming the interpretation of the provision above is 
correct. It may also be argued that abandonment, which renders the property bona 
vacantia,67 does not fall within the definition of “transfer”,68 thus rendering section 56(1) 
of the Deeds Registries Act irrelevant. 
However, in the context of abandonment, the interests of the mortgagee should also 
be protected. The mortgagee, as with the landowner, would also be an innocent party 
affected by the unexpected accrual of a negative value by the land, for example by the 
State granting a third party a mining right therein. As such, an abandonment statute 
should require the consent of a mortgagee to any court order permitting abandonment. 
In any case, where (1) it is not possible to find a purchaser for the land in question and 
(2) the debtor is in fact losing money by virtue of her ownership of the land, it may be 
in the best interests of the mortgagee to provide its consent. The principal debt will 
remain unaffected. 
Where the mortgagee consents to the abandonment, it is necessary to consider the 
fate of the mortgage bond. An abandonment statute would only operate in 
 
64 See Author Unknown “Chapter 17 Expropriation and Vesting Transfers” in Conventional Deeds 
Manual/Deeds Practice Manuals (RS, 2018) 1-191-1-192. 
65 See R Brits Real Security Law (2016) 57-58; Muller et al Silberberg 440; Nel Conveyancing 129. 
66 Section 56(1)(c). 
67 Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 492; Van der Merwe Sakereg 227; 
Van der Merwe (1980) SALJ 187-188; Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership 8-9. 
68 While the Deeds Registries Act does not include a definition of “transfer” in its definition section 
(section 102), the term “transfer” would seem to indicate that what is envisioned is a bilateral act, one 
with a transferor and a transferee. Effectively the term “transfer” is only relevant in the context of derivate 
acquisition, which abandonment is not. For more on derivative acquisition, see Muller et al Silberberg 
Chapters 9 and 10; Van der Merwe Sakereg Chapter 7; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in 




circumstances in which the land has acquired a negative value, and no purchaser 
thereof can be secured. Leaving a mortgage bond registered against the abandoned 
land could lead to confusion down the line, as well as dissuade those who may 
otherwise be willing to take a grant of the land from the State with a view to 
rehabilitating it eventually. It would ultimately be simplest that abandonment – done 
with the consent of the mortgagee – resulted in the cancellation of the bond in the 
deeds office. 
Costs orders will be awarded against the State on a successful abandonment 
application. Litigation could have been avoided since the State had the chance to take 
transfer of the property from the landowner, but elected not to cooperate in coming to 
an agreement. 
2. Passing of responsibilities 
Although not the concern of the landowner, and not the focus of an abandonment 
statute, it is necessary to discuss the passing of responsibilities following a successful 
abandonment application briefly. This will necessarily depend on the context in which 
the abandonment has occurred. 
The mining context is a simple one as far as the passing of responsibilities is 
concerned. In this case, the responsibility to rehabilitate the land never rested with the 
landowner in the first place. Rather, it rested with the mining right holder,69 and where 
the right holder no long exists, a rehabilitation fund should exist.70 Other responsibilities 
unrelated to the mining operations would pass to the State as the new owner of the 
land, unless it had been agreed that the land would be granted to the right holder. 
In the heritage building context, the State as owner will necessarily come to acquire 
the responsibilities imposed by the NHRA. However, it may be necessary for the NHRA 
to be amended to provide for the management of such buildings when ownership is 
passed to the State as a result of a successful abandonment application. Responsibility 
should depend on the grading of the building in question, seeing as the responsibility 
 
69 E van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum (2016) 560-574; MO Dale South African Mineral 
and Petroleum Law (SI 25 2018) 275-281C. See section 43 of the MPRDA and sections 24 to 24S of 
the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA). 




to protect and preserve such buildings is already assigned on such a basis in terms of 
the NHRA.71 Realistically, only heritage sites that are graded II or III (provincial heritage 
sites and other heritage resources respectively72),73 and predominantly the latter would 
be relevant in this case.74 In any case, funds for the management of such sites will 
come from the public purse,75 but it is desirable that the responsibilities for 
management of these sites are clearly defined. It would seem, in line with the 
assignment of responsibilities in the NHRA, provincial heritage resource authorities 
would take responsibility for abandoned properties rated Grade II.76 Local authorities 
would bear responsibility for those properties rated Grade III.77 
Concerning problem buildings and unlawfully occupied land, inevitably responsibility 
for such land should pass to the State, specifically local government.78 Given that the 
obligation to realise the right to housing rests on the State,79 it would seem appropriate 
that the State take responsibility for unlawfully-occupied land following a successful 
abandonment application by the landowner. It would then be open for the State to 
 
71 See section 8(2)-(4) of the NHRA. 
72 See section 7(1) of the NHRA. See Chapter 6 Section 3.2. 
73 Given that Grade I (national heritage sites) are those with “with qualities so exceptional that they are 
of special national significance” (section 1(a) of the NHRA), such sites are unlikely to be in private 
ownership in the first place. A list of declared national heritage sites is available on the website of the 
South African National Heritage Resources Agency. See South African Heritage Resources Agency 
“Declared National Heritage Sites” South African Heritage Resources Agency 
<https://www.sahra.org.za/national-heritage-sites/> (accessed on 25-10-2018). 
74 None of the cases canvassed in Chapter 6 Section 3.2 concerned heritage resources which had been 
awarded a Grade II rating. 
75 Section 21(1)(a) of the NHRA states that among the sources of funding available to the South African 
National Heritage Resources Agency includes “moneys appropriated by Parliament to enable it to 
perform its functions and exercise its powers”. 
Provincial heritage resource authorities are also funded from the public purse. For example, Provincial 
Gazette establishing Heritage Western Cape, it is stated that the “provincial department shall provide 
funds to Heritage Western Cape from moneys appropriated by the Western Cape Provincial Parliament 
for heritage resources management in the Western Cape to enable the Council of Heritage Western 
Cape to perform its functions and duties and exercise its powers prescribed in the Act”. See section 3(1) 
of PN 336 in PG5937 of 25-10-2002. 
Municipalities are the bodies responsible for Grade III heritage resources, and as such, any expense 
incurred in maintaining such a resource would come from the public purse. However, as established in 
Chapter 6, the municipalities are not currently empowered to issue compulsory repair notices for 
heritage resources, or take action to carry out repairs then later recover such costs from the landowner. 
See also P Marques The Right to Neglect Property: An Analysis of the Weaknesses of the National 
Heritage Resources LLB research paper University of Cape Town (2012) 5-7. 
76 Section 8(3) of the NHRA. 
77 Section 8(4) of the NHRA. 
78 Part B of Schedule 4 of the Constitution, 1996, provides that building regulations are a local 
government matter subject to section 155(6) (a) and (7). Furthermore, section 152(1)(d) states that one 
of the objects of local government is to promote a safe and healthy environment. 




allocate ownership of the land to the unlawful occupiers, providing them with much-
needed security of tenure. 
Further research will be required into the passing of responsibilities on a successful 
abandonment application. The brief outline above may not be sufficient. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the matter in further detail, since its focus is 
rather on whether abandonment is possible, whether it should be permitted, and under 
what circumstances. 
3. Expropriation without compensation 
It is necessary to touch on the potential consequences of expropriation without 
compensation for the abandonment context, given its central importance in the 
discourse about land in South Africa. There have been recent moves towards realising 
the possibility of expropriation without compensation. While talk of expropriation 
without compensation is not new,80 moves towards the realisation of such a policy 
gained momentum following the African National Congress’ (ANC) 54th national 
conference which took place from the 16 December to 20 December 2017.81 The party 
endorsed a resolution to seek to amend the Constitution to permit the expropriation of 
land without compensation, although with the stipulation that such would have to be 
done in a sustainable manner.82 
Following the resolution at the ANC’s conference, a motion concerning expropriation 
without compensation was adopted by the National Assembly.83 Although the motion 
was sponsored by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the smaller party ultimately 
had to make a number of concessions to the larger ANC to secure the passing of the 
motion.84 Following a process of public participation, including written submissions and 
 
80 Expropriation without compensation has been a cornerstone of the Economic Freedom Fighters policy 
since its formation. See Economic Freedom Fighters Economic Freedom Fighters Founding Manifesto: 
Radical Movement Towards Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime (27-07-2013). Available at 
<https://effonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Founding-Manifesto.pdf> (accessed 06-02-2020). 
81 Mahlakoana Business Day (21-12-2017) 1; Njobeni & Koko Cape Argus (22-12-2017) 4. 
82 Mahlakoana Business Day (21-12-2017) 1; Njobeni & Koko Cape Argus (22-12-2017) 4. 
83 Phakathi Business Day (28-02-2018) 1. See also A Gildenhuys “Full Compensation, Fair 
Compensation or No Compensation in Expropriations for Land Reform: A South African Perspective” in 
B Hoops, E Marais, L van Schalkwyk & N Tagliarino (eds) Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair 
Compensation (2018) 123 152-154. 




oral hearings,85 the final report of the Constitutional Review Committee was adopted 
on the 15th of November 2018.86 The adopted report recommended the amendment of 
the property clause to make explicit that expropriation without compensation is an 
option for land reform.87 In its view, this was already implicit in the property clause, but 
ultimately requires express approval.88 
The road to the amendment of the property clause inevitably will not be a smooth one. 
Threats of legal challenges to the adoption of the report, to block an amendment, have 
been made.89 As of writing, the Draft Constitution Eighteenth Amendment, 2019,90 has 
been published, with written comments to have been submitted by 31 January 2020. 
The Bill provides for the amendment of section 25(2)(b) to allow for the amount of 
compensation awarded to be nil when land is expropriated for land reform purposes.91 
National legislation must provide the “circumstances where a court may determine that 
the amount of compensation is nil”, subject to sections (2) and (3) of section 25.92 The 
publication of the Bill has once again brought the issue of expropriation to the fore.93 
 
85 This process has been subject to criticism due to the manner in which the large volume of submissions 
was handled. See A October “Land Expropriation Shambles Highlights How Public Participation at 
Parliament is not Working” (29-11-2018) Daily Maverick < https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-
11-29-land-expropriation-shambles-highlights-how-public-participation-at-parliament-is-not-working/> 
(accessed 29-01-2019). 
86 See Parliamentary Communication Services “Joint Constitutional Review Committee Adopts Report 
on Expropriation of Land Without Compensation” (15-11-2018) Parliament of South Africa 
<https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/joint-constitutional-review-committee-adopts-report-
expropriation-land-without-compensation> (accessed 23-11-2018); Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
“Committee Report on Review of Section 25 of Constitution Adopted” Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
<https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/27548/> (accessed 23-11-2018); Constitutional Review 
Committee Report of the Joint Constitutional Review Committee on the Possible Review of Section 25 
of the Constitution 15-11-2018. Available at <https://pmg.org.za/files/181115FinalReport.docx> 
(accessed 07-02-2020). 
87 Constitutional Review Committee Report 28. 
88 Constitutional Review Committee Report 28. 
89 B Phakathi “Committee Recommends Amending Constitution for Land Expropriation” (15-11-2018) 
Business Day <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-11-15-committee-recommends-
amending-constitution-for-land-expropriation/> (accessed 23-11-2018); B Phakathi “Parliament ‘Will 
Oppose AfriForum’s Bid to Halt Property Clause Amendment’” (21-11-2018) Business Day 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-11-21-parliament-will-oppose-afriforums-bid-to-halt-
property-clause-amendment/> (accessed 23-11-2018); J Gerber “Land Expropriation: Court Battle 
Looms as Parliament Opposes AfriForum Interdict Bid” (21-11-2018) News24 
<https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/land-expropriation-court-battle-looms-as-parliament-
opposes-afriforum-interdict-bid-20181121> (accessed 21-11-2018). 
90 Draft Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill, 2019. 
91 Clause 1(a). 
92 Clause 1(c). See Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019. 
93 Merten “ANC’s Executive Proposal on Expropriation Without Compensation Obscures Already Vast 
Ministerial Powers” Daily Maverick; Grootes “Land Issue: Once More at Front and Centre of the ANC’s 




It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in detailed conjecture as to what the 
final amendment to the property clause will look like and how it will work in practice. 
However, it does not appear that the EFF’s approach to nationalise all land will be 
adopted,94 as the recommendation of the report seems to foresee private 
landownership continuing in the context of land reform. Rather a moderate approach 
with a focus on unused land appears to be the strong likelihood.95 This conjecture is 
based on the statements of the President of both the ruling ANC and South Africa.96 In 
any case, a radical programme of expropriation without compensation, as advocated 
by the EFF, would render this thesis moot. As such, the implications of such a radical 
approach for this thesis will not be explored. 
What is key about such a moderate approach, as seems to be the strongest possibility, 
is that the State will be able to pick and choose which land it wishes to expropriate 
without compensation. As such, some land with a negative value – but holding a 
potential for land reform and human settlement – would be expropriated. Even in the 
absence of amendments to the Constitution, it has been suggested that such land may 
be expropriated without compensation.97 For example, with a view to test the property 
clause as it currently exists, the City of Ekurhuleni has announced plans to expropriate 
four properties without paying compensation.98 The stated purpose for expropriating 
the properties is human settlement.99 The properties in question are unlawfully 
occupied, and the owners thereof had effectively “relinquished their property-
 
94 P Hoffman “On the Nationalisation of Land” (05-03-2018) PoliticsWeb 
<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/on-the-nationalisation-of-land> (accessed on 19-10-2018). 
95 This conjecture is based on the statements of the South African and ANC President, Cyril Ramaphosa. 
See C Ramaphosa “This is No Land Grab” (24-08-2018) Business Day 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-08-24-exclusive-this-is-no-land-grab-writes-cyril-
ramaphosa/> (accessed on 19-10-2018). 
96 See Ramaphosa “This is No Land Grab” Business Day. 
97 This is the argument put forward by Ruth Hall of the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies 
(PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape. See R Hall The Land Question: What is the Answer? 
(2018) unpublished public lecture presented at the University of the Western Cape, 02-08-2019; B 
Phakathi “Constitution Already Covers Land Reform, Says Expert” Business Day (11-04-2018) 2. 
98 N Gous “Ekurhuleni Plans to Expropriate Four Pieces of Land Without Compensation” (28-09-2018 
TimesLive <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-09-28-ekurhuleni-plans-to-
expropriate-four-pieces-of-land-without-compensation> (accessed 07-02-2020); Author Unknown 
“Ekurhuleni Identifies Land to Expropriate Without Compensation” (29-09-2018) Polity 
<http://www.polity.org.za/article/ekurhuleni-identifies-land-to-expropriate-without-compensation-2018-
09-28> (accessed 07-02-2020). 
99 Gous “Ekurhuleni Plans to Expropriate Four Pieces of Land Without Compensation” TimesLive; 




ownership rights and responsibilities”.100 These seem to be owners, who if provided 
with the option of abandonment, would have pursued it. Whether these owners were 
offered the opportunity to enter into an “abandonment” agreement, or simply could not 
be found, is unknown. As of writing, there no further reported developments on this 
case are available.101 
The current iteration of the Expropriation Bill102 also makes reference to land that has 
been “abandoned”.103 The Bill states that may be just and equitable to pay zero 
compensation for land that has been abandoned.104 However, the fact that the Bill 
acknowledges that such land still needs to be expropriated, even if zero compensation 
is paid, means it recognises that such land technically still has a registered owner. 
Thus, while the land may be informally abandoned, in that the landowner no longer 
maintains it and has stopped paying rates in respect thereof, abandonment in the 
sense as understood in terms of the law of property has not occurred. 
However, expropriation without compensation – in line with the moderate approach 
above – would not provide relief to every owner of property that had a negative value. 
The government could opt, on deciding the liabilities that attach to the land in question 
are excessive and the possibility of rehabilitating the land for human settlement 
unlikely, not to expropriate otherwise unused property. 
As such, even if a moderate form of expropriation without compensation become a 
reality, it would still be necessary for an abandonment statute to exist. It is unlikely the 
State would seek to expropriate every piece of unused land, particularly where the 
liabilities attached thereto are significant, and the land cannot be used for human 
settlement without cost-prohibitive rehabilitation. Both the mining and heritage contexts 
– where land will likely not be suitable for human settlement purposes – provide 
examples thereof.  
 
100 Gous “Ekurhuleni Plans to Expropriate Four Pieces of Land Without Compensation” TimesLive; 
Author Unknown “Ekurhuleni Identifies Land to Expropriate Without Compensation” Polity. 
101 The most recent reference to this case appears to be in an opinion piece by Black First Land First 
leader Andile Mngxitama, published in the Sunday Independent on 10 November 2019, which stated 
that it is unclear whether the properties in question had been seized by the municipality. See A 
Mngxitama “Ekurhuleni Doing Well on the Land Issue” Sunday Independent (10-11-2019) 8. 
102 Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019 (in Government Gazette 42127 of 21-12-2018). 
103 Clause 12(3)(d). 





It is ultimately necessary, in light of the principle of publicity,105 that for abandonment 
of landownership to be possible in South African law, it will have to be given effect to 
by statute.106 However, as has been established above, such a statute cannot operate 
to facilitate an unrestricted right to abandon, but rather should permit abandonment to 
be regulated by the courts. Even before a court is approached for relief, a landowner 
should attempt to ameliorate her own situation, through either reaching an agreement 
to transfer the land in question to the State or exhausting all compensatory 
mechanisms available to her.  
It is correct to point out that the statute suggested above is not abandonment in the 
true sense of the word. As has been pointed out by scholars, and explored earlier in 
this thesis,107 abandonment in its true sense operates as a unilateral divestment of 
ownership.108 The suggestions above require to cooperation of third parties, whether 
it be the State, or the courts, or a mortgagee. It would be better to describe the 
procedure set out as a “regulated exit” from ownership, rather than abandonment. 
However, as the use of the term “abandonment” is easier to indicate the purpose of 
such a statute, that term is preferred. 
Such a statute, as outlined above, is necessary to provide an appropriate balance 
between the rights of landowners and society as a whole. As established in Chapter 
Six, there are a number of circumstances in which the burden of landownership will be 
excessive, and requiring someone to remain owner may not be justified. Even if a 
moderate form of expropriation without compensation becomes a reality – with a focus 
on unused land109 – this is no guarantee that every owner of land that has accrued a 
negative value can hope to be expropriated. An abandonment statute would still be 
necessary and relevant.  
 
105 See Chapter 3 Sections 2 to 4. 
106 H Mostert “No Right to Neglect? Exploratory Observations on How Policy Choices Challenge the 
Basic Principles of Property” in S Scott & J van Wyk (eds) Property Law Under Scrutiny (2015) 11 26-
28. 
107 See Chapter 2 Section 2. 
108 Strahilevitz (2009-2010) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 360; Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law 
Review 194-195. 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
1. Abandonment 
The law of abandonment is more complicated than the limited attention accorded to 
the doctrine in major property law texts may suggest.1 Abandonment is a unilateral act, 
through which an owner may simply dispose of her property at will,2 but the cooperation 
of third parties is usually required to dispose of ownership of property.3 The 
circumstances in which true abandonment may occur are extremely limited.4 
Restrictions on the abandonment of property serve as a means through which 
obligations on property owners may be enforced.5 The limited case law on 
abandonment, rather than confirming a right on the part of owners to dispose of their 
property as they see fit, concerns ownership disputes between two parties who wish 
to have ownership in the property affirmed.6 There is no case in which an owner has 
attempted to claim a right to abandon corporeal property, let alone succeed in such a 
claim to avoid the obligations that attach to the ownership of property.7 
No express prohibition on the abandonment of landownership exists in South African 
law. Sonnekus argues, in light of South Africa’s negative system of registration,8 that 
 
1 See for example G Muller, R Brits, JM Pienaar & Z Boggenpoel Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law 
of Property 6 ed (2019) 158-160, 305-306; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 224-227; Van der 
Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 
490-491. 
2 E Peñalver “The Illusory Right to Abandon” (2010) 109 Michigan Law Review 191 194. 
3 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 203ff. 
4 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 191. See the discussion of the law of abandonment in South 
Africa in Chapters 2 and 3. 
5 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 193-194. 
6 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 194. See discussion of the abandonment of movable property 
in South African law in Chapter 2 Section 4.1, and the analysis in Chapter 2 Section 4.4. 
7 The only case in which a party claimed a right to abandon involved a servitude, in which it was found 
that a servitude may not be abandoned in circumstances which would lead to significant harm to the 
servient tenement. See Du Plessis v Philipstown Municipality 1937 CPD 335; AJ van der Walt The Law 
of Servitudes (2016) 572-573; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 336n133; Muller et al Silberberg 401; Van der Merwe Sakereg 538; CG 
Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 144. 
8 As explained in Chapter 3 Section 2.2.1, in a negative system of registration, there is no guarantee the 
land register is correct. The land register may, for various reasons, not reflect the true legal position of 
proprietary relations in respect of a parcel of land. The land register may be incomplete, or even 
incorrect. See Muller et al Silberberg 256ff; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s 
Principles 537; Van der Merwe Sakereg 342ff; CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert (founding ed) 




the abandonment of landownership is possible.9 In his view, it is not necessary for 
legislation to prescribe formalities to achieve the abandonment of landownership, but 
that such can be achieved through the same common law principles which apply to the 
abandonment of movables.10 These principles are the relinquishment of physical 
possession coupled with an intention no longer to be owner.11 However, the application 
of the common law principles does not appear sufficient in light of the principle of 
publicity,12 which requires the existence of (and changes to) real rights to be 
observable to third parties.13 A review of the relevant legal framework reveals the 
absence of any mechanism through which such abandonment may be achieved in a 
manner which would satisfy the principle of publicity.14 Without a mechanism through 
which the principle of publicity may be given effect to, it is ultimately necessary to 
conclude that the abandonment of landownership in South African law is impossible.15  
The conclusion that the abandonment of landownership is not possible in South African 
law by itself is not satisfactory. It is necessary to engage with the question as to whether 
landowners should be permitted to abandon landownership. This thesis contends that 
an unrestricted right to abandon is not feasible in the South African context. However, 
there may be circumstances in which land may accrue a negative value through no 
fault of the landowner herself.16 In the absence of a third party willing to take transfer 
of such property,17 such a landowner may require some form of exit from that 
ownership. It is thus necessary to ask in what circumstances such exit should be 
permitted. 
 
9 Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 751ff. See Chapter 3 Section 2.4.2. 
10 Sonnekus (2004) TSAR 751ff. See Chapter 3 Section 2.4.2. 
11 Muller et al Silberberg 158; Van der Merwe & Pope “Part III – Property” in Wille’s Principles 490; Van 
der Merwe Sakereg 224; Reck v Mills 1990 (1) SA 751 (A) 757C; S M Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Gerber 
1979 (4) SA 930 (A) 936F-G; Salvage Association of London v S.A. Salvage Syndicate, Ltd. (1906) 23 
SC 169 171. 
12 H Mostert “No Right to Neglect? Exploratory Observations on How Policy Choices Challenge the 
Basic Principles of Property” in S Scott & J van Wyk (eds) Property Law Under Scrutiny (2015) 11 26-
27. 
13 Muller et al Silberberg 93-95; Van der Merwe Sakereg 12-15; TW Merrill & HE Smith “Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle” (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 
1 26. 
14 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 26-27. See Chapter 3 Section 2.4.3. 
15 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 26-27. See Chapter 3 Section 2.4.3. 
16 See Chapter 6 Section 3. 




2. The Contrasting Approach of Switzerland and Scotland 
The approaches towards the abandonment of land in both Switzerland and Scotland 
are informative for South African property law academics. These two jurisdictions take 
opposing approaches – Switzerland permits the abandonment of landownership,18 
while the abandonment of landownership is simply not possible in Scots law.19 What 
both jurisdictions demonstrate, however, is that the law needs to provide a mechanism 
for the abandonment of landownership. Without such a mechanism, the publicity 
principle is not given effect to, and abandonment cannot be achieved.  
In Swiss law, abandonment (Dereliktion) of immovable property is achieved through 
clear actions in the Grundbuch.20 Scots law, by contrast, has no comparable 
mechanism.21 In the absence of such a mechanism, the abandonment of 
landownership is simply not possible.22 Ownership, being a legal relationship, can only 
be terminated in circumstances provided for by law.23 As the Inner House of the Court 
of Session stated, landownership is manifested in the written record.24 This makes “the 
fact of ownership public and, subject to operation of law, permanent”.25 
These two jurisdictions also demonstrate that abandonment does not occur in a 
vacuum. A permissive regime would appear to be feasible in the context of Switzerland. 
The societal cost of abandonment in that jurisdiction would appear to be negligible.26 
This is not necessarily the case in every jurisdiction, which would include South Africa 
and Scotland. While the socio-economic situations in South Africa and Scotland are 
 
18 Art. 666 Abs. 1 read with Art. 964. Abs. 1. See H Rey & L Strebel “Art. 666” in H Honsell, NP Vogt & 
T Geiser (eds) Basler Kommentar Zivilgesetzbuch II 5 ed (2015) 1134 1134-1135; J Schmid & B 
Hürlimann-Kaup Sachenrecht (2017) para 868; H Rey Die Grundlagen des Sachenrechts und das 
Eigentum 3 ed (2007) para 1673ff; P Tuor, B Schnyder, J Schmid & A Jungo Das Schweizerische 
Zivilgesetzbuch 14 ed (2015) § 100 para 33; F Hitz “Art. 666” in M Amstutz, P Breitschmid, A Furrer, D 
Girsberger, C Huguenin, A Jungo, M Müller-Chen, V Roberto, AK Schnyder & HR Trüeb (eds) 
Handkommentar zum Schweizer Privatrecht 3 ed (2006) 166 166-167; P Simonius & T Sutter 
Schweizerisches Immobiliarsachenrecht (1995) para 127. 
19 The Scottish Environment Protection Agency v The Joint Liquidators of the Scottish Coal Company 
Limited [2013] CSIH 108 para 103 (CSIH). See also M Combe & M Rudd “Abandonment of Land and 
the Scottish Coal Case: Was it Unprecedented?” (2018) 22 The Edinburgh Law Review 301. 
20 See Chapter 5 Section 3.2. 
21 See Chapter 5 Section 4.2.2.3. 
22 CSIH para 103.  
23 CSIH para 100. 
24 CSIH para 100. 
25 CSIH para 100. 




not comparable, there may still be reasons which exist in Scotland not to permit 
unrestricted abandonment.27 For example, land on which open-cast coal mining has 
been conducted, for which significant environmental rehabilitation is required, serves 
as an example of land for which the disposal of which should be regulated.28 There is 
no universal approach to the abandonment of landownership, but that ultimately the 
manner in which a jurisdiction regulates or prohibits it reflects the obligations that attach 
to ownership. Even where the abandonment of landownership is not expressly 
prohibited, the decision not to provide a mechanism through which it can be achieved 
appears to indicate a policy choice in this respect, even if this appears to be more of a 
gap in the law. This is apparent from the South African context. 
3. The Case for Reform in South Africa 
In the prevailing legal framework, the abandonment of landownership is not possible 
in South African law.29 As such, reform is necessary, to provide an exit for landowners 
whose land has accrued a negative value, in certain circumstances. In light of the 
social-obligation norm of the law of property as conceptualised by Alexander,30 which 
finds expression in the South African constitutional property clause,31 Chapter 4 
proposes a set of factors to guide reform.32 The first of these factors to be considered 
is the extent of the burden on the landowner. The second is to what extent a third-party 
benefits from the burden to which the landowner is subjected. The third factor 
evaluates the extent to which existing compensatory mechanisms alleviate the burden 
 
27 See legal and policy analysis in Chapter 5 Section 4.3. 
28 Author Unknown “Revealed: ‘National Crisis’ Opencast Mine Warning” (13-07-2014) The Herald 
<http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13169742.Revealed___national_crisis__opencast_mine_warni
ng/> (accessed 15-01-2020); A Leach “Ticking Time Bonds: Scottish Open Cast Coal Leaves Legacy 
of Dereliction” (25-02-2014) Mining Technology <http://www.mining-
technology.com/features/featureticking-time-bonds-scottish-open-cast-coal-leaves-legacy-of-
dereliction--4184435/> (accessed 15-01-2020). 
29 See the conclusions reached in Chapter 3 Section 4. Also see Mostert “No Right” in Property Law 
Under Scrutiny (2015) 26-28. 
30 G Alexander “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 
745; G Alexander Property and Human Flourishing (2018). See also G Alexander & E Peñalver An 
Introduction to Property Theory (2012) Chapter 5; G Alexander & E Peñalver “Properties of Community” 
(2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127. 
31 Section 25. Alexander (2009) Cornell Law Review 782ff; G Alexander The Global Debate over 
Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (2006) Chapter Four. See 
Chapter 4 Section 5. 




on the landowner. The final factor considers the potential cost to society at large of 
permitting abandonment in the circumstances. 
The factors above are considered in detail in Chapter 6. Three contexts in which land 
can accrue a negative value, for reasons beyond the control of the landowner, are 
evaluated in light thereof. These are (1) the mining context,33 (2) the heritage building 
context,34 and (3) the context of problem buildings and unlawful occupation of land.35 
In all three contexts, the prevailing legal framework is deficient in balancing the 
interests of the landowner, the State and third parties. Existing compensatory 
mechanisms in these contexts – such as those provided for in the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act36 - are not adequate in alleviating the burden 
to which landowners are subjected.37 In some circumstances, a landowner may be 
responsible for her position. For example, a developer who purchases a heritage 
building, assuming the risk she may not be granted the permission required to alter or 
demolish it, may not necessarily be entitled to an exit from that ownership.38 However, 
absent such culpability, it would seem unjust not to provide a landowner with some 
form of exit from that burden. 
4. Reform Through Statute 
It has been proposed in Chapter 7 that reform needs to come in the form of an 
abandonment statute, which provides for a balancing of the competing interests of the 
landowner and society at large.39 Given the substantive factors to be considered in 
whether abandonment should be permitted, it is not sufficient – nor appropriate – that 
such reform take the shape of a provision inserted into pre-existing legislation. Rather, 
an individual abandonment statute is required. 
An abandonment statute would require a landowner to attempt to exhaust her options 
in seeking the transfer of her property to the State, as well as any compensatory 
mechanisms which may otherwise ameliorate her position. It is suggested that such a 
 
33 See Chapter 6 Section 3.1. 
34 See Chapter 6 Section 3.2. 
35 See Chapter 6 Section 3.3. 
36 Act 28 of 2002. 
37 See Chapter 6 Section 3. 
38 See discussion in Chapter 6 Section 3.2. 




statute provide a streamlined process through which a landowner may exhaust her 
options. For example, relevant public authorities should be required to set out 
procedures for the receipt of requests from landowners who wish to negotiate the 
transfer of their land to the State. Such requests would be evaluated in line with the 
factors outlined above.40 This will further situate the completion of the prerequisites in 
the realm of administrative law, with its requirement of procedural fairness.41 Such 
provision would have the effect of formalising the practice of “abandonment” 
agreements between landowners and municipalities.42 Absent a formalisation of the 
process, the ad-hoc conclusion of “abandonment” agreements may raise the legitimate 
expectations doctrine, appearing to be a practice that one can reasonably expect to 
continue.43 
An abandonment statute should make provision for a landowner to approach a court. 
However, a landowner may only do so following compliance with the necessary 
prerequisites, coupled with a failure to reach an agreement with a public authority 
regarding transfer of the land or adequate compensation. Motion proceedings44 in 
which relevant parties are joined, and interested parties are entitled to be joined would 
appear to be the most appropriate procedure. Again, the factors outlined above should 
guide any decision in this regard, as well as any other relevant circumstances not 
covered by these factors. 
The possibility of a moderate form of expropriation without compensation becoming a 
reality does not negate the necessity for an abandonment statute. Unlike the complete 
nationalisation of land,45 moderate expropriation without compensation permits the 
State to select the properties it wishes to acquire. Property that holds both a negative 
value and has no potential for land reform and human settlement is thus unlikely to be 
 
40 See Chapter 7 Section 1.3. 
41 See section 3(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. See also note 30 in Chapter 
7. 
42 See Chapter 7 Section 1.1. 
43 See C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 39ff and discussion in Chapter 7 Section 
1.1. 
44 Motion proceedings, or application proceedings, are one of the two most important means to approach 
a court of first instance in the South African legal system. The other is action proceedings, which involves 
the giving of oral evidence by witnesses. By contrast, motion proceedings are “decided on the papers 
placed before the court”. The evidence on which a party to motion proceedings wishes to rely must be 
in these papers. See S Pete, D Hulme, M du Plessis, R Palmer, O Sibanda & T Palmer Civil Procedure: 
A Practical Guide 3 ed (2017) 153. 




chosen for such expropriation. Therefore, there remains scope for the operation of an 
abandonment statute. 
5. Concluding Thoughts 
The remarks of Peñalver on the doctrine of abandonment,46 which have been 
reiterated throughout this thesis, have been made in respect of the United States of 
America (USA). In that jurisdiction, he states that the prohibition on the abandonment 
of landownership reflects the law’s general suspicion of abandonment in general.47 It 
creates a situation in which there are no spaces in which an owner may abandon her 
property without the cooperation of a third party.48 It is clear that the law of 
abandonment in South Africa is similarly complicated, and in many ways mirrors the 
legal situation in the USA that Peñalver has outlined.49 The abandonment of 
landownership provides the most evident example. While one cannot state that the 
abandonment of landownership is prohibited, an evaluation of South Africa’s legal 
framework considering the principle of publicity makes it clear that it is simply not 
possible.50 Such impossibility is effectively the same thing as an express prohibition 
from the standpoint of the landowner. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide the exact details of how the 
abandonment of landownership, or a regulated exit from landownership, should be 
regulated in South African law. Such a task will rest with those who draft legislation, at 
all spheres of government. What this thesis seeks to do is to provide guidance, in light 
of the social-obligation norm that finds expression in South Africa’s constitutional 
property clause.51 An unrestricted right to abandon landownership is not feasible in the 
South African context, given the potential socio-economic impact of permitting 
 
46 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 191. 
47 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 212, 214-219. 
48 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 203-213. 
49 See in general Chapters 2 and 3. See also R Cramer “The Abandonment of Landownership in South 
African and Swiss Law” (2017) 134 SALJ 870. Note on the aforementioned publication by the author: 
My Memorandum of Understanding with my supervisor, as well as obligations attaching to funding I 
received through the Swiss-South African Joint Research Programme to facilitate my comparative study, 
required me to publish from my doctoral research. The article referenced here is the result of the 
obligation to publish from my doctoral research. 
50 Mostert “No Right” in Property Law Under Scrutiny 26-27. 





landowners to pass their obligations on to the State.52 However, there are many 
landowners who find themselves saddled with land which has acquired a negative 
value through no fault of their own. As such, law reform requires a delicate balancing 
of the competing interests. 
It is hoped that this thesis will not only inspire law reform in respect of providing 
landowners some form of exit where their property has acquired a negative value, but 
also further research into the doctrine of abandonment in general. As Peñalver 
explains, if the creation of ownerless land is not possible, it is difficult to think of a 
situation in which true abandonment of movables may occur, without falling foul of 
legislation regulating the disposal of movable property.53 This position is due to an 
absence of spaces in which such property may be deposited without an owner’s 
permission.54 This observation is as applicable to the USA as it is to South Africa. The 
manner in which abandonment operates – if it can operate at all – in respect of 
movables in contemporary South African law warrants research. Restrictions on the 
manner in which movable property may be disposed of can help incentivise a greater 
emphasis on recycling.55 It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to expand on 
this further. 
What is clear is that the prevailing status quo with respect to the possibility of 
abandoning landownership is unsatisfactory. The rights and obligations of landowners 
in circumstances where property accrues a negative value need to be made clear. 
While the abandonment of landownership, as an unrestricted entitlement, cannot exist, 
options for “regulated exit” must be made available. 
 
 
52 See Chapter 4 Section 4.1 (particularly the sources in note 116) and Chapter 6 Section 2.1. 
53 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 194. 
54 Peñalver (2010) Michigan Law Review 206. 
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